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My dissertation investigates human capital issues, including education and health, 
in China. In the first chapter, I test for evidence of an intra-household flypaper effect by 
evaluating the impact of an educational fee reduction reform in rural China on different 
categories of household expenditures. Using data from Gansu Province in China, I find 
that educational fee reductions were matched by increased voluntary educational 
spending on the same children receiving fee reductions, providing strong evidence of an 
intra-household flypaper effect. The second chapter investigates the long-term effects of 
China’s 1959-1961 famine. Using China’s 2000 population census data, I find that 
women affected by the famine in the first year of life were living in smaller houses, 
achieved lower level of education, and provided less labor in their adulthood. But there 
are no long term effects on men affected by the famine in their early years of life. In the 
third chapter, I investigate the impact of school quality on students’ educational 
attainment using a regression discontinuity research design that compares students just 
above and below entrance examination score thresholds that strictly determine admission 
to the best high schools in China’s rural counties. Using data from Gansu Province in 
China, I find that attending the best high school in one’s county of residence decreases 
the probability to take college entrance examination; increases college entrance scores 








My dissertation, “Human Capital in Developing Countries”, includes three separate 
papers. 
Chapter 2 is the first paper which is titled “Does an intra-household flypaper effect 
exist? Evidence from the educational fee reduction reform in rural China”. In this chapter, 
I test for the existence of an intra-household flypaper effect by estimating the impact of 
the educational fee reduction reform in rural China on household expenditures. 
Chapter 3 is the second paper which is titled “Famine, fertility and fortune in China”. 
In this chapter, I investigate the effects of the 1959-1961 Great Famine in China on the 
long term social and economic outcomes of those cohorts affected by the famine in the 
early years of life. 
Chapter 4 is the third paper which is titled “Does school quality matter? Evidence 
from a natural experiment in rural China”. This chapter is based on a co-authored paper 
with Albert Park, Chang-tai Hsieh and Xuehui An. In this chapter, I investigate the 
effects of school quality on students’ academic performance in high schools by using the 
magnet school system in rural China as a natural experiment.  
Chapter 5 is the conclusion.  
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Chapter 2 
Does an intra-household flypaper effect exist? Evidence from the educational fee 
reduction reform in rural China 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
      Government transfers in developing countries often address the challenge posed 
by poverty and low levels of educational attainment among vulnerable populations, 
especially children. An important question in considering the effectiveness of such 
transfers is the extent to which transfers targeting to a child “stick” to him or her or, as 
suggested by many models of household decision-making (e.g., Becker, 1974), targeted 
individual transfers are equivalent to an increase in total household resources and are 
neutralized by reallocations of resources away from the target child toward other family 
members. The existence of an intra-household flypaper effect (IFE) thus provides an 
essential justification for policies targeting children. Indeed, Becker (1981) attributes the 
failure of compensatory education programs for minority children to the absence of a 
strong IFE. 
      In recent years, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs like PROGRESA in 
Mexico have become extremely popular in developing countries.1  Cash transfers made 
conditional on child enrolment can be thought of as a subsidy that reduces the price of 
education for each targeted child.  Since the subsidy reduces household’s expenditures 
on the targeted child, the question arises as to how the saved funds are spent, in particular 
whether the funds benefit (or stick to) the targeted child or whether they act similarly to a 
generic household income transfer.  However, perhaps partly due to data limitations, no 
previous studies have examined this issue systematically.2 Rather, evaluations of CCT 
                                                 
1 For example, such programs exist in Bangladesh, Pakistan, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Brazil, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, and Honduras. 
2 Some research focuses on the implications for intra-household allocation of the fact that the funds are 
transferred to women, not men.  See Attanasio and Lechene (2002),  Rubalcava, Teruel and Thomas 
(2006) and Bobonis (2004). 
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programs have focused on the programs’ impact on educational attainment3, health and 
nutrition4, work5, migration6, fertility7, and spillover effects among households in the 
same community8. If there is an IFE for conditional cash transfers, then the programs 
could benefit targeted children in ways that go well beyond the impact of the program on 
school enrolment9. Testing for the existence of the IFE also yields insights into the nature 
of intra-household decision-making in developing countries. 
      In this paper, I test for the first time whether an intra-household flypaper effect 
exists for child-targeted transfers by investigating the impact on household expenditures 
of an educational fee reduction reform that took place in rural China in 2005. As part of 
the large-scale program called the Two Exemptions One Subsidy (TEOS) program, 
students enrolled in primary and middle schools were exempted from school fees charged 
by schools, and students from poor families were exempted from textbook charges and 
received living subsidies if they lived in school dormitories. Since only enrolled children 
received any benefits from the program, the program was equivalent to conditional (on 
enrolment) cash transfer programs widely implemented in many developing countries. 
       A reform that reduces educational fees for children essentially reduces the price 
of education. For those households not sending children to schools before the reform 
because of the high educational fees, the combination of price and income effects from 
the reform may induce parents to send more of their children to school. However, for 
those households already sending most or all of their children to school before the reform, 
the reform has no effect on children's school enrolment. In China, primary and middle 
school enrolment rates were already high before the fee reduction reform, and a main 
motivation for the reform was to reduce the financial burden of taxes and fees for rural 
residents. Indeed, according to Park and Shi (2008), the estimated effect of the reform on 
primary school enrolment is close to zero and not statistically significant, and the 
                                                 
3 Schultz (2004), Behrman and Sengupta (2005), de Janvry et al. (2006), Schady and Araujo (2006), 
Khandker, Pitt and Fuwa (2003), Filmer and Schady (2006) and Maluccio and Flores (2004). 
4 Behrman and Hoddinott (2005), Rivera et al. (2004), Gertler (2004) and Morris et al. (2004). 
5 Parker and Skoufias (2000, 2001), Gertler, Martinez and Rubio-Codina (2006), Schady and Araujo (2006) 
and Yap, Sedlacek and Orazem (2002). 
6 Angelucci (2004) and Stecklov et al. (2005). 
7 Schultz (2004), Stecklov et al. (2006) and Todd and Wolpin (2006). 
8 Bobonis and Finan (2005) and Angelucci and De Giorgi (2006). 
9 Park and Shi (2008). 
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estimated effect of the reform on middle school enrolment is statistically significant but 
very small10. Thus, for most households, with reduced educational fees spent on enrolled 
children, parents had more money for other expenditures, including expenditures on 
voluntary educational goods and other non-educational goods. If the IFE exists, we would 
expect parents to spend the extra money still on the education and on the target child who 
benefits from the fee reduction11. 
      In this paper, I test the IFE by estimating the impact of TEOS reform on 
individual-specific household expenditures, focusing in particular on how the reform 
affected voluntary educational expenditures (on supplies, tutoring, etc.) and required 
educational expenditures (primarily school and textbook fees) on targeted children and 
their siblings. Detailed information on household expenditures is required for conducting 
such an analysis. I use Chinese rural household data from the Gansu Survey of Children 
and Families (GSCF), a longitudinal study following multiple cohorts of children. I 
helped supervise the last wave of the survey in 2007 for which I designed questions to 
collect comprehensive information on access to the TEOS program and on household 
expenditures on food (23 categories), non-food consumption (17 categories), and 
educational expenditures on each child (both required and voluntary). 
      Our identification strategy exploits the fact that household surveys were 
conducted before and after the reform, there was variation across schools in the amount 
of fee reductions due mainly to differences in the amount of fees charged prior to the 
reform, and access to subsidies and the amount of subsidies varied with the age (or grade 
level) of children in the household.  The GSCF collected three waves of data in 2000, 
2004, and 2007. The first two waves of survey were conducted before the reform and the 
third wave was conducted after the reform. I compare the spending of households with 
similar age children before and after the reforms living in the same village, and see how 
differences in the amount of educational fee reductions across schools and for children in 
different grades affected household expenditure patterns. In this paper, I use intended 
transfer as the main treatment variable, which is calculated based on program rules. 
                                                 
10 10% increase in the reduced educational fees leads to only 0.4% increase in the probability to be 
enrolled in the middle school. 
11 In my paper, if the parents spend the money received by the targeted children still on these children, it is 
also defined as intra-household flypaper effect, which traditionally only focuses on the money sticking to 
some specific categories of expenditures.  
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Firstly, I check the impact of the reform on household level expenditures. I find that a one 
Yuan increase in the household intended transfers per capita from the reform leads to 
0.613 Yuan decrease in household required educational expenditures per capita and a 
0.651 Yuan increase in household voluntary educational expenditures per capita; the 
absolute values of these two coefficients are not significantly different. But there is no 
significant impact of the reform on household total income per capita, total expenditures 
per capita, or other specific categories of expenditures. And then, using a household fixed 
effect specification to examine differences in child-specific expenditures within the same 
households, I find that a one Yuan increase in individual intended transfers from the 
reform leads to a 0.448 Yuan decrease in individual required educational expenditures 
and a 0.519 Yuan increase in individual voluntary educational expenditures; again the 
absolute values of these two coefficients are not significantly different. The results 
provide strong evidence that an IFE exists. Parents spent the saved money from the fee 
reductions on voluntary educational expenditures on the same child. I also find that given 
the same amount of intended transfers households with better educated mothers spend 
more on education, and parents spend more on girls, older children and children enrolled 
in middle school. 
      The only previous literature that has studied the IFE in developing countries is a 
small empirical literature examining the impact of school feeding programs12. Jacoby 
(2002) studied the impact of school feeding programs in the Philippines on children's 
caloric intake, comparing children's caloric intake on schooling days and non-schooling 
days. He found that daily caloric intake rose roughly one-for-one with feeding program 
calories. Using a similar methodology, Afridi (2005) found that 49% to 100% of nutrients 
provided by a mandated school meal program in India “stuck” to the children receiving 
meals. While both studies provide support for the existence of the IFE, their results could 
be driven by specific features of food consumption and school feeding program, for 
example it may be difficult to substitute more consumption in one meal with less 
consumption at other times, or home food availability may be related to other factors 
                                                 
12 There exists a much larger literature on the flypaper effect in public finance (see Hines and Thaler (1995) 
for a review). More recent papers include Knight (2002), Choi, Laibson, and Madrian (2007),Walle and Mu 
(2007) , and Lalvani (2002). A number of papers in this literature find positive evidence that earmarked 
funds do increase spending on targeted areas. 
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affecting home production. In contrast, cash transfers or subsidies are fully monetized, 
providing more opportunity for passing on program benefits to other household members; 
in this sense they provide a purer test of the IFE. 
      One study asking a similar question to ours but in a developed country context is 
by Kooreman (2000), who showed that the marginal propensity to consume child 
clothing out of exogenous child benefits provided by a Dutch government program was 
much larger than the marginal propensity out of other income sources. However, the 
effects are identified solely from policy variation over time, so the results could be driven 
by time trends in expenditures that would have occurred even in the absence of the 
policy. 
       The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section introduces 
the data and China's recent educational fee reduction reform in rural areas. The third 
section provides a simple conceptual framework for analysis. The fourth section 
describes empirical strategies. The fifth section presents the results. The sixth provides 
some robustness checks, followed by a concluding section. 
 
2.2 Background 
2.2.1 Gansu Survey of Children and Families 
       The data used in this paper was collected as part of Gansu Survey of Children 
and Families (GSCF). The GSCF is a longitudinal study which was conducted in Gansu 
province in the western part of China, one of the poorest provinces. In 2007, GDP per 
capita in Gansu was 9527 Yuan13 (about 1389 dollars using the exchange rate on July 1st, 
200814), and the population was about 26 million15. The sample is representative of rural 
Gansu, excluding minority counties, and is drawn from 100 villages in 42 townships and 
20 counties. Figure 2.1 shows the distribution of these 20 counties in Gansu province. 
       The GSCF follows a cohort of rural children aged 9-12 in the year 2000, when 
the first wave of the survey was conducted. The children and their families were 
re-interviewed in 2004 (wave 2) when the children were 13-16 years old, and in 2007 
                                                 
13 This number is from http://tieba.baidu.com/f?kz=306047423. 
14 1 Dollar = 6.86 Yuan. The exchange rate is from http://www.x-rates.com/d/CNY/table.html. 
15 The population number is from Gansu Bureau of statistics( 
http://210.72.51.4/doc/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=3408).  
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(wave 3) when they were 16-19 years old. The third wave also surveyed a new cohort of 
children aged 9-15 in 2007 and their families. The GSCF has a linked survey design 
which includes child, household, mother, father, homeroom teacher, school principal, and 
village leader questionnaires. The survey collected detailed information for target 
children and all siblings on enrolment status, grade level, and different types of 
educational expenditures, as well as on household income, expenditures, and wealth. 
Questions on income included a battery of questions on specific crops produced, 
livestock raised, self-employment income, wage income, prices, and inputs used in each 
type of production. The expenditure module consisted of 23 categories of food 
expenditures and 17 categories of non-food expenditures asked in each wave of the 
survey. Also, there are questions on over 40 different types of fixed capital and consumer 
durable goods. In the third wave, I designed a special section in the household 
questionnaire asking about fee exemptions and living subsidies received by each enrolled 
child in the household. School and county educational bureau questionnaires also 
described policy implementation during the recent period of educational fee reforms.16 
      In this paper, I use data on households with children enrolled in school. The main 
analysis focuses on the survey data for the years 2000 and 2007. For the sake of 
comparison, in each year only households having a sampled child aged from 9-12 years 
are used in the analysis. After dropping observations with missing values, the final 
sample includes 2134 households, 1629 in 2000 and 505 in 2007. In the sample, there are 
4410 children (defined as survey target children and their siblings), 3498 in 2000 and 912 
in 2007. Table 2.1 lists some basic characteristics of these households and children. From 
Panel A in Table 2.1, we can see that the average household size, number of children, and 
number of enrolled children are very close in the two years, but a little smaller in 2007. 
But the ratio of enrolled children to the total number of children is higher in 2007(0.890), 
than in 2000(0.830). We can also see that in 2007, mothers and fathers have more 
schooling years, and households have higher income and expenditures. The total 
enrolment rate of children in the sample increases from 85.8% in 2000 to 94.7% in 2007, 
and the enrolment rate of children aged 9-16 increased from 93.0% in 2000 to 98.2% in 
                                                 
16  More detailed information about the GSCF is available at the project website: 
http://china.pop.upenn.edu/. 
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2007. In this paper, I restrict attention to enrolled children in the analysis. After 
observations with missing values are dropped, there are 3865 children remaining in the 
final sample, of which 3001 children are from the year 2000 data, and 864 children are 
from the year 2007 data. Table 2.1 also lists the characteristics of enrolled children. From 
the table, we can see that in both years, the average age and the ratio of girls in the 
sample are very close to each other. Among all enrolled children, the percentage of 
primary school students is a little lower in 2007 than in 2000; it is 81.1% in 2007 and 
88.3% in 2000. However, the percentage of middle school students is a little higher; it is 
16.4% in 2007 and 11.1% in 2000. The percentage of students enrolled in other levels of 
schools is 2.4% in 2007 and 0.6% in 2000. 
 
2.2.2 Educational fee reduction reform in rural China 
      Under the decentralized fiscal system established after China's economic reforms 
began in 1979, compulsory education in China has been financed by local governments. 
Because of imbalanced economic development, poorer localities lacking local financial 
resource bases frequently have had no choice but to pass financing burdens down to farm 
households. The free compulsory education system espoused by official policy has never 
been achieved in practice, and educational fees in fact have often accounted for a large 
share of household expenditures, especially of the poor. Before recent reforms, individual 
schools enjoyed significant discretion in setting various fee levels for students. This 
system led to frequent complaints about excessive fee charging and heavy burdens placed 
on farmers.  
      In the past 5 years there have been a number of reforms to the system of rural 
educational finance in China.  One of the main objectives of the recent reforms is to 
reduce the rural educational fees charged to students in order to reduce farmers' burdens. 
The focus of this paper is on the most recent of these reforms, known widely as the “Two 
Exemptions One Subsidy (TEOS)” policy, which targets children engaged in compulsory 
education, which in China includes primary school (typically grades 1-6) and lower 
secondary, or middle school (grades 7-9). According to government documents, TEOS 
was initiated nationally in the beginning of calendar year 2005 in all nationally 
designated poor counties (Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Education, 2005).  The 
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population of national poor counties accounts for about one fourth of China's total rural 
population. The policy was expanded to all of rural China in 2006, since which time it 
also has been called the new security system for rural compulsory education (nongcun 
yiwu jiaoyu baozhan xin jizhe)17. In this paper, I do not distinguish between these two 
names, and call the program TEOS throughout. 
      The policy's two exemptions refer to exemptions from paying school fees (xueza 
fei) and charges for textbooks (keben fei), which previously had been paid by students. 
The one subsidy refers to a living subsidy to partially cover the costs of students living in 
school dormitories. The three components differ somewhat in their coverage and 
financing. The exemption of school fees targeted all rural children, and funding for this 
exemption is shared proportionally by the central and local governments. The textbook 
charge exemption was targeted at the children of poor households only, and the central 
government took full responsibility for funding. The subsidy for living expenses was also 
targeted at the poor, but was financed by local governments who were asked to put their 
programs in place by the end of 2007.  If a student was fully exempted from all three 
types of expenses (school fees, textbook fees, and dormitory living costs), based on field 
visits in Gansu the only remaining fee he or she would typically be asked to pay by the 
school would be to purchase notebooks. 
      In Tables 2.2-2.3, I report evidence on the timing of the implementation of the 
TEOS reform based on county and household questionnaires from the Gansu survey.  
Among the 20 counties surveyed, 15 percent reported implementing the school fees 
exemption in primary schools in the fall of 2004, another 50 percent reported starting in 
spring 2005, and the rest reported starting in spring 2006 (Table 2.2). The textbook fee 
exemptions began a little bit earlier, with 30 percent of counties starting in fall 2004, and 
another 45 percent in spring 2005. Just for the school fees exemption, by spring 2006 all 
counties had implemented the textbook fee exemption.  The results are nearly identical 
for middle schools (Table 2.2). Implementation of the living subsidies was much slower, 
especially in primary schools. Only 10 percent of counties reported providing living 
subsidies in spring 2005, 65 percent of counties reported having started the program by 
spring 2006 when both exemption policies were fully implemented, and 30 percent of 
                                                 
17 Guangming Daily (2007). 
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counties still had not begun providing subsidies by the time of the survey in summer 
2007. Implementation was much faster in middle schools, which typically have more 
students living in dormitories.  60 percent of counties started providing living subsidies 
in spring 2005, and by spring 2006, 95 percent of counties had begun providing living 
subsidies. 
      Evidence from the household data is presented in Table 2.3. Because the coverage 
is based on recall, I restrict attention to students who have been in their current school 
since fall 2004 (primary students in grades 3-6 and middle school students in grade 9). 
Since the textbook fee exemption and living subsidies are targeted to children from poor 
households, it is possible that the coverage rates for students in the sample could be 
significantly lower than for schools or counties.  In fact this is true for the living subsidy.  
No students report receiving living subsidies until spring 2005 and by spring 2007 only 
0.92 percent of primary students and 8.96 percent of middle school students report 
receiving living subsidies (Table 2.3). In contrast, a very high proportion of students 
report receiving the textbook fee exemption--86 and 78 percent of primary and middle 
school students in spring 2007 (Table 2.3). The large difference in coverage of textbook 
exemptions and living subsidies likely is due to the fact that as a poor province Gansu 
receives a large amount of central subsidies for textbook exemptions, but lacks local 
resources to finance living subsidies (which are not centrally financed). Finally, a small 
percentage of primary school students (4 percent) and middle school students (9 percent) 
report not receiving the school fees exemption in 2007. This could be due to misreporting 
or attendance at private schools. 
      Prior to the reform, schools charged a single comprehensive educational fee, 
which included school fees, textbook charges and notebook fees. The value of the school 
fee exemption thus varied by county and school level, depending on the value of the 
single fee established prior to TEOS. I use the following formula to estimate the annual 
exempted school fees for each primary and middle school student: 
,2007 ,2007 ,2007Pr _i s i ie CEF notebookfee textbookfeeSF = − −     (2.1) 
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Here, Pr _ se CEF  is the comprehensive educational fee charged by school s before 
the reform18, which is asked in the school questionnaire; the notebook charge is equal to 
10 Yuan for primary students and 15 Yuan for middle school students; and the textbook 
fee is equal to 70 Yuan for primary school students and 140 Yuan for middle school 
students. The average value of estimated school fees exempted for primary school 
students is 54.26 with standard deviation equal to 54.66, and the average value of the 
estimated school fees exempted for middle school students is 71.75 with standard 
deviation equal to 56.13. Figure 2.2 shows the kernel density of exempted school fees 
over 100 villages. We can see that the exempted school fees are different for primary 
school students and middle school students, and they vary across villages. 
      According to the Gansu Educational Bureau, the subsidy provided to counties in 
2007 for textbook purchases under TEOS was 35 Yuan per semester for primary school 
students and 70 Yuan per semester for middle school students. Since counties within the 
province buy the same textbooks, the value of the textbooks actually provided, and thus 
the value of the subsidy, is assumed to be uniform throughout the province. The criterion 
for allocating the free textbooks was the students' household income per capita19. Overall, 
79.58 percent of primary school students and 72.69 percent of middle school students 
reported receiving textbook fee exemptions in the past year. The provincial education 
bureau recommended a living subsidy for poor students of one Yuan per day for 239 days 
per year, or 239 Yuan per year and 120 Yuan per semester (Gansu Educational Bureau, 
2006). However, according to the 2007 survey data, only 0.92 and 8.96 percent of 
primary and middle school students received the subsidy. 
      Therefore, for each child enrolled in primary or middle school, total cost 
reductions from the reform, which I call intended transfer, are equal to the exempted 
school fees plus 70 or 140 if she is exempted from the textbook fee too; plus 239 if she 
gets the living subsidy. Table 2.4 shows the average value of intended transfers per capita 
                                                 
18 In this paper, each village is assigned a nearest primary school, each township is assigned a nearest 
middle school. Students living in each village are assumed to attend the nearest school. 
19 But there was also variation in the number of free textbooks available to students in specific grade levels 
or schools, due to unexpected variation in class size or poor planning. Also, variation in the number of 
needy students across grades and schools could lead to differences in the extent to which the poorest 
students received the exemption. In our field research, we encountered a number of cases in which students 
received the textbook fee exemption in some semesters but not in others. 
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for households in the sample in 2007. It also summarizes descriptive statistics for 
household   expenditures, including total expenditures per capita20, food expenditures 
per capita21, non-food expenditures per capita22, health expenditures per capita23, required 
educational expenditures per capita24, and voluntary educational expenditures per capita25. 
From Table 2.4, we see that, for all households, the intended transfers account for about 
2.971% of total expenditures. This figure is similar for the richest 30% of households 
(2.197%), but is greater for the poorest 30% of households (3.774%). 
 
2.3 Conceptual framework 
The impacts of the educational fee reduction reform can be analyzed under the 
framework of maximizing household utility. We can assume that parents are maximizing 
a household utility function U(X, E), where X is a vector of household consumptions, 
including consumptions of voluntary educational goods and other non-educational goods, 
and E is the number of enrolled children. I assume that U(X, E) satisfies: (1) 0
XU > , 
0
EU > ; (2) 0XXU < , 0EEU < ; (3) 0XEU > . And I also assume that both X and E 
are normal goods. Since the number of enrolled children cannot be arbitrarily large, we 
assume E cannot exceed *E . *E  could be interpreted as the total number of children of 
schooling age in the family. I assume that household has income I, the vector of prices for 
X is denoted as XP , and the price for E is denoted as EP . EP in this paper can be 
                                                 
20 Total expenditures are equal to the sum of expenditures on food, expenditures on non-food consumption 
and service, expenditures on health care, expenditures on required educational items, and expenditures on 
voluntary educational items. 
21 Expenditures on food are the sum of expenditures on rice, flour, maize, beans, bean products, other 
grains, potatoes and sweet potatoes, grain products, corn, pork, beef and mutton, chicken, other meat, 
marine products, eggs, vegetables, edible oils, dried and fresh fruits and nuts, spices, cigarette and alcohol, 
soft drinks, canned food, restaurant food, and money spent on food proceeding. 
22 Expenditures on non-food consumption and service are the sum of expenditures on washing and 
cleaning supplies, miscellaneous household items and hardware, clothing consumption, bedding, 
transportation maintenance and parts, electronic appliances maintenance, transportation costs, postage, 
communication devices maintenance fees, rent, house decoration and renovation, electricity, fuel, cultural 
products, cultural service fee, personal goods (including jewelry, makeup, etc.), and personal service fees 
(including salon, bath, photos, etc.). 
23 Expenditures on health care are the sum of expenditures on buying medicine, and health insurance. 
24 Expenditures on required education items is the sum of tuition and textbook fee. 
25 Expenditures on voluntary educational items is the sum of expenditures on supplies of pens, exercise 
books, etc., supplementary tutoring, and snake in school and costs of transportation to school. 
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defined as required educational fees for each child. Then the household maximization 
problem is represented by the following:  
 
.
 ( , )
X E
U X EMax  
S.t.   * *X EX E IP P+ ≤  
*E E≤  
Figure 2.3 shows the optimal choice of households having different preferences. For type 
A households, parents care more about the education of their kids such that they send all 
their kids of schooling age to the schools. Therefore, the maximization problem has a 
corner solution, which is represented by 0A  in Figure 2.3. But for type B households, 
parents care less about the education of their kids; therefore, their maximization problem 
has an interior solution, which is represented by 0B in Figure 2.3. 
      The educational fee reduction reform reduces EP , which is shown in Figure 2.3 
as budget line rotating rightward around point M. Since both X and E are normal goods, 
for type A households, the maximization problem still has a corner solution, which is 
represented by point 1A  in Figure 2.3. That is, the number of enrolled kids stays the 
same as before the reform, while the households can have more money to spend on other 
goods, which is represented by the higher level of other consumptions in Figure 2.3. On 
the contrary, for type B households, their optimal choice moves to 1B , at which more of 
their kids are enrolled in the schools and they are also able to consume more of other 
goods. 
      In this paper, my goal is not to study the impact of the reform on the children's 
school enrolment, which is studied in a separate paper (Park and Shi (2008)); therefore I 
take household's enrolment decision as given in the analysis. It is a reasonable 
assumption since the educational fee reduction reform was not found to have big effects 
on children's school enrolment. Actually, according to Park and Shi (2008), the primary 
school enrolment rate was 96.3% before the reform and 98.18% after the reform; and the 
middle school enrolment rate was 88.92% before the reform but 91.44% after the reform. 
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The increase of enrolment rates is small. Indeed, the estimated impact of the reform on 
primary school enrolment is close to zero and not statistically significant. Although the 
estimated impact of the reform on middle school enrolment is statistically significant, the 
magnitude is not large; 10% increase in money transferred from the reform only led to 
0.4% increase in the probability of middle school enrolment. Besides, children of primary 
school age (6-12 years old) account for 72% of the sample but children of middle school 
age (13-16 years old) only account for 25% of the sample. It shows that it is reasonable to 
take household enrolment decision as given in the analysis. Of course, it might cause 
some potential bias in empirical exercises, the detail of which is discussed in section 
2.4.1. 
      Based on this assumption, parents' maximization behavior can be divided into two 
steps. In the first step, they pay required educational fees for their enrolled children, the 
total amount of which is **EP E ; in the second step, parents choose the optimal value of 
X using the remaining money **EI P E−  to maximize the utility. For the sake of 
analysis, I divide X into two parts: voluntary educational goods, VE , and all other 
non-educational goods, X .  The household maximization problem can be rewritten as 
the following: 
,




U XMax E E  
S.t.      ** * *X V V EX IP P E P E+ ≤ −             (2.2) 
Here, XP  is a vector of prices of non-educational goods and VP  is a vector of the 
prices of voluntary educational goods. We assume that the educational fee reduction 
reform reduces the required educational fees to
EP ; then the maximization problem 
becomes:  
,
*  ( , , )
V
X VE
U XMax E E  
S.t. * ** * * ( )*X V V E E EX IP P E P E P EP+ ≤ − + −           (2.3) 
Comparing (2.2) and (2.3) in the above, we can see that reducing the required educational 
fee does not change the relative prices between the non-educational goods and voluntary 
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educational goods, but is equivalent to a cash transfer to households equal to 
*( )*E EP EP−  . The other thing we can see is that the amount of the transfer depends 
on the price of education households pay before the reform, i.e. EP . The higher is EP , 
the greater is the implicit cash transfer. 
      Figure 2.4 shows the maximization problem described above. In Figure 2.4, 
voluntary educational goods are put on the X-axis, and all other non-educational 
consumptions are on the Y-axis. Since the educational fee reduction reform did not 
change the relative prices between the voluntary educational goods and non-educational 
goods, the reform shifts the budget line outward. Before the reform, households choose to 
consume A. After the budget line is shifted outward, optimal consumption will be at point 
B if households redistribute the money among all expenditures, but will be at point C if 
households continue to spend the extra money on education, which is defined as the IFE 
in this paper. One could similarly interpret the X-axis as measuring the non-educational 
goods purchased for the targeted children, and the non-educational goods for other 
enrolled children on the Y-axis.  
      The above discussion implies that, if the IFE exists, then the impact of the reform 
on household voluntary educational expenditures should be positively significant, and 
much greater than the impact on other household expenditures. And individual-specific 
voluntary educational expenditure should increase for the children receiving benefits 
from the reform. 
      One caveat needs mentioning. If household preference over voluntary educational 
goods and other non-educational goods has some special features, for example, the utility 
function is quasi-linear, then even the IFE does not exist, with the increase of the money 
available for voluntary educational goods and all other non-educational goods, we can 
still see that all the extra money is spent on voluntary educational goods. This alternative 
explanation is shown in Figure 2.5. However, we can test whether this type of household 
preference is consistent with the data. I regress expenditures on voluntary educational 
goods and expenditures on all non-educational goods separately on money available for 
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purchasing them26. If the household utility function has the features described in the 
above, we should expect to see a much larger coefficient of voluntary educational 
expenditures than that of other non-educational expenditures. Table 2.A shows the 
regressions using household sample from year 2000. From this table, we can see that with 
the increase in the money available, the non-educational expenditures increase, which is 
shown in columns (2) and (4). But from columns (1) and (3), with the increase in the 
money available, the increase in voluntary educational expenditures is much smaller. 
These results show that it is impossible for the preference to have some special features 
such that the increase in the money available to be spent on voluntary educational goods 
and other non-educational goods only leads to the increase in the consumption of 
voluntary educational goods. Besides, we need to notice that quasi-linear preference 
plays no role in the determination of the implication of IFE that the saved money will be 
spent on the children receiving this money.  
      Another important question is how parents know how much they save from the 
reduced education fees and then spend it on children's voluntary educational items. 
Actually, there are several ways for parents to get this information. One is from schools' 
publicized information. In the field research, we did see schools posted the information 
about what kinds of items were exempted and how much was exempted. The parents can 
also know this information just from their own experience since most of them have 
children enrolled in school before 2005 when the TEOS reform started. Figure 2.A shows 
the distribution of the school entering year of the oldest children in the sample 
households. From Figure 2.A, we can see that more than 95% households had children 
enrolled before 2005. For the remaining households, they can also know this information 
from their neighborhoods. 
      After knowing the implications of the intra-household flypaper effect, one might 
ask what causes the IFE. To the best of my knowledge, there is no formal theory 
providing explanations for the IFE. However, one might image that parents have a fixed 
amount of money they would like to spend for each of their children’s education, the 
                                                 
26  At the same time, I control for household demographic structure, land area per capita, number of kids 
enrolled in different levels of schools, mother's education, father's education, and dummies for different 
villages. I use two measures for money available for purchasing voluntary educational goods and all 
non-educational goods; one is the sum of expenditures on these goods, and the second one is equal to 
household total income subtracting required educational expenditures. 
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reduction of required educational fees does not change this “habit formation”. Therefore, 
with the reduction in the required educational fees and the fixed amount of total money to 
be spent, we can observe the increase in the voluntary educational expenditures.  
 
2.4 Empirical strategy 
      As discussed in the above, if the IFE exists, the impact of the reform on 
household voluntary educational expenditure should be significantly positive, and the 
impact of the reform on household other categories of non-educational expenditures 
should be much weaker. And the reform is also expected to have significantly positive 
impact on individual voluntary educational expenditures. In this section, I discuss 
empirical strategies used to identify the reform's impacts on expenditures in household 
level and in individual level.  
 
2.4.1 Household level regressions 
      Before the reform, different schools in different villages charged different 
educational fees; therefore, when the reform removed the educational fees, households in 
villages having higher educational fees before the reform benefited more from the reform. 
We can compare educational expenditures of households, which were surveyed in 2007 
when the reform had been implemented, in villages having higher pre-reform educational 
fees with those households in villages having lower pre-reform educational fees. 
However, cross-sectional comparisons cannot differentiate the impact of the reform from 
the village characteristics which might also be related with expenditures. Since GSCF 
also collected information in 2000; therefore, households surveyed in 2000 are used as a 
control group in this paper. In other words, I compare households in the same village but 
surveyed before the reform and after the reform, by which the fixed village characteristics 
can be canceled out; and then I compare the before-after difference in the expenditures of 
households in the villages having higher pre-reform educational fees with the before-after 
difference in expenditures of those living in the villages having lower pre-reform 
educational fees. The identification idea used here is a “continuous” version of 
difference-in-difference strategy. 
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      A crucial identification assumption for different-in-difference strategy to be valid 
is that the change of educational expenditures from 2000 to 2007 in villages benefiting 
more from the reform should not be systematically different from those in villages 
benefiting less from the reform in the absence of the reform. I can test this assumption by 
using the first two waves (in years 2000 and 2004) of data.  The identification will also 
be violated if there exist some time-varying and region-specific effects correlated with 
transfers (essentially the pre-reform educational fees) from the reform and potentially 
affect household educational expenditures. Unfortunately, the mechanism for schools in 
different villages to charge different fees before the reform is not clear. But, since GSCF 
collected detailed village level variables, which makes it possible to include a large 
number of village variables in year 2000 (interacted with year 2007 dummy) to control 
these time-varying and region specific effects. In the regression, I include illiterate ratio, 
ratio of primary school graduates in labor force, primary school enrolment rate, middle 
school enrolment rate, indicator for having pre-school classes, distance of primary school 
from the village seat, log value of money given to schools by village, indicator for having 
primary school run by the village, indicator for having middle school run by the village, 
indicator for having railway through the village, indicator for having bus stop in the 
village, log value of average agricultural income per capita, log value of average 
industrial income per capita, ratio of households engaged in non-agricultural work, ratio 
of households running household enterprise, log value of wage for men doing 
non-agricultural work, log value of wage for women doing non-agricultural work, log 
value of wage to hire labor for agricultural production, indicator for having enterprises 
owned by county, indicator for having enterprises owned by township, indicator for 
having private enterprises. Combined with village fixed effects, inclusion of these 
variables in regression function helps to correct bias due to possible endogeneity of the 
pre-reform educational fees charged in different villages. 
      Another concern is that there might be some other concurrent government 
programs correlated with the level of educational fees charged before the reform and 
potentially affected educational expenditures. Indeed, Chinese government exempted all 
agriculture-related taxes in 2006; this policy should not affect the estimation since it is 
not related with pre-reform educational fees and common for all the households in 
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different villages. To the best of my knowledge, there are no other programs concurrent 
with the educational fee reduction reform in Gansu. 
      The following regression function is estimated: 
0 1 2 ,2000 2007
* * *mht htht v t htvVillageITPC V Year YearEX Hα α α ε= + + + + + +
(2.4) 
In equation (2.4), mhtEX  on the left hand side is a vector of outcome variables, 
including household income per capita, household total expenditures per capita, and 
specific categories of expenditures per capita, including food, non-food goods and service, 
health care, required educational expenditures and voluntary educational expenditures. 
htITPC  is intended transfers per capita household h should get in year t from the 
reform. The value is equal to zero in pre-reform years. In the year 2007, it is equal to the 
sum of intended transfers to each enrolled child in the household divided by the number 
of family members27. htH  is a vector of household variables, including household 
demographic structure28, household endowments29, log of household real income per 
capita, and the number of children enrolled in different grades30. Interactions of village 
variables in 2000 and dummy for year 2007, 
,2000 2007*vV Year , are included in the 
regressions to control for time-varying and region-specific factors. I also control for 
village average expenditure levels and cohort average expenditure levels by including 
village fixed effects,
vVillage , and year fixed effects, tYear .  htε  is an error term 
with mean equal to zero. In the estimation, robust standard errors are calculated by 
clustering at the village level. 
                                                 
27  Since the eligibility for students to get textbook fee exemption and living subsidy mainly depends on 
household income, and the amount of exempted textbook charge and living subsidy are the same for all the 
kids eligible to get them. Therefore, by including household income in the regressions as a control, the 
variation from textbook fee exemption and living subsidy is absorbed. In other words, the variation in the 
variable of intended transfer comes from the variation in the extent of exempted school fees. I will test it in 
Section 6.1.  
28 Household demographic structure includes ratio of male from 0-5, 6-12, 13-16, 17-19, 20-29, 30-39, 
40-49, 50-54, 55 and above, ratio of female from 0-5, 6-12, 13-16, 17-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-54, 55 
and above, and total number of family members. 
29 Household endowments include land area per capita, father's schooling year, and mother's schooling 
year. 
30 This vector of variables includes number of children enrolled in primary school, middle 
school, high school, and other school levels. 
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      In estimating functions (2.4), one important caveat bears mentioning. According 
to Park and Shi (2008), the fee reduction reform has no significant effects on primary 
school enrolment, but it does have significant positive effects on middle school enrolment. 
In this paper, I take the enrolment decision as given by using households having enrolled 
children as the sample for analysis and including the numbers of kids enrolled in different 
grades as control variables. The results shown in this paper should not be extended to 
interpret the behaviors of households without any children enrolled in schools. However, 
even when we interpret the results in this way; there are still ways in which the results 
could be biased. Households sending children (especially 13-16 years old children) to 
school only after the reform reduced educational fees might be less willing to invest in 
children's education due to unobservable characteristics that prevented them from 
enrolling their children in the absence of the reform. Then the estimates of the impact of 
the reform on voluntary educational expenditures would be biased downward. However, 
the bias should not be large because 9-12 years old children account for majority of the 
sample (67%)31 and the impact of the reform on middle school enrolment is small as 
described above. 
 
2.4.2 Individual level regressions 
      In order to identify the impact of the reform on individual level educational 
expenditures, I take advantage of two sources of variation. One is the variation in 
intended transfer received by children enrolled in different levels of grade but living in 
the same family. The other is differences in the magnitude of fee reductions in different 
villages. Children surveyed in year 2000 are used as a control group in both cases. 
      GSCF collected information on required and voluntary educational expenditures 
for each enrolled child, which makes it possible to exploit within-household variation to 
identify the impact of the reform on individual educational expenditures. Children living 
in the same family might get different transfers from the reform if they are enrolled in 
different grades. Children enrolled in high school receive no transfers, and children 
                                                 
31 There are also 5% children aged from 6-8 years, although Park and Shi (2008) did not investigate the 
impact of the reform on them, the impact should not be significant since these children were only be likely 
to be enrolled in primary schools, and the impact of the reform on enrolment in primary school is not 
significant. 
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enrolled in middle school get more transfers from the reform than children enrolled in 
primary school. We therefore can compare educational expenditures on children living in 
the same family, but enrolled in different grades, to identify the impact of the reform on 
educational expenditures while controlling for household level unobservables. However, 
if just cross-sectional data in one year is used, the impact of the reform cannot be 
differentiated from the systematic difference in the educational expenditures on children 
enrolled in different grades in the absence of the reform. Fortunately, children surveyed 
in 2000 can be used as a control group. Intuitively, I compare educational expenditures 
differences between children enrolled in different grades but living in the same family 
before the reform with similar differences after the reform, a version of 
difference-in-difference strategy. 
    The above idea can be represented by the following specification: 
0 1 2
* *iht iht iht ihthtEE IT X γα α α ε= + + + +                (2.5) 
In equation (2.5), ihtEE  is a vector of child-specific expenditure variables, including 
educational expenditures (required and voluntary) of children i living in household h in 
year t; ihtIT  is intended transfer received by child i in household h in year t, equal to 
zero in the year 2000; ihtX  is a vector of individual characteristics, including sex and 
age; 
htγ  is a household fixed effect for household h surveyed in year t. ihtε is an error 
term with mean equal to zero. In the estimation, robust standard errors are calculated by 
clustering at the village level. In order to cancel out household fixed effects, I subtract 
household average values from every variable in equation (2.5), and then to compare 
before and after the reform within the same village, I add village fixed effects to the 
regression. Finally, the following equation is estimated: 
________________ _______ _______
1 2
*( ) *( ) ( )iht iht iht ihtvht ht ht htVillageEE IT XEE IT Xα α ε ε− = − + − + + −   
(2.6)  
By using the within-household variation to identify the effect of the reform, we can 
implicitly control any observable and unobservable village and household level variables. 
But the identification assumption should be that the systematic difference between 
educational expenditures on children enrolled in different levels of schools does not 
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change from 2000 to 2007 in the absence of the reform. This assumption might be 
violated if the time path of educational expenditures on children enrolled in higher level 
school is different from the time path of educational expenditures on children enrolled in 
lower level school, or/and if parents' preference toward different children changes. I test 
this identification assumption by taking advantage of special survey design of the GSCF 
data. GSCF includes three waves of data, two (year 2000 and 2004) before the reform 
and one (year 2007) after the reform. Since children surveyed in year 2000 and 2004 
were not affected by the reform, so I am able to do control experiment to test this 
identification assumption. 
      In order to exploit the variation in the extent of fee reductions in different villages, 
the following regression function is estimated:  
0 1 2 3 4 ,2000 2007* * * * *iht iht iht iht ht v t ihtvVillageV Year YearEE IT IT XX HHα α α α α ε−= + + + + + + + +
(2.7)  
In this function, ihtEE  on the left hand side is defined the same as that in function 
(2.6), which is a vector of outcome variables, including required educational expenditures 
and voluntary educational expenditures. In order to control heterogeneity between 
treatment group and control group, I include a vector of individual characteristics, 
ihtXX , including dummy for girl, age, and dummies of grades; and a vector of 
household characteristics, htHH , which is a vector of household characteristics, 
including household demographic structure, household endowments, and log of 
household real income per capita. As discussed above, I include the interactions of 
village variables in 2000 and indicator for year 2007, 
,2000 2007
*
vV Year , as control. I 
also control for average village and cohort education expenditure by including village 
fixed effect, 
vVillage , and year fixed effect, tYear . In the function, ihtε is an 
error term with mean value equal to zero. The most important variables in this regression 
function are ihtIT  and ihtIT − . ihtIT  is intended transfer child i in household h gets 
from the reform in year t. The coefficient before this variable,
1α , captures the impact of 
the reform on child i. ihtIT −  is the sum of intended transfer of all other children living 
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in the same family. The coefficient before this variable,
2α , captures spillover effect of 
intended transfer other children in the same family gets. In the estimation, robust standard 
error is calculated by clustering in village level. If the IFE exists, we should expect to see 
precisely estimated 
1α  and insignificant 2α . 
      In order to estimate function (2.7), the identification assumptions needed are the 
same as those for estimating household regressions. The potential selection due to 
endogenous enrolment decision leads to the same bias in the estimation as it does in the 
household regressions. In addition, the estimated results might still be driven by some 
unobservable household or village changes in educational expenditures. But if so, then 
we should expect to see the same effects of ihtIT  and ihtIT −  on individual 
educational expenditures. Therefore, the estimation of function (2.7) itself can also 
provide evidence to see whether the unobservable household or village changes in 
educational expenditures affect the estimation. 
 
2.5 Empirical results 
2.5.1 Descriptive results 
Table 2.5 describes the household expenditure patterns in 2000 and 2007. From this 
table, we can see that required educational expenditures per capita in 2007 is much lower 
than that in 2000, the difference of the average values in these two years is -71.349, and 
is significant by different from zero at the 1% level. This means that the educational fee 
reduction reform did reduce required payments for children's education. All other 
variables, including total expenditures, food expenditures, non-food expenditures, health 
expenditures, and voluntary educational expenditures, increased from 2000 to 2007, with 
the changes being statistically significant. But this increase might just be due to the 
existing time trends.  
      Next, I estimate a rough measurement of the impact of the reform by using the 
difference-in-difference strategy, and report the results in Table 2.6. In the table, the 
“treated” group includes villages having average intended money transferred from the 
reform above the median, and the “untreated” group includes villages having average 
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intended money transferred below the median. Year 2000 is the pre-reform period and 
year 2007 is the post-reform period. 
      The table lists results for total expenditures per capita and other categories of 
expenditures per capita, including expenditures on food, expenditures on non-food 
consumption and services, expenditures on health care, required educational expenditures, 
and voluntary educational expenditures. From the table, we can see that compared with 
the untreated group, the expenditures of the treated group are always higher. One 
important reason might be because the treated group includes villages having higher 
intended transfers, i.e. higher pre-reform educational fees, which could be related to 
better economic status of these villages. Secondly, we can see that, compared with 
pre-reform period, expenditures in the post-reform period are greater, whether for the 
treated or untreated group. The difference-in-difference results are shown in the 
right-bottom cell 
in each section in Table 2.6. We can see that the effects are statistically significant only 
for required educational expenditures per capita and voluntary educational expenditures 
per capita; both of them are significant at the 1% level. The difference-in-difference 
result for required educational expenditures per capita is -40.27, which means the average 
required educational expenditures per capita in the treated villages decreased by 40.27 
Yuan more than in the untreated villages. The difference-in-difference result for voluntary 
educational expenditures per capita is 55.33, which means that the average voluntary 
educational expenditures per capita in treated village increased by 55.33 Yuan more than 
in the untreated villages. All the other results are not statistically significant. These 
simple comparisons provide preliminary evidence for the existence of the IFE, i.e. 
households used money saved from reduced required educational fees to spend on the 
voluntary educational items. Since it cannot control for other variables, this paper 
provides more reliable regression results in the following. 
 
2.5.2 Household level regressions 
      Table 2.7 presents the results for the household level regressions. Section A in 
Table 2.7 shows the main results using data from waves of years 2000 and 2007, while 
results in section B are results from a control experiment using data from waves of years 
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2000 and 2004. For clarity of presentation, we just present the coefficients of the intended 
transfers per capita, and suppress reporting the coefficients on the many control variables. 
These full results are available upon request. 
      Column (1) of section A shows the impact of the fee reduction reform on 
household income per capita. The reform is expected to increase income if households 
use the money from the reform to make productive investments. However, the result 
shows that there is no significant impact of the reform on income, and the coefficient is 
negative. Column (2) shows the impact on total expenditures per capita. While the 
coefficient is -2.222, it is not significant either. Since household saving is equal to 
income minus total expenditures, we can derive from these two estimated results that 
there is also no impact of the reform on household savings, i.e. households do not save 
the money from the reduced educational fees. 
      Columns (3) to (7) show the impact of the reform on different categories of 
expenditures. Columns (3) to (7) correspond to expenditure on food, non-food goods and 
services, health care, required educational fees, and voluntary educational spending 
respectively. Firstly, from columns (3), (4) and (5), we can see that the impact of 
educational fee reduction reform on expenditures on food, non-food goods and service, 
and health care per capita are not statistically significant and are all negative. The 
coefficients are -0.014, -1.770 and -0.476 respectively. Only the impacts on required 
educational expenditures and voluntary educational expenditures are significant (see 
columns (6) and (7)). The coefficient of required educational expenditures is -0.613 and 
significant at the 1% level. This means that a one Yuan intended transfers per capita leads 
to a 0.613 Yuan reduction in required educational payments per capita. Since there were 
some other fee reductions before 2005, but intended transfers only capture the change in 
required educational fees due to the most recent reform starting in 2005;  however,  the 
dependent variable measures the change in required educational expenditures from 2000 
to 2007, therefore, the estimated coefficient is not expected to be equal to -1. In addition, 
it is also possible that schools did not fully implement the policies or that parents 
under-reported required educational fees. However, what is relevant for testing the IFE is 
the comparison of the coefficient in columns (6) and (7). Column (7) reports the impact 
of the reform on household voluntary educational expenditures per capita. The coefficient 
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shown in this column is 0.651, significant at the 5% level. Thus, one Yuan of intended 
transfers per capita from the reform leads to a 0.651 Yuan increase in voluntary 
educational expenditures per capita. We can see that although the magnitudes of 
coefficients in column (6) and column (7) are not exactly the same, they are very close to 
each other and have opposite signs. Indeed, the P-value of the Wald test testing the null 
hypothesis that the absolute values of these two coefficients are the same is 0.899, which 
means that the difference between the absolute values of these two coefficients is not 
significant. These results suggest that there are no income effects of the reform and that 
parents spend the money transferred from the reform on voluntary educational 
expenditures. 
      Section B shows the results from a control experiment testing the identification 
assumption that the time trends of household expenditures in villages benefiting more 
from the reform are not systematically different from villages benefiting less from the 
reform. The critical issue is how to generate hypothetical intended transfers for each 
enrolled child surveyed in year 2004. I calculate the mean value of intended transfers for 
children enrolled in each grade and living in each village in 2007, and then I assign this 
average value to children enrolled in the same grade and living in the same village in 
2004. The households' hypothetical intended transfers per capita are equal to the sum of 
all such hypothetical intended transfers divided by the number of household members. 
All other control variables are defined to be the same as in section A. From section B, we 
can see that none of the coefficients are significant, showing that the time trends of 
households' expenditures in different villages are not systematically different in the 
absence of the reform. 
      From Table 2.7, we see that on average one Yuan in intended transfers per capita 
leads to a 0.651 Yuan increase in voluntary educational expenditures per capita. I also test 
the heterogeneous effects of the reform on voluntary educational expenditures. I 
investigate whether impacts differ by household income per capita, total number of 
enrolled children, mother's schooling years, and father's schooling years (columns (1) to 
(4) in Table 2.8). The coefficient on the interaction of log value of household income per 
capita and intended transfers per capita is positive (0.148); but not statistically 
significant(column (1)). The coefficient on the interaction term with number of enrolled 
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children is 0.274, and also not statistically significant (column (2)). Columns (3) and (4) 
show the heterogeneous impact of the reform in terms of mother's and father's schooling 
years respectively. Although both coefficients are positive, only the coefficient on the 
interaction with mother's schooling years (0.083) is significant (at the 5% level). The 
coefficient of the interaction term with father's schooling years is smaller (0.037) and not 
statistically significant. With higher level of education, parents might know more about 
the importance of children’s education, since mothers have been found to care more 
about children's education than fathers32, therefore, with the same amount of educational 
fee reductions, mothers having higher education would spend more on children’s 
education, but fathers having higher educational would not.  
 
2.5.3 Individual level regressions 
      In this paper, I am exploiting variation of different educational fee reductions 
received by children enrolled in different grades in the same family to identify the impact 
of the reform on educational expenditures on individual children. This identification idea 
is summarized in equation 2.6. Table 2.9 presents the estimation results.  This table is 
also divided into two sections in the same manner as Table 2.8. Columns (1) and (2) 
show the results from the estimation of equation (2.6), and columns (3) and (4) show the 
results from the estimation of equation (2.7). As before, we only report coefficient on the 
individual intended transfers and the coefficient on the sum of all other children's 
intended transfers in the same family. 
      We find that one Yuan increase in intended transfers leads to a 0.493 Yuan 
decrease in required educational expenditures(column (1) in section A) and a 0.578 Yuan 
increase in voluntary educational expenditures(column (2)). These two coefficients have 
opposite signs and similar magnitudes. Both are statistically significant at the 1% level. I 
test the null hypothesis that the absolute values of these two coefficients are equal. The 
P-value of the Wald test is 0.794, suggesting that there is no significant difference 
between the magnitudes of these two coefficients. Column (3) also shows the impact of 
the reform on individual required educational expenditures, estimated from regression 
function (2.7). The coefficient on the individual level intended transfers is -0.422 and 
                                                 
32 Thomas, 1990, and Duflo, 2000. 
 28
statistically significant at the 1% level, while the coefficient on the sum of all other 
children's intended transfers is -0.085 and statistically not significant at all. Similarly, for 
voluntary educational expenditure, the coefficient on individual intended transfers is 
0.586 and statistically significant at the 5% level, while the coefficient on the sum of 
other children's intended transfers is 0.012 and statistically not significant. As before, I 
also am unable to reject the null hypothesis that the absolute values of the coefficients on 
individual intended transfer in columns (3) and (4) are equal (the P-value of the Wald test 
is 0.550). In addition, as I point out in Section 4.2, if the results are driven by 
unobservable village or household changes in education expenditures, the individual 
intended transfers, ihtIT , and the sum of other children's intended transfers, ihtIT − , 
should have same effects on education expenditures. But the results in Table 2.9 show 
that they are different. 
      Section B in Table 2.9 shows the results from the control experiment that uses 
data from year 2000 and year 2004. Columns (1) and (2) show the results testing the 
identification assumption that the difference of educational expenditures between 
children enrolled in different grades does not change across the time. Both coefficients in 
these two columns are not significant, which supports the assumption. The last two 
columns in section B test whether the time trends of household educational expenditures 
are different in different villages in the absence of the reform. From columns (3) and (4), 
we can also see that no coefficients are statistically significant. This provides evidence 
that there are no different time trends of individual educational expenditures in different 
villages in the absence of the reform. 
      In this paper, I also investigate the heterogeneous impact of the reform on 
voluntary educational expenditure in terms of individual characteristics, including gender, 
birth order, and grade enrolled. All the heterogeneous tests are based on regression 
function (2.7). Table 2.10 presents the results. Columns (1) to (3) correspond to tests for 
heterogeneous impacts in terms of gender, birth order, and grade enrolled respectively. 
The coefficient on the interaction term of the girl dummy and individual intended 
transfers is 0.585, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. Given one Yuan increase 
in intended transfers, girls can get 0.585 Yuan more than boys in terms of voluntary 
education expenditures from their parents. One explanation for it might be because 
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parents did not spend enough money on girls before the reform due to budget constraint; 
therefore, after the reform parents would like to make up for the gap. Parents also spend 
more on older children. The coefficient on the interaction of birth order and individual 
intended transfer is -0.471 and statistically significant at the 1% level. Consistent with 
this result, the coefficient on the interaction of individual intended transfer and middle 
school dummy is 0.864 and statistically significant at the 5% level (column (3)). Thus, 
with one Yuan increase in intended transfer from the reform, parents would spend 0.864 
Yuan more on voluntary educational expenditures on children enrolled in middle school 
than on children enrolled in primary school. For children enrolled in middle schools, 
either because they need more expenditures on school supplies, et.al., or because parents 
would like to reinforce their competence to enter better high school, or because parents 
think that the return to the educational investment on middle school kids is higher since 
they are about to enter the labor market, therefore, with the same amount of money saved 
from the reform, parents spend more on the voluntary educational expenditure on 
children enrolled in the middle schools than those enrolled in the primary schools.  
 
2.6 Robustness checks 
2.6.1 Do schools “evade” mandated fee reductions through greater voluntary 
educational expenditures? 
      One could argue that after the educational fees are exempted, schools may evade 
the regulations by requiring so-called “voluntary” expenditures; in other words, perhaps 
the voluntary expenditures are not actually voluntary. An obvious example is that schools 
might require students to take more tutoring classes organized by schools in order to 
charge additional tutoring fees after the regular school fees were exempted. Or the school 
could pass on the costs of services previously provided by the school for free and 
describe the payments as voluntary. In this section, I provide evidence against this 
possibility. 
      Table 2.11 shows the reform's impact on different components of household 
voluntary educational expenditures. The first column still shows the impact of the reform 
on household voluntary educational expenditures per capita. Columns (2) to (4) list the 
impacts of the reform on the different components of voluntary educational expenditures 
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by increasing order of the magnitudes of the estimated impacts. The impact of the reform 
on tutoring expenditures is the smallest. The coefficient is equal to -0.007 and not 
significant at all (column (2)). It shows that the schools did not charge additional fees by 
requiring children to attend more tutoring classes, which is the most feasible way schools 
can use if they would like to charge more fees from the students. 
      The impacts of the reform on other components (including expenditures on school 
supplies, and children's food and snack in school and transportation) are positive and 
statistically different from zero. The coefficient on expenditures on school supplies is 
0.193 and statistically significant at the 5% level (column (3)). The coefficient on 
expenditures on children's food and snack in school and transportation is 0.464 and 
statistically significant at the 5% level (column (4)). This suggests that parents used the 
money saved from the reduced required educational fees to buy more or better quality 
school supplies and food or snack for their children. It is not possible for schools to 
require students to buy these from the school since charging students with extra fees is 
politically sensitive especially in rural China, the school principals would take a big risk 
if parents complaint about it. Indeed, in our field research, we have never seen such a 
case that schools sell school supplies or food to students. 
      In addition, after the educational fees were exempted, the schools were subsidized 
by the central and local governments. In 2005, the total money used to subsidize schools 
in Gansu was 216 million Yuan33. At the same time, all the information is publicized, and 
parents can complaint about the overcharged fees. Therefore, schools do not have 
incentive to charge additional fees from students after the regular educational fees were 
exempted. 
 
2.6.2 Do variations from textbook exemption and living subsidy drive the results? 
      In this paper, the variation of intended transfer also comes from the variation of 
getting textbook fee exemption and living subsidies. In principle, the eligibility to get 
textbook fee exemption and living subsidies depends on household income, however in 
practice, whether a child could get textbook fee exemption or living subsidies might also 
depend on other unobservable variables, for example personal connection, corruption, 
                                                 
33 March 23, 2005, China Education Daily 
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et.al, which might contaminate the estimation even after household income is controlled 
in the regressions. In this section, I am going to investigate whether these possible 
unobservable variables lead to biased OLS estimates. I assume that all children enrolled 
in primary schools and middle schools are eligible to be exempted from textbook fee 
charge, but no one gets living subsidy. Then I construct a new variable, which I call 
intended transfer II. It is equal to school fees exemption, which is defined in equation 
(2.1) in section 2.2, plus 70 (140) if the child is enrolled in primary school (if the child is 
enrolled in middle school.). The household intended transfer II per capita is equal to the 
sum of intended transfer II of all the children living in the household divided by the 
number of total family members. By doing so, the variation of intended transfer II is 
totally from the variation in pre-reform school fees. Then, I re-estimate functions (2.4), 
(2.6) and (2.7) by replacing intended transfer with newly constructed intended transfer II. 
The results are shown in Table 2.12 and Table 2.13. 
      Table 2.12 shows the results from household level regression. From this table, we 
can see that only the coefficients shown in columns (6) and (7) are significant. The 
coefficient in column (6) is equal to -0.608, significant at the 1% level. We should 
compare this coefficient with that shown in column (6) in Table 2.7, which is equal to 
-0.613. We can see that they are almost the same. Indeed, I test the hypothesis that these 
two coefficients are equal, and P-value of Wald test is 0.880, which means that these two 
coefficients are not significantly different. Then we can turn to the coefficient shown in 
column (7) in Table 2.12. This coefficient is equal to 0.627, significant at the 5% level. 
The corresponding coefficient in column (7) in Table 2.7 is equal to 0.651. These two 
coefficients are very close to each other, and the P-value of Wald test testing their 
equality is 0.755, which also shows that these two coefficients are not significantly 
different. 
      Table 2.13 shows the results from individual level regressions, but using newly 
defined intended transfer II as treatment variable. The first two columns show the results 
from estimating function (2.6). The coefficient shown in column (1) is equal to -0.464, 
significant at the 1% level. However, the coefficient shown in column (2) is equal to 
0.586, also significant at the 1% level. Columns (3) and (4) show the estimated results of 
function (2.7). Coefficient in column (3) is equal to -0.421, significant at the 1% level, 
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but the coefficient in column (4) is equal to 0.537, significant at the 10% level. We can 
compare these four coefficients in Table 2.13 with those corresponding coefficients 
shown in Table 2.9. We can see that the estimated impacts of the reform on required 
educational fees are almost the same. The P-values of Wald test are 0.282 and 0.975 for 
coefficient shown in columns (1) and (3) respectively. The estimated impacts of the 
reform on voluntary educational expenditures in Table 2.13 and in Table 2.9 are also 
close to each other. The P-values of Wald test are 0.944 and 0.519. 
      The results discussed in above show that the variations from textbook fee charge 
and living subsidy do not have any effects on the estimation. 
 
2.6.3 The impacts of required educational fees on expenditures: IV strategy 
      In this section, I investigate the impact of required educational expenditures on 
other expenditures directly. In order to exploit the variation in required educational 
expenditures due to the educational fee reduction reform, I use intended transfer from the 
reform as IV for required educational expenditures. Table 2.14 shows the estimated 
coefficients. Columns (1) to (6) in the table show the results of household level 
regressions, and column (7) in the same table shows the result of individual level 
regression. 
      Let's firstly look at the results shown in columns (1) to (6) in Table 2.14. In all 
these columns, household intended transfer from the reform per capita is used as an IV 
for household required educational expenditures per capita. The first stage regression has 
been shown in Table 2.7. The F-value of the first stage regression is equal to 20.10. It is 
larger than 10, which means that household intended transfer from the reform per capita 
is not a weak IV for household required educational expenditures per capita34. We can 
see that only the coefficient in column (6), i.e., the regression of household voluntary 
educational expenditures per capita, is significant. The coefficient is equal to -1.061, 
significant at the 5% level. It means that one Yuan decrease in required educational 
expenditures per capita leads to 1.061 Yuan increases in voluntary education expenditure 
per capita. Although the coefficient is not exactly equal to -1, the P-value of F test testing 
the hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to -1 is 0.608, which means that the coefficient 
                                                 
34 Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995.  
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is not significantly different from -1. The result estimated here is also consistent with that 
shown in Table 2.7. In Table 2.7, one Yuan intended transfer per capita from the reform 
leads to 0.613 Yuan decreases in required educational expenditures per capita and 0.651 
Yuan increases in voluntary educational expenditures per capita, from which we can 
derive that one Yuan decrease in required educational expenditures per capita leads to 
1.062 Yuan increases in voluntary educational expenditures per capita. In Table 2.14, all 
other coefficients shown in columns (1) to (5) are not significant, which means that the 
change in the required educational expenditures due to the reform does not affect 
household expenditures except for household voluntary educational expenditures. 
      Column (7) in Table 2.14 shows the result of individual level regression. In this 
column, the individual intended transfer from the reform and the sum of other children's 
intended transfer from the reform in the same family are used as IVs for individual 
required educational expenditures and the sum of other children's required educational 
expenditures in the same family. I do not present the regression result for the first stage in 
Table 2.14, but the F-values are 26.83 and 60.12 in the first stage regression of individual 
required educational expenditures and the sum of all other children's required educational 
expenditures in the same family. These two F-values are larger than 10, which mean that 
the IVs used are not weak35. In column (7), the coefficient before individual required 
educational expenditures is -1.312, significant at the 10% level, while the coefficient 
before the sum of other children's required educational expenditures is not significant. It 
means that one Yuan decrease in individual required educational expenditures leads to 
1.312 Yuan increases in voluntary educational expenditures on this child. I also test the 
hypothesis that this coefficient is equal to -1. The P-value of F test is equal to 0.643, 
which means that the coefficient is not significantly different from -1. The result shown 
in Table 2.14 is consistent with that shown in Table 2.9. As shown in columns (3) and (4) 
in Table 2.9, one Yuan increase in the intended transfer from the reform leads to 0.422 
Yuan decreases in required educational expenditures and 0.586 Yuan increases in 
voluntary educational expenditures, which means that one Yuan decrease in required 
educational expenditures leads to 1.389 Yuan increases in voluntary educational 
                                                 
35 Bound, Jaeger and Baker, 1995. 
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expenditures, which is slightly larger but still very similar to the estimates shown in 
Table 2.14. 
 
2.6.4 Measurement error 
      Measurement error in household income as control variable could lead to 
attenuation bias in the income coefficient, while could bias other coefficient estimates as 
well, especially if incomes are correlated with intended transfers. In order to see the 
effects of measurement error on the coefficient of interest, I use the average value of 
income of all other households living in the same village in the same year as an IV. A 
critical assumption for the validity of this IV is that measurement errors in the incomes of 
different households are independent. Table 2.15 shows the results for the household 
level (columns (1) to (6)) and individual level (columns (7) to (8)). 
      We find that the results do not change in any noticeable may when we use 
instruments. The coefficients shown in columns (1) to (4) at Table 2.15 are not significant, 
the same as in section A at Table 2.7. The coefficients shown in columns (5) and (6) are 
significant. The coefficient shown in column (5) is -0.601, significant at the 1% level; 
and the coefficient shown in column (6) is 0.692, significant at the 5% level. Comparing 
with the corresponding coefficients shown in Table 2.7, we can see that although the 
estimated impact of the reform on household required educational expenditures is slightly 
smaller in Table 2.15, but the estimated impact of the reform on household voluntary 
educational expenditures is slightly larger in Table 2.15, both coefficients shown in Table 
2.7 and Table 2.15 are very close to each other. Then, we can see the results in columns 
(7) to (8). The one shown in column (7) is -0.498, significant at the 5% level; the one 
shown in column (8) is 0.527, significant at the 10% level. Compared with the 
coefficients shown in columns (3) to (4) in Table 2.9, although the estimated impact of 
the reform on individual required educational expenditures is larger, but the estimated 
impact of the reform on individual voluntary educational expenditures is smaller in Table 
2.15, both coefficients shown in Table 2.9 and Table 2.15 are very close to each other 
too. 
      From the above discussion, we can see that although there might be some 
measurement errors in the variables, the estimation of the reform's impact is not affected. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
      This paper tests for the existence of an intra-household flypaper effect by 
investigating the impact of an educational fee reduction reform in rural China on 
household expenditures. 
      Using household survey data from the Gansu Survey of Children and Families, I 
first investigate the impact of the reform on household level expenditures. I find that a 
one Yuan increase in the household intended transfers per capita from the reform leads to 
a 0.613 Yuan decrease in household required educational expenditures per capita, and a 
0.651 Yuan increase in household voluntary educational expenditures per capita. The 
absolute values of these two coefficients are not statistically different. But there are no 
significant impacts of the reform on household total income per capita, total expenditures 
per capita, or other categories of expenditures, including expenditures on food, non-food 
consumption and services, and health care. And I also find that a one Yuan increase in 
individual intended transfers leads to a 0.422 Yuan decrease in the individual required 
educational expenditures, but leads to a 0.586 Yuan increase in the individual voluntary 
educational expenditures. The absolute values of these two coefficients are also not 
significantly different. In addition, I find that with the same amount of increase in the 
intended transfers from the reform, households having more educated mothers spend 
more on voluntary educational items, and parents spend more on girls, older kids and kids 
enrolled in middle schools. Overall, this paper provides a strong evidence for the 
existence of an intra-household flypaper effect. 
      The findings in this paper also have policy implications. Besides the commonly 
recognized positive impacts of governments' educational subsidy programs on targeted 
children's enrolment, this paper shows that these programs also increase parents' 
investment on enrolled children's education, which increases their short- and long-run 
welfare. It also shows that when evaluating governments' educational subsidy programs, 






Figure 2.1 Gansu Province and GSCF counties  
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Table 2.1 Characteristics of households and children in the sample 
 2000 2000  2007 2007 
  Mean S.D.   Mean S.D. 
Panel A Households characteristics      
Household size 4.489 1.084   4.265  1.140 
Number of children 2.274 0.711  2.002 0.768 
Number of enrolled children  1.847 0.716  1.733 0.741 
Number of enrolled children/number of children  0.830 0.235  0.890 0.233 
Father's schooling year 6.953 3.566   7.251  2.899 
Mother's schooling year 4.192 3.513   5.275  3.436 
Land area per capita (Mu) 2.075 1.497   2.060  1.457 
Total income per capita (Yuan) 1052.819 1359.057  1375.746 1659.385 
Total expenditure per capita (Yuan) 1065.753 1101.159  1318.828 1001.087 
Observation 1629 1629  505 505 
      
Panel B Children characteristics       
Age 11.419 2.570   11.805  2.512 
Female  0.488 0.500   0.486  0.500 
Total enrolment rate 0.858 0.349   0.947  0.223 
Enrolment rate of children aged 9-16  0.930 0.255   0.982  0.131 
Observation 3498 3498   912  912  
      
    Of which, enrolled children       
Age 11.347 2.010   11.797  2.268 
Female 0.482 0.500   0.484  0.500 
Indicator for being enrolled in primary school 0.883 0.322   0.811  0.391 
Indicator for being enrolled in middle school 0.111 0.314   0.164  0.371 
Indicator for being enrolled in other levels of school  0.006 0.079   0.024  0.154 
Observation 3001 3001   864 864 














Table 2.2 Percentage of counties claiming to implement TEOS in each semester (%) 
Primary School       
 Fall, 2004 Spring, 2005 Fall, 2005 Spring, 2006 Fall, 2006 Spring. 2007
School Fees Exemption 15 65 65 100 100 100 
Textbook Exemption 30 75 75 100 100 100
Living Subsidy 0 10 15 65 70 70 
       
Middle School       
 Fall, 2004 Spring, 2005 Fall, 2005 Spring, 2006 Fall, 2006 Spring. 2007
School Fees Exemption 15 65 65 100 100 100 
Textbook Exemption 30 80 80 100 100 100 
Living Subsidy 0 60 65 95 95 95 
       






Table 2.3 Percentage of children claiming to have TEOS in each semester (%)
Primary School        
 Fall, 2004 Spring, 2005 Fall, 2005 Spring, 2006 Fall, 2006 Spring. 2007 Total student number 
School Fees Exemption 7.32 44.24 52.10 61.94 92.07 95.73 1311 
Textbook Exemption 7.70 40.12 48.97 60.34 80.70 85.74 1311 
Living Subsidy 0.00 0.31 0.31 0.69 0.84 0.92 1311 
        
Middle School        
 Fall, 2004 Spring, 2005 Fall, 2005 Spring, 2006 Fall, 2006 Spring. 2007 Total student number 
School Fees Exemption 8.53 40.30 49.47 56.29 88.06 91.04 469
Textbook Exemption 8.10 41.36 49.89 56.50 74.63 78.04 469 
Living Subsidy 0.21 3.20 3.20 4.90 7.25 8.96 469 
(1) The total student sample is constructed according to the following (a) children must be in school, (b) children reporting policy time later 
than "liu ji" time were dropped; (c) children having drop-out experience were dropped; (d) primary school student 
sample includes students in grade 3 to grade 6 in 2007; middle school student sample includes student in grade 3. 









Table 2.4  Intended transfer and household expenditures in 2007            
 All  Richest 30% Poorest 30% 
Variables Mean Percentage (%)   Mean Percentage (%)  Mean Percentage (%)
Total expenditure per capita 1318.828 100  1871.353 100 1041.442 100 
In which :         
Food expenditure per capita 425.418 32.257   644.890 34.461  301.357 28.937  
Non-food expenditure per capita 586.485 44.470   825.368 44.105  478.213 45.918  
Health expenditure per capita 202.250 15.336   272.060 14.538  165.480 15.889  
Required educational expenditure per capita 17.874 1.355   20.206 1.080  19.710 1.893  
Voluntary educational expenditure per capita 86.800 6.582   108.830 5.816  76.682 7.363  
        
Intended transfer per capita 39.183 2.971   41.115 2.197  39.305 3.774  
OBS 505 505   152 152  152 152 
Note: .           
(1) Percentages in this table are percentage of total expenditure per capita       
(2) All money is deflated to year 2000 value         
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Table 2.5 Household expenditures in years 2000 and 2007  
   2000 2007 2007-2000 
Total expenditure per capita 1065.753 1318.828 253.075***
 (1101.159) (1001.087) (52.238) 
Food expenditure per capita 264.245 425.418 161.173***
 (251.209) (327.658) (15.853) 
Non-food expenditure per capita 501.916 586.485 84.569** 
 (923.528) (688.433) (38.237) 
Health expenditure per capita 157.725 202.250 44.525** 
 (323.759) (390.756) (19.149) 
Required educational expenditure per capita 89.223 17.874 -71.349***
 (106.120) (43.939) (3.277) 
Voluntary educational expenditure per capita 52.643 86.800 34.157*** 
 (79.675) (134.694) (6.311) 
Number of households 1629 505   






























Table 2.6 Descriptive results  
 Total expenditure per capita  Expenditure on food per capita  
 Treated Untreated Treated-Untreated  Treated Untreated Treated-Untreated 
2000 1178.58  922.65  255.93   301.36  218.53  82.83  
2007 1516.85  1080.65  436.20   457.37  351.80  105.57  
2007-2000 338.27  158.00  180.27   156.01  133.27  22.74  
      
 Expenditure on non-food goods and service per capita  Expenditure on health care per capita 
 Treated Untreated Treated-Untreated  Treated Untreated Treated-Untreated 
2000 544.75  434.88  109.87   157.89  157.86  0.03  
2007 677.13  489.13  188.00   235.13  170.64  64.49  
2007-2000 132.38  54.25  78.13   77.24  12.78  64.46  
      
 Required education expenditure per capita  Voluntary education expenditure per capita 
 Treated Untreated Treated-Untreated  Treated Untreated Treated-Untreated 
2000 114.72  65.03  49.69   59.86  46.34  13.51  
2007 23.86  14.44  9.42   124.66  55.81  68.84  
2007-2000 -90.87  -50.59  -40.27***   64.80  9.47  55.33*** 
* 10% significant level; ** 5% significant level; *** 1% significant level. 
In this table, "Treated" group includes the villages where the average saving from the reform is above the median value. "Untreated" group includes the 














Table 2.7 Impacts of education fee reduction reform on household expenditure  



























Section A  2000-2007        
Intended transfer/total 
family member -0.677 -2.222 -0.014 -1.770 -0.476 -0.613 0.651 
 (2.869) (2.214) (0.464) (1.539) (0.700) (0.137)*** (0.264)** 
        
Observations 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134 
R-squared 0.25 0.22 0.50 0.13 0.11 0.45 0.53 
Wald Test: H0: Absolute value of coefficients in columns (6) and (7) are equal; P-value=0.899 
        
Section B  2000-2004        
Hypothetical intended 
transfer 
/total family member 
4.498 0.844 -0.227 -0.007 0.699 0.149 0.231 
 (5.665) (2.013) (0.542) (1.080) (1.259) (0.109) (0.198) 
        
Observations 2991 2991 2991 2991 2991 2991 2991 
R-squared 0.21 0.28 0.43 0.17 0.06 0.63 0.58 
                
Village variables in 
year 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log value of 
household 
income per capita 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household 
endowments Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num. of kids enrolled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household 
demographic structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are calculated clustering over villages; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
(1) village variables in 2000 include illiterate ratio, ratio of primary school graduates in labor force, primary school enrollment rate, middle school 
enrollment rate, indicator for having preschool classes, distance of primary school from the village seat,  log value of money given to schools by 
village, indicator for having primary school run by the village, indicator for having middle school run by the village, indicator for having railway 
through the village, indicator for having bus stop in the village, log value of average agricultural income per capita, log value of average industrial 
income per capita, ratio of households engaged in non-agricultural work, ratio of households running household enterprise, log value of wage for men 
doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage for women doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage to hire labor for agricultural production, 
indicator for having enterprises owned by county, indicator for having enterprises owned by township, indicator for having private enterprises.   
(2) household endowments include land area per capita, mother's schooling year and father's schooling year. 
(3) number of kids enrolled includes number of kids enrolled in primary school, number of kids enrolled in middle school, number of kids enrolled in 
high school and number of kids enrolled in other level of schools 
(4) household demographic structure includes ratio of male aged 0-5, ratio of male aged 6-12, ratio of male aged 13-16, ratio of male aged 17-19, ratio 
of male aged 20-29, ratio of male aged 30-39, ratio of male aged 40-49, ratio of male aged 50-54, ratio of male aged above 54, ratio of female aged 0-5, 
ratio of female aged 6-12, ratio of female aged 13-16, ratio of female aged 17-19, ratio of female aged 20-29, ratio of female aged 30-39, ratio of female 


















Table 2.8 Heterogeneity of the reform's impacts on household expenditure on voluntary educational items per capita 
























Intended transfer from the reform per capita(*)log value of household income per capita 0.148    
 (0.121)    
Intended transfer from the reform per capita(*)total number of enrolled kids  0.274   
  (0.202)   
Intended transfer from the reform per capita(*)mother's schooling year   0.083  
   (0.040)**  
Intended transfer from the reform per capita(*)father's schooling year     0.037 
    (0.051) 
Intended transfer from the reform per capita -0.348 -0.081 0.048 0.353 
 (0.828) (0.443) (0.399) (0.529) 
     
Village variables in year 2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log value of household 
income per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household endowments Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num. of kids enrolled Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household demographic structure Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2134 2134 2134 2134 
R-squared 0.53 0.36 0.53 0.53 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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(1) village variables in 2000 include illiterate ratio, ratio of primary school graduates in labor force, primary school enrollment rate, middle school 
enrollment rate, indicator for having preschool classes, distance of primary school from the village seat,  log value of money given to schools by 
village, indicator for having primary school run by the village, indicator for having middle school run by the village, indicator for having railway 
through the village, indicator for having bus stop in the village, log value of average agricultural income per capita, log value of average industrial 
income per capita, ratio of households engaged in non-agricultural work, ratio of households running household enterprise, log value of wage for men 
doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage for women doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage to hire labor for agricultural production, 
indicator for having enterprises owned by county, indicator for having enterprises owned by township, indicator for having private enterprises.   
(2) household endowments include land area per capita, mother's schooling year and father's schooling year.  
(3) number of kids enrolled includes number of kids enrolled in primary school, number of kids enrolled in middle school, number of kids enrolled in 
high school and number of kids enrolled in other level of schools 
(4) household demographic structure includes ratio of male aged 0-5, ratio of male aged 6-12, ratio of male aged 13-16, ratio of male aged 17-19, 
ratio of male aged 20-29, ratio of male aged 30-39, ratio of male aged 40-49, ratio of male aged 50-54, ratio of male aged above 54, ratio of female 
aged 0-5, ratio of female aged 6-12, ratio of female aged 13-16, ratio of female aged 17-19, ratio of female aged 20-29, ratio of female aged 30-39, 






















Table 2.9 Impacts of education fee reduction reform on individual education expenditures  

















Section A 2000-2007         
Deviation of individual intended transfer  
from the reform from household mean value 
-0.493 0.578 
 
Individual intended transfer 
 from the reform -0.422 0.586 




Sum of other kids' intended  
transfer from the reform -0.085 0.012 
       (0.090) (0.118) 
         
Observations 3865 3865   3865 3865 
R-squared 0.47 0.44   0.38 0.49 
Wald test: H0: |(1)|=|(2)|, P-value: 0.794  Wald test: H0: |(3)|=|(4)|, P-value: 0.550 
         
Section B 2000-2004         
Deviation of individual intended transfer  
from the reform from household mean value -0.241 0.332 
 
Individual intended transfer  
from the reform 0.021 0.328 
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 (0.155) (0.356)    (0.122) (0.251) 
 
   
Sum of other kids' intended  
transfer from the reform 0.043 -0.016 
       (0.095) (0.139) 
         
Observations 5342 5342     5342 5342 
R-squared 0.653 0.397     0.66 0.52 
            
Deviation of individual characteristics from 
household mean value Yes Yes 
 
Village variables in 2000 
interacted 
with year 2007 dummy  
Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes Yes  Individual characteristics Yes Yes 
       Dummies for grade enrolled Yes Yes 
    Household endowments Yes Yes 
    Household demographic structure Yes Yes 
    Household income per capita Yes Yes 
    Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
           Village fixed effect Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
(1) village variables in 2000 include illiterate ratio, ratio of primary school graduates in labor force, primary school enrollment rate, middle school 
enrollment rate, indicator for having preschool classes, distance of primary school from the village seat,  log value of money given to schools by 
village, indicator for having primary school run by the village, indicator for having middle school run by the village, indicator for having railway 
through the village, indicator for having bus stop in the village, log value of average agricultural income per capita, log value of average industrial 
income per capita, ratio of households engaged in non-agricultural work, ratio of households running household enterprise, log value of wage for men 
doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage for women doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage to hire labor for agricultural production, 
indicator for having enterprises owned by county, indicator for having enterprises owned by township, indicator for having private enterprises.   
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(2) individual characteristics include indicator for female and age 
(3) dummies for grade enrolled include indicator for being enrolled in grade1-grade6 in primary schools, grade1-grade3 in middle schools, 
grade1-grade3 in high schools and other levels of schools 
(4) household endowments include land area per capita, mother's schooling year and father's schooling year  
(5) household demographic structure includes ratio of male aged 0-5, ratio of male aged 6-12, ratio of male aged 13-16, ratio of male aged 17-19 ratio 
of male aged 20-29, ratio of male aged 30-39, ratio of male aged 40-49, ratio of male aged 50-54, ratio of male aged above 54, ratio of female aged 
0-5 ratio of female aged 6-12, ratio of female aged 13-16, ratio of female aged 17-19, ratio of female aged 20-29, ratio of female aged 30-39, ratio of 


























Table 2.10 Heterogeneity of the reform's impacts on individual voluntary expenditure on educational items  














Individual intended transfer from the reform*indicator for female 0.585   
 (0.219)***   
Individual intended transfer from the reform*birth order  -0.471  
  (0.166)***  
Individual intended transfer from the reform*middle school dummy   0.864 
   (0.369)** 
Individual intended transfer from the reform 0.343 0.934 -0.053 
 (0.266) (0.295)*** (0.327) 
Household aggregate saving from the reform Yes Yes Yes 
Birth order No Yes No 
Village variables in 2000 Yes Yes Yes 
Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for grade enrolled Yes Yes Yes 
Household endowments Yes Yes Yes 
Household demographic structure Yes Yes Yes 
Household income per capita Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3865 3865 3865 
R-squared 0.49 0.49 0.46 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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(1) village variables in 2000 include illiterate ratio, ratio of primary school graduates in labor force, primary school enrollment rate, middle school 
enrollment rate, indicator for having preschool classes, distance of primary school from the village seat,  log value of money given to schools by village, 
indicator for having primary school run by the village, indicator for having middle school run by the village, indicator for having railway through the 
village, indicator for having bus stop in the village, log value of average agricultural income per capita, log value of average industrial income per capita, 
ratio of households engaged in non-agricultural work, ratio of households running household enterprise, log value of wage for men doing non-agricultural 
work, log value of wage for women doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage to hire labor for agricultural production, indicator for having 
enterprises owned by county, indicator for having enterprises owned by township, indicator for having private enterprises.   
(2) individual characteristics include indicator for female and age 
(3) dummies for grade enrolled include indicator for being enrolled in grade1-grade6 in primary schools, grade1-grade3 in middle schools, grade1-grade3 
in high schools and other levels of schools 
(4) household endowments include land area per capita, mother's schooling year and father's schooling year  
(5) household demographic structure includes ratio of male aged 0-5, ratio of male aged 6-12, ratio of male aged 13-16, ratio of male aged 17-19 ratio of 
male aged 20-29, ratio of male aged 30-39, ratio of male aged 40-49, ratio of male aged 50-54, ratio of male aged above 54, ratio of female aged 0-5 ratio 
of female aged 6-12, ratio of female aged 13-16, ratio of female aged 17-19, ratio of female aged 20-29, ratio of female aged 30-39, ratio of female aged 




















Table 2.11 Decomposition of the reform's impact on voluntary educational expenditures  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Expenditure on  
voluntary education 





on school supplies 
Expenditure on 
snack in school 
and transportation 
Intended transfer/total family member 0.651   -0.007 0.193 0.464 
  (0.264)**   (0.027) (0.095)** (0.210)** 
Village variables in year 2000 Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Log value of household 
income per capita Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Household endowments Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Num. of kids enrolled Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Household demographic structure Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2134   2134 2134 2134 
R-squared 0.53    0.20 0.48 0.47 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are calculated clustering over villages; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1% 
(1) village variables in 2000 include illiterate ratio, ratio of primary school graduates in labor force, primary school enrollment rate, middle school 
enrollment rate, indicator for having preschool classes, distance of primary school from the village seat,  log value of money given to schools by 
village, indicator for having primary school run by the village, indicator for having middle school run by the village, indicator for having railway 
through the village, indicator for having bus stop in the village, log value of average agricultural income per capita, log value of average industrial 
income per capita, ratio of households engaged in non-agricultural work, ratio of households running household enterprise, log value of wage for men 
doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage for women doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage to hire labor for agricultural production, 
indicator for having enterprises owned by county, indicator for having enterprises owned by township, indicator for having private enterprises.   
(2) household endowments include land area per capita, mother's schooling year and father's schooling year.  
(3) number of kids enrolled includes number of kids enrolled in primary school, number of kids enrolled in middle school, number of kids enrolled in 
high school and number of kids enrolled in other level of schools 
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(4) household demographic structure includes ratio of male aged 0-5, ratio of male aged 6-12, ratio of male aged 13-16, ratio of male aged 17-19, ratio 
of male aged 20-29, ratio of male aged 30-39, ratio of male aged 40-49, ratio of male aged 50-54, ratio of male aged above 54, ratio of female aged 0-5, 
ratio of female aged 6-12, ratio of female aged 13-16, ratio of female aged 17-19, ratio of female aged 20-29, ratio of female aged 30-39, ratio of 




































Table 2.12 Robustness check using intended transfer II in household level regression  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 Household income per capita 
Total expenditure
per capita 









care per capita 
Expenditure on 
required  
education items per 
capita 
Expenditure on  
voluntary education 
items per capita 
Intended transfer II/total 
family member -1.914 -2.505 -0.294 -1.980 -0.250 -0.608 0.627 
 (2.123) (2.421) (0.452) (1.878) (0.643) (0.129)*** (0.265)** 
Wald test: H0: (6) in table 12 = (6) in section A in table 7;  (7) in table 12 = (7) in section A in table 7; P-value:  0.880 0.755 
        
Village variables in year 
2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Log value of household 
income per capita No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household endowments Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Num. of kids enrolled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household demographic 
structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134 
R-squared 0.56 0.22 0.50 0.14 0.11 0.45 0.53 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are calculated clustering over villages; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(1) village variables in 2000 include illiterate ratio, ratio of primary school graduates in labor force, primary school enrollment rate, middle school enrollment rate, indicator for having 
preschool classes, distance of primary school from the village seat,  log value of money given to schools by village, indicator for having primary school run by the village, indicator for 
having middle school run by the village, indicator for having railway through the village, indicator for having bus stop in the village, log value of average agricultural income per capita, log 
value of average industrial income per capita, ratio of households engaged in non-agricultural work, ratio of households running household enterprise, log value of wage for men doing 
non-agricultural work, log value of wage for women doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage to hire labor for agricultural production, indicator for having enterprises owned by 
county, indicator for having enterprises owned by township, indicator for having private enterprises.   
(2) household endowments include land area per capita, mother's schooling year and father's schooling year.  
(3) number of kids enrolled includes number of kids enrolled in primary school, number of kids enrolled in middle school, number of kids enrolled in high school and number of kids enrolled 
in other level of schools 
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(4) household demographic structure includes ratio of male aged 0-5, ratio of male aged 6-12, ratio of male aged 13-16, ratio of male aged 17-19, ratio of male aged 20-29, ratio of male aged 
30-39, ratio of male aged 40-49, ratio of male aged 50-54, ratio of male aged above 54, ratio of female aged 0-5, ratio of female aged 6-12, ratio of female aged 13-16, ratio of female aged 
































Table 2.13 Robustness check using intended transfer II in individual level regression  











Deviation of individual intended 
transfer  
from the reform from household 
mean value 
-0.464 0.586  
Individual intended 
transfer 
 from the reform 
-0.421 0.537 




Sum of other kids' 
intended  





  (0.080) (0.101) 
         
Observations 3865 3865   3865 3865 
R-squared 0.47 0.44   0.38 0.49 
Wald test: H0: coefficients in 
this table is equal to coefficients 
in section A in table 2.9; 
P-value: 
0.282 0.944 
  0.975 0.519 
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Deviation of individual 




Village variables in 
2000 interacted with 
year 2007 dummy  
Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes Yes  
Individual 
characteristics Yes Yes 
     
 
Dummies for grade 
enrolled Yes Yes 
    
Household 
endowments Yes Yes 
    
Household 
demographic structure Yes Yes 
    
Household income per 
capita Yes Yes 
    Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
           Village fixed effect Yes Yes 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; 
(1) village variables in 2000 include illiterate ratio, ratio of primary school graduates in labor force, primary school enrollment rate, middle school 
enrollment rate, indicator for having preschool classes, distance of primary school from the village seat,  log value of money given to schools by 
village, indicator for having primary school run by the village, indicator for having middle school run by the village, indicator for having railway 
through the village, indicator for having bus stop in the village, log value of average agricultural income per capita, log value of average industrial 
income per capita, ratio of households engaged in non-agricultural work, ratio of households running household enterprise, log value of wage for men 
doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage for women doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage to hire labor for agricultural production, 
indicator for having enterprises owned by county, indicator for having enterprises owned by township, indicator for having private enterprises.   
(2) individual characteristics include indicator for female and age 
(3) dummies for grade enrolled include indicator for being enrolled in grade1-grade6 in primary schools, grade1-grade3 in middle schools, 
grade1-grade3 in high schools and other levels of schools 
(4) household endowments include land area per capita, mother's schooling year and father's schooling year  
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(5) household demographic structure includes ratio of male aged 0-5, ratio of male aged 6-12, ratio of male aged 13-16, ratio of male aged 17-19 ratio 
of male aged 20-29, ratio of male aged 30-39, ratio of male aged 40-49, ratio of male aged 50-54, ratio of male aged above 54, ratio of female aged 
0-5 ratio of female aged 6-12, ratio of female aged 13-16, ratio of female aged 17-19, ratio of female aged 20-29, ratio of female aged 30-39, ratio of 






























Table 2.14 Robustness check of change in the specification of regressions  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) 




























Expenditure on required education items per capita (Household 
intended transfer from the reform per capita as IV) 1.748 3.626 0.023 2.888 0.776 -1.061 
  
 (3.524) (3.471) (0.757) (2.426) (1.139) (0.510)**
  
Individual required education expenditure (Individual intended 
transfer from the reform as IV) 




      
 
(0.671)*
Sum of other kids' required education expenditure(Sum of other 
kids' intended transfer in the same family as IV) 
      
 
0.074 




F-test: H0: (6) =-1 ; (7) =-1; P-value:      0.608  
0.643 
         
Village variables in year 2000 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Log value of household 
income per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Household endowments Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Num. of kids enrolled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
No 
Household demographic structure 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Individual characteristics No No No No No No 
 
Yes 
Dummies for grade enrolled No No No No No No 
 
Yes 
Year fixed effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Village fixed effect 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
Observations 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134 
 
3865 
R-squared 0.55 0.20 0.50 0.08 0.08   
    
Robust standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.     
(1) village variables in 2000 include illiterate ratio, ratio of primary school graduates in labor force, primary school enrollment rate, middle school enrollment rate, indicator for having 
preschool classes, distance of primary school from the village seat,  log value of money given to schools by village, indicator for having primary school run by the village, indicator for 
having middle school run by the village, indicator for having railway through the village, indicator for having bus stop in the village, log value of average agricultural income per capita, 
log value of average industrial income per capita, ratio of households engaged in non-agricultural work, ratio of households running household enterprise, log value of wage for men doing 
non-agricultural work, log value of wage for women doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage to hire labor for agricultural production, indicator for having enterprises owned by 
county, indicator for having enterprises owned by township, indicator for having private enterprises.   
(2) household endowments include land area per capita, mother's schooling year and father's schooling year.  
(3) number of kids enrolled includes number of kids enrolled in primary school, number of kids enrolled in middle school, number of kids enrolled in high school and number of kids 
enrolled in other level of schools 
(4) household demographic structure includes ratio of male aged 0-5, ratio of male aged 6-12, ratio of male aged 13-16, ratio of male aged 17-19, ratio of male aged 20-29, ratio of male 
aged 30-39, ratio of male aged 40-49, ratio of male aged 50-54, ratio of male aged above 54, ratio of female aged 0-5, ratio of female aged 6-12, ratio of female aged 13-16, ratio of female 
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aged 17-19, ratio of female aged 20-29, ratio of female aged 30-39, ratio of female aged 40-49, ratio of female aged 50-54 and total number of family members.  
(5) individual characteristics include indicator for female and age 
(6) dummies for grade enrolled include indicator for being enrolled in grade1-grade6 in primary schools, grade1-grade3 in middle schools, grade1-grade3 in high schools and other levels 
of schools 
(7) The F-value of the first stage regression is 20.10  for IV estimates in the household level regressions; The F-value of the first stage regression is 26.83 for individual saving as IV, and 




























Table 2.15 Impacts of educational fee reduction reform on expenditures after correcting for measurement error  














care per capita 
Expenditure on 
required  
















family member -2.012 0.059 -1.661 -0.501 -0.601 0.692      
 (2.359) (0.601) (1.572) (0.709) (0.139)*** (0.310)**      
Individual intended transfer         -0.498 0.527 
         (0.232)** (0.293)* 
Sum of other kids' intended 
transfer 
      
 
-0.157 -0.012 
               (0.147) (0.173) 
       
Village variables in year 
2000 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Log value of household 
income per capita Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Household endowments Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Num. of kids enrolled Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   No NO 
Household demographic 
structure Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Individual characteristics No No No No No No   Yes Yes 
Dummies for grade enrolled No No No No No No   Yes Yes 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Village fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Observations 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134 2134   3865 3865 
R-squared 0.06 0.22 0.07 0.09 0.30        0.01 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, standard errors are calculated clustering over villages; * significant at10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
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(1) village variables in 2000 include illiterate ratio, ratio of primary school graduates in labor force, primary school enrollment rate, middle school enrollment rate, indicator for having 
preschool classes, distance of primary school from the village seat,  log value of money given to schools by village, indicator for having primary school run by the village, indicator for 
having middle school run by the village, indicator for having railway through the village, indicator for having bus stop in the village, log value of average agricultural income per capita, log 
value of average industrial income per capita, ratio of households engaged in non-agricultural work, ratio of households running household enterprise, log value of wage for men doing 
non-agricultural work, log value of wage for women doing non-agricultural work, log value of wage to hire labor for agricultural production, indicator for having enterprises owned by county, 
indicator for having enterprises owned by township, indicator for having private enterprises.   
(2) household endowments include land area per capita, mother's schooling year and father's schooling year.  
(3) number of kids enrolled includes number of kids enrolled in primary school, number of kids enrolled in middle school, number of kids enrolled in high school and number of kids enrolled 
in other level of schools 
(4) household demographic structure includes ratio of male aged 0-5, ratio of male aged 6-12, ratio of male aged 13-16, ratio of male aged 17-19, ratio of male aged 20-29, ratio of male aged 
30-39, ratio of male aged 40-49, ratio of male aged 50-54, ratio of male aged above 54, ratio of female aged 0-5, ratio of female aged 6-12, ratio of female aged 13-16, ratio of female aged 
17-19, ratio of female aged 20-29, ratio of female aged 30-39, ratio of female aged 40-49, ratio of female aged 50-54 and total number of family members.  
(5) individual characteristics include indicator for female and age 






Table 2.A Testing household utility function  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 











Total expenditure - required educational expenditures 0.009 0.991   
 (0.002)*** (0.002)***   
Total income - required educational expenditures -0.001 0.170
   (0.001) (0.019)*** 
Land area per capita -2.650 2.650 -2.640 9.406 
 (6.392) (6.392) (6.450) (89.534) 
Mother's schooling years -2.908 2.908 -2.220 55.713 
 (2.320) (2.320) (2.341) (32.495)* 
Father's schooling years 1.168 -1.168 1.431 22.471 
 (2.129) (2.129) (2.148) (29.822) 
Num of kids enrolled in primary schools  52.041 -52.041 50.182 -295.185 
 (15.171)*** (15.171)*** (15.307)*** (212.484) 
Num of kids enrolled in middle schools 226.332 -226.332 231.360 391.294 
 (20.452)*** (20.452)*** (20.619)*** (286.229) 
Num of kids enrolled in high schools  930.718 -930.718 934.668 -45.104 
 (62.558)*** (62.558)*** (63.177)*** (877.021) 
Num of kids enrolled in other levels of schools  2,109.959 -2,109.959 2,119.839 316.783 
 (134.436)*** (134.436)*** (135.876)*** (1,886.208) 
Household demographic structure YES YES YES YES 
Village fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1629 1629 1629 1629 
R-squared 0.54 1.00  0.53 0.23 
Standard errors in parentheses     
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      There were numerous famines during the twentieth century36. The largest of these 
was China's 1959-1961 famine, which resulted in about 30 million excess deaths37. 
Previous research has focused on estimating excess mortality; however, there were 
undoubtedly important effects on the livings as well38. In particular, children born during 
the famine may have suffered from malnutrition in the initial years of life, resulting in 
adverse long term health effects and influencing economic and social attainments as 
adults. In this chapter, I investigate the long term effects of China's 1959-1961 famine on 
the adult education, labor market performance, and wealth of rural Chinese women and 
men who were exposed to the famine in utero and during the first two years of life. 
      Because of lack of food in the famine, children suffered from insufficient nutrition 
intake, which damaged their health. This health shock may have had a long-term effect 
simply because it persists over time. The health shock could also affect other outcomes, 
such as educational attainment and labor market performance, which help determine 
long-run well-being. On the other hand, estimates of famine impacts are complicated by 
potential selection bias. First, parents living through the famine could alter their fertility 
decisions. Parents unable to provide adequate support for children could choose to 
postpone childbearing, so that only parents with better endowments or better family 
background would still have children. Second, because of the negative impacts of famine 
on women's health, only those in good health were able to conceive. Both of these led to 
positive fertility selection. Third, weaker children were more likely to die during the 
                                                 
36 Sen, 1981; Ravallion, 1987 
37 Ashton et al., 1984 
38 Steinet et al.,1975; Barker et al., 2005 
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famine, leading to another positive selection with respect to children's health. The 
combination of negative shocks and positive selection complicates estimates of famine 
effects. After the famine ended, parents postponing having children in the famine started 
to have children, and women in worse health in the famine resumed fertility ability; both 
of these led to negative fertility selection for children born directly after the famine. In 
this paper, I provide a conceptual framework to describe the above responses to the 
famine, and estimate the long term effects of the famine after controlling for positive 
fertility selection during the famine. I also provide some suggestive evidence of negative 
fertility selection right after the famine. 
      The data requirements for conducting such an investigation are considerable. 
Information is required on the extent of famine experienced by individuals many years 
ago, as well as detailed information on adult outcomes in the present day. I use provincial 
excess death rates in 1959-1961 to measure famine intensity. Outcome variables are from 
the China 2000 population census. Because the 2000 census data contains information 
about every individual's birth province, as well as her year and month of birth, it is 
possible to link each individual's adult outcomes with the famine intensity experienced in 
her childhood. Additionally, the availability of birth month makes it possible to control 
for positive selection from fertility. I have estimated the long term effects of the famine 
by comparing cohorts conceived before the famine, therefore not affected by the positive 
fertility selection due to the famine, but affected by the famine, i.e. born between 
February 1957 and June 1959, with those not affected by the famine, i.e. born between 
January 1954 and January 1957, and comparing individuals born in different provinces. 
Using a sample of rural women from the China 2000 population census data, after 
controlling for fertility selection, I find that women exposed to the famine with 10% 
higher death rate than normal in the first year of life completed 0.024 fewer years of 
schooling, had a 0.54% lower probability of completing high school, worked 0.014 fewer 
days per week, and lived in houses with 0.005 fewer rooms and 0.199 square meters less 
housing area per capita. I do not find significant effects of the famine on men, nor do I 
find significant effects of the famine on individuals exposed to it in utero or in the second 
year. In order to test positive fertility selection in the famine, I replace cohorts born 
between February 1957 and June 1959 with cohorts born between July 1959 and October 
 
75
1962, i.e., those affected by the famine in the initial years of life and whose parents' 
fertility decisions were also affected by the famine, and repeat the analyses. I find that the 
famine effects become much weaker, which supports positive fertility selection during 
the famine. I then test for negative fertility selection after the famine by adding cohorts 
born after the famine to the first sample as a control group, and re-estimate the famine 
effects; I find that the significant negative effects of the famine become insignificant or 
weaker. This provides some suggestive evidence for the existence of negative fertility 
selection immediately after the famine. 
      Four other papers have focused on the long term effects of China's 1959-1961 
famine. Using Chinese Household and Health Survey (CHNS) data, Luo et al. (2006) 
found that women exposed to greater severity of famine in early life were more likely to 
be overweight as adults. However, they only compared mean value of weight for 
different groups in different years without running any regressions, such that their results 
could not be thought of as precisely estimated famine effects. Using the same data set, 
Chen and Zhou (2007) found that cohorts exposed to the famine had a lower average 
height, less labor supply, and less income. Without detailed information of birth month in 
CHNS data, their measurement of famine severity, i.e. 1960 death rate, could not capture 
different exposure to the famine of cohorts born in different months.  By analyzing 
China’s 1990 population census data and the CHNS data, Meng and Qian (2006) found 
that exposure to the famine reduced height, weight, weight-for-height, head 
circumference, educational attainment, and labor supply. But in their paper, they did not 
look at different effects of famine on men and women. Almond et al. (2007) found that 
cohorts exposed to higher exogenous mortality in utero were more likely to be poorer, 
disabled, and illiterate; these cohorts were also more likely not to work, to have worse 
marriage market outcomes and have daughters. They also used China’s 2000 population 
census data. Since the Great Famine in China lasted for three years, cohorts born in the 
beginning of the famine were affected by the famine in the first two years of life, which 
are also considered as a very important period for children’s physical and psychological 
development. Therefore, just looking at in utero effects might understate the true effects 
of the famine. More importantly, all the above four papers did not deal with selection 
problem explicitly.  
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      I use China’s 2000 population census data, which includes detailed information of 
birth month, making it possible to construct a famine intensity measurement precisely 
reflecting different cohorts’ different exposure to the famine in utero, in the first year and 
in the second year. Especially, I can use the information of birth month to deal with 
different fertility selections due to the famine, i.e. positive fertility selection in the famine 
and negative fertility selection immediately after39. To the best of my knowledge, it is the 
first time in the literature to deal with fertility selection problem in the estimation of the 
long run impacts of the famine. Furthermore, I investigate in-utero, first year, and second 
year effects separately, which helps to identify famine effects more precisely, and 
provides some evidence about which stages in early life are more important in children's 
development. Finally, I examine the impacts of the famine on men and women separately, 
which provides some evidence on gender inequality.  
      This paper is related to other research about the effects of famines in other 
countries. For example, Stein et al. (1975) investigated the long term consequences of 
malnutrition on 40,000 children conceived and born during the 1944-1945 Dutch famine, 
and found no lasting effects of prenatal malnutrition on health status or mental 
performance. However, they found negative effects of more prolonged malnutrition in 
postnatal life. Barker et al. (2005) found that survivors of the 1944-1945 Dutch famine 
were more likely to have cardiovascular disease. This paper is also related to research 
using non-Chinese data on the impact of early life conditions on adult outcomes. Almond 
and Chay (2003) found that better conditions in early life for U.S. black women led to 
better health in adulthood and higher birth weight of the women's children. Behrman and 
Rosenzweig (2004) used U.S. data to exploit intrauterine nutrient intake differences 
between monozygotic female twins. They found a strong impact of fetal growth on 
schooling attainment and height. Royer (2005) documented long-run and 
intergenerational effects of birth weight differences between twins. Almond (2006) found 
that U. S. cohorts who were in utero during the 1918 influenza pandemic had worse adult 
outcomes as they aged than cohorts born just before and after the pandemic in terms of 
educational attainment, physical disability, socioeconomic status and mortality. 
                                                 
39 GØrgens et al. (2005) estimated the impacts of the Great Famine in China on height of cohorts after 
controlling for selection from children death. But they did not address selection from fertility. 
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Lindeboom et al. (2006) showed that poor macroeconomic conditions in early life 
reduced longevity in the Netherlands. Alderman et al. (2006) found that rainfall shocks 
and exposure to war affected early-life nutrition and later height and schooling levels of 
young adults in Zimbabwe. Maccini and Yang (2006) found that higher early-life rainfall 
had a positive effect on the adult outcomes of women but not of men, using Indonesian 
data. 
      The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides background 
and description of the famine. Section 3.3 provides a conceptual framework for how the 
famine affected individuals' adult outcomes and how different selections in and after the 
famine affect the estimates. Section 3.4 describes the data sources, sample and variables 
used. Section 3.5 presents the empirical strategy and results. Section 3.6 discusses, and 
Section 3.7 concludes. 
 
3.2 1959-1961 famine 
      After the People's Republic of China was founded in 1949, in order to quickly 
catch up to western nations, the government adopted a heavy-industry-oriented 
development strategy in 1952. In the same year, it started agricultural collectivization, 
replacing traditional family farms with collectively managed production teams. From 
1952 to 1958, agricultural and industrial outputs increased continuously and dramatically. 
Prompted by this success and a desire to surpass developed countries, Chairman Mao 
Zedong launched the Great Leap Forward to accelerate economic growth. In rural areas, 
the People's Commune movement was also launched on a full scale in the summer of 
1958. The People's Commune created huge collectives and eliminated all private 
ownership; it also provided free food through large commune dining halls. The 
Communist Party told the people that China would soon enter the communism stage, 
when people could get whatever they needed; however, only one year later, the country 
was in crisis.  
      Beginning in the winter of 1958, starvation was observed in Sichuan and Anhui 
provinces. By the spring of 1959, starvation became widespread. The estimated daily 
availability of food energy per capita during this period decreased considerably to about 
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1800 calories, reaching a low point of only 1500 calories in 196040. A study using 
demographic data released after the start of economic reforms concluded that this crisis 
resulted in about 30 million excess deaths41. From Figure 3.1, we can see that the crude 
death rate42 dramatically increased between 1959 and 1960. Facing such a severe famine, 
parents might decide not to have children or delay having children, and weaker women 
might not be able to conceive. According to Peng (1987), total fertility up to age 39 was 
about 5.6 births per woman in pre-famine years, but it dropped to its lowest historic level, 
3.06, in 1961. From Figure 3.1, we can also see that the crude birth rate43 dropped 
sharply between 1959 and 1961. Both the increase in death rate and the decrease in birth 
rate led to a dramatic decrease in population between 1959 and 1961, shown in Figure 
3.2.  
      Although the famine occurred nationally in 1959-1961, there was large regional 
variation44. Table 3.1 shows the distribution of provincial death rates. We can also see 
this geographic variation in Figure 3.3. In 1959, the most severe famine occurred in the 
Sichuan province, where the death rate was 4.7%; however, the lowest death rate, which 
was only 0.78%, was observed in Shanghai City. In 1960, when the famine was the most 
severe nationally, variation across provinces was still large. The Anhui province became 
the province with the highest death rate (6.86%), while Shanghai City still had the lowest 
death rate (0.69%). In 1961, when the famine was nearing its end, the Sichuan province 
had the highest death rate of 2.94%, and Shanghai City still had the lowest death rate of 
0.77%. 
      In January 1962, the government abandoned its radical policies. The emphasis 
was shifted from steel production back to agriculture. As a result, grain output started to 
grow in 1962; in the same year, the famine ended. From Figure 3.1, we can see that the 
                                                 
40 Ashton et al., 1984 
41 Ashton et al., 1984 
42 Crude death rate is defined as number of deaths per 1000 people. I call it death rate for simplicity in this 
paper. The source and construction are discussed later. 
43 Crude birth rate is defined as number of births per 1000 people. I call it birth rate for simplicity in this 
paper. The source and construction are discussed later. 
44 Due to the government's preferential treatment of urban residents through a grain rationing system and 
the maintenance of government-controlled stockpiles, the lack of food was much more devastating in rural 
than in urban areas. Because of the variation in the proportion of rural population, population density, 
exposure to natural disaster, and provincial response to food shortages, exposure to the famine also varied 
greatly across provinces. (Ashton et al., 1984; Lin and Yang, 2000) 
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death rate resumed its normal level immediately when the famine ended in 1962. 
However, the birth rate did not return to its normal level right away. There was a 
dramatic increase in the birth rate in 1962, and it reached the highest point in 1963. There 
are two possible reasons: parents postponing having children in the famine might have 
started to have children when the famine ended, and those women not able to conceive 
during the famine recovered their fertility when they had enough nutritional intakes after 
the famine. This dramatic increase after the famine can be thought of as compensatory 
birth. After 1963, the birth rate decreased and went back to its normal level.  
 
3.3 Conceptual framework 
      Starting with Grossman (1972), individual health is typically considered as a 
function of an initial health endowment and other factors45. And the initial health 
endowment is determined by genetic characteristics, which are determined at conception, 
and environmental conditions experienced in early life. In biology, the idea that the 
environmental conditions in a certain sensitive level period of life may have irreversible 
effects is known as “critical-period programming.” Biological46 and economic studies47 
provide evidence for this idea. Since health status plays an important role in determining 
individuals' outcomes such as education, labor market performance and income48 . 
Therefore, I am actually investigating the reduced relation between environmental 
conditions in early life and the adult outcomes.  
      In this context, special attention should be given to likely directions of any 
selections. Individuals could only be included in the dataset used (the China 2000 
population census) if they were still alive in 2000. A potential worry is that the famine 
might affect the likelihood of survival through 2000, and those whose survival was 
induced by the famine could have different initial characteristics from the overall 
population of births in a locality in a particular year. The famine affected survival of 
children through three channels. First, during the famine, parents might have postponed 
having children if they felt unable to provide enough support for children.  Second, 
                                                 
45 Other factors might include historical health inputs, demographic variables, the time histories of 
community infrastructure, and the disease environment. 
46 See studies cited in (Barker, 1998; Diamond, 1991). 
47 See the papers cited in section 1. 
48 Behrman and Deolalikar, 1988; Currie and Madrian, 1999; Currie and Hyson, 1999. 
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women might not be able to conceive because of “famine amenorrhea”49  due to 
insufficient nutritional intake and subsequent poor health during the famine50. Third, after 
children were born in the famine, weaker children might have died due to lack of 
nutritional intake. When the famine ended, parents with lower endowments and those 
who had postponed having children during the famine started to have children, and 
weaker women not able to conceive during the famine could conceive when they got 
enough nutrition after the famine. In other words, the famine induced sample selectivity, 
biasing the regression estimates. As it turns out, the famine led to positive selection for 
cohorts conceived in the famine and negative selection for cohorts conceived 
immediately after the famine.  
      The joint distribution of married couples' endowments, women's health and 
newborn children's health is denoted by ( , , )F φ μ ψ . Higher values of φ  represent more 
endowments. There is a threshold
*φ , only those parents with endowments higher than 
*φ would like to have children, since they would be able to provide enough support for 
their children. Higher values of μ  represent better women's health. We also have a 
threshold
*μ , only those women with health better than *μ  are able to conceive. 
Higher values of ψ  represent better newborn children's health. There also exists a 
health threshold 
*ψ such that children with health below this threshold could not survive 
to adulthood. In addition, there exists another threshold g above which children have 
“good” health. Then, the proportion of children born and surviving to adulthood λ  is:  
* * *
( , , )Pλ φ μ ψφ μ ψ= ≥ ≥ ≥  
      Suppose that an inter-temporal health linkage exists, so that better infant health 
leads to better adult health, and only those with initial health above g have good health in 
adulthood. Then, the fraction of adults in good health, 
goodHealth , is:  
                                                 
49 Forster and Ranum, 1975. 
50 See (Frisch and McArthur, 1974; Frisch, 1978, 2002) for review of biological evidence. See (Ford et al., 
1989; Langsten, 1985; SG et al., 2007; Jowett, 1991) for description of “famine amenorrhea” in Bangladesh, 















      During and after the famine, both the distributions and thresholds of parents' 
endowments, women's health and children's health were likely to change. The changes 
can be represented by Figure 3.4. The solid curve in Figure 3.4 can be thought of as the 
distribution of parents' endowments, or women's health, or newborn children's health. 
      As discussed above, the famine reduced parents’ endowments, worsened 
women’s health and also new-born children’s health, which can be represented by the 
shift of the solid curve to the dashed curve in Figure 3.4. From Figure 3.4, we can see that 
the tail to the left of the thresholds, 
*φ  , *μ , and *ψ , becomes thicker. It means that 
more parents decided not to have children, more women could not conceive because of 
amenorrhea due to insufficient nutrition and subsequent worse health, and more new-born 
children could not survive because of worse health in the famine. Meanwhile, parents 
with “marginal” endowments might choose not to have children in tougher environments 
since the costs of having children might increase because it was expected to become 
harder to get necessary resources in the famine. Women with “marginal” health might not 
be able to conceive in the famine, since exogenous environments deteriorated so much 
that women needed better health to conceive. As well, infants with “marginal” health 
died in the famine, since exogenous environments deteriorated so much such that infants 
need better health to survive. All these three can be represented by the shifting of the 
thresholds in Figure 3.4. That is, the thresholds shift from
*φ  to **φ  , *μ  to **μ , and 
*ψ  to **ψ .  
      The shift in these distributions led to decreased parents' endowments and women's 
health, both leading to worse children's health since family background and mothers' 
health were positively correlated with children's health. Combined with the direct effects 
of famine on children's health, the fraction of children in good health decreased, i.e. 
( )P gφ ≥  decreased. However, the shift in the thresholds had different implications. 
With the shift of the threshold of parents' endowments, richer parents could still have 
children. In addition, the shift in threshold of women's health made women in better 
 
82
health able to conceive. Higher endowments of parents and better health of mothers led to 
better health of children. In addition, the shift in the threshold of children's initial health 
caused children in better health to remain alive. We can see from the expression of the 
fraction of individuals with good health in the population, that the shifts in the thresholds 
led to increases in 
*φ , *μ , and *ψ , so * * *( , , )P φ μ ψφ μ ψ≥ ≥ ≥  decreased. The 
effects of shifts in the thresholds i.e. decrease of 
* * *
( , , )P φ μ ψφ μ ψ≥ ≥ ≥  in the 
denominator, offset the effects of shifts in distributions (i.e. decrease of ( )P gφ ≥  in the 
numerator). Therefore, for us to observe that more severe famine experienced in early life 
is associated with worse health (and worse adult outcomes) in later life, deterioration in 
the distribution of initial health must overwhelm the second effects (selection effects). If 
we do find that more severe famine in early life is negatively associated with later-life 
health and other adult outcomes, then the existence of these selection effects leads these 
effects to be a lower bound of the true causal effects. 
      When the famine ended, the distributions and thresholds of parents' endowments, 
women's health, and newborn children's health should shift back. That is, the dashed 
curve in Figure 3.4 should shift back to the solid curves, and all three thresholds, 
**φ , 
**μ  and **ψ , should also shift back to *φ , *μ and *ψ , respectively. For those 
parents who were supposed to have children in the post-famine period, the proportion of 
children with “good” health, 
goodHealth , should be the same as that before the famine. 
However, those poorer parents postponing having children in the famine might decide to 
have children, and weaker women who could not conceive because of insufficient 
nutrition intake in the famine could conceive after the famine. Their children are expected 
to have worse health. Therefore, compared with the pre-famine period, there should be 
more “low-quality” children born immediately after the famine. This is negative fertility 
selection. However, there was no selection due to death of children during this period, 
since the threshold above which children could survive in the post-famine period was the 




3.4 Data sources and sample composition 
3.4.1 Population census data 
      The primary data used in this paper is from a 0.095% random sample drawn from 
the China's 5th National Population Census conducted by the China National Bureau of 
Statistics in 2000. This sub-sample includes 1,180,111 observations, covering all of 
China's 31 provinces51. There are 604,050 (51%) men and 575,769 (49%) women in the 
sample. 
      Because of the government's preferential treatment of urban residents, the effects 
of the famine on urban residents were not nearly as pronounced as on rural residents. In 
addition, children's educational attainment was disrupted by the Great Proletarian 
Cultural Revolution52 from 1966 to 1976 in urban regions53. I therefore restrict the study 
to individuals born in rural areas. However, although the census data includes 
information about individuals' birth provinces, it does not record whether these 
individuals were born in rural or urban regions. I therefore restrict the sample to those 
individuals who had a rural hukou (household registration booklet) in 200054, which 
accounts for 75.2% of the original sample. 
      Chongqing was an independent municipality directly under the jurisdiction of the 
central government in 2000, but it was a city of the Sichuan province before 1997. 
Therefore, in this paper, I treat Chongqing as a part of Sichuan province, but not as an 
independent municipality. Because of limitations in death rate data, I removed people 
born in Hainan and Tibet provinces. Individuals in these two provinces only account for 
0.78% of the total sample, so dropping them should not lead to a selection problem. Since 
I am investigating the effects of early life conditions on individuals' adult outcomes, only 
                                                 
51 The population census does not include Hongkong, Macao, and Taiwan. 
52 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in the People's Republic of China was a struggle for power 
within the Communist Party of China that manifested as wide-scale social, political, and economic chaos, 
and grew to include large sections of Chinese society; it eventually brought the entire country to the brink 
of civil war. (See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural\_Revolution) 
53 Gregory and Meng, 2002a, 2002b; Giles et al., 2007. 
54 This restriction excludes those who changed their hukou from rural to urban, leading to selection bias. 
However, it is very hard to change hukou in China; only upper class people, such as college graduates, are 
likely to change their hukou. As shown below, the famine has negative effects on cohorts affected, which 
means the ratio of upper class people in the cohorts not affected by the famine is higher, then hypothetically 
there are more upper class persons changing their hukou in cohorts not affected by the famine; therefore, 
the exclusion of those changing their hukou leads to downward bias of estimated famine effects. 
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those born between January 1954 and December 1966, i.e. 34 to 46 years old in 2000, are 
used for analysis.  
      The final sample used in this paper therefore includes individuals born between 
January 1954 and December 1966 having a rural hukou in 2000, excluding individuals 
from Hainan and Tibet. Table 3.2 shows the distribution of the sample by birth province. 
      Population census data includes individuals' birth province, birth year, and birth 
month. I use the birth province to link adults' outcomes with provincial famine shocks in 
early life. The birth year and birth month can be used to more precisely identify the 
timing of when individuals were affected by the famine. In this paper, I investigate the 
effects of the famine on three groups of outcome variables. The first group is human 
capital variables, including years of schooling and high school indicator; the second 
group is labor market performance, including employment indicator and work days per 
week of those employed; since there is no variable of individual income in population 
census data, the third group of outcome variables include household wealth per capita, 
measured by average number of rooms per capita and average housing area per capita. 
For specific variable definitions, see the Data Appendix. 
 
3.4.2 Famine intensity data  
      The measurement of famine intensity is generated from provincial death rates in 
different years. I obtain provincial death rates from China Compendium of Statistics: 
1949-2004, which was compiled and published by the China National Bureau of 
Statistics. In this paper, I use excess death rate (EDR) to measure famine intensity in 
1959-1961. In order to estimate excess death rate for each province-year from 1959-1961, 
I first calculate the average death rate in 1954-1958, 
5458_death rate , and the 
average death rate in 1962-1966, 
6266_death rate , for each province. I then 






_ _ _ _ j jjz j z
death rate death rate





Here, j represents province j, z=1959, 1960 and 1961. 
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      The excess death rates in 1959-1961 are defined as the percentage by which the 
death rate in each province exceeds provincial predicted death rate. Specifically, the 
variable is the natural log of death rate in the famine year minus the natural log of 
provincial predicted death rate, as shown in the following:  
ln( ) ln( )_ _ _jz jz jzprovincial predicted death rateEDR DR= −  
EDRs in other years are zero, as defined. Table 3.3 shows the estimated excess death rate 
for different provinces in 1959-1961. From the bottom row, we can see that, nationally, 
the highest excess death rate was in 1960 (15.41%), and the lowest excess death rate is 
5.17%, in 1961. This is consistent with the famine pattern, i.e. the most severe famine 
happened in 1960, and the famine was coming to its end in 1961. 
Cohorts born in different months experienced the famine at different times, even within 
the same year. I therefore calculate famine intensity experienced in utero, the first year 
and the second year, respectively, for cohorts born in province j in month m of year t and 
experiencing famine in year z and z+1 using the following method: 
 
, 1* *
( _ _ _ ) ( _ _ _ 1)mt mt
jmt jz j zN N
months in year z months in year z
FI EDR EDR += +
+
 
Here, ( _ _ _ )mtmonths in year z  and ( _ _ _ 1)mtmonths in year z+ are 
the number of months in utero (in the first, second year) spent in year z and year z+1 by 
cohorts born in month m of year t. N is set to 10 when I calculate famine intensity 
experienced in utero, and to 12 when I calculate famine intensity experienced in the first 
and second year. z is equal to 1959, 1960 and 1961. 
      Table 3.4 reports selected summary statistic of the sample for analysis. Since I 
restrict the sample to cohorts born between 1954 and 1966, the average ages of men and 
women were both 39.48 in 2000. Ninety-nine percent of women were married in 2000, 
but only 94% of men were married in the same period. Women's education level was 
lower than men's; only 5% of women completed high school, and on average, they 
finished 6.72 years of schooling. In contrast, 12% of men completed high school, with an 
average of 8.07 years of schooling. Men also performed better than women in the labor 
market: 94% of men were employed from October 25 to 31 in 2000, but only 85% of 
 
86
women were employed during this period. Among those employed, men worked 6.05 
days and women worked 5.86 days from October 25 to 31 in 2000. However, women’s 
living conditions, which are used to measure wealth, were slightly better: women were 
living in households with 0.85 average rooms per capita and 25.62 square meters average 
housing area per capita, while men had 0.82 average rooms per capita and 24.47 square 
meters average housing area per capita. The last three rows show the famine intensity 
experienced in utero, in the first year and in the second year for all those experiencing 
famine during these early years. Table 3.4 shows that, on average, the famine intensities 
experienced in these three stages are almost the same: 0.27 for in-utero, 0.29 for the first 
year, and 0.31 for the second year. 
 
3.5 Empirical strategy and results 
3.5.1 Empirical strategy 
      In examining the relationship between famine experienced in early life and adult 
outcomes, I seek to isolate different effects of the famine on the cohorts experiencing 
famine in utero, in the first year and in the second year. I also seek to isolate deviation of 
adult outcomes from the mean in one's birth province, as well as from the mean of the 
national birth cohort. Because particular provinces in China may be subject to 
slow-moving changes over long periods of time (reflecting, for example, different rates of 
economic development), I also try to isolate variations in a person's outcomes that 
diverge from the long-running trends in her birth province. 
      In this paper, I estimate the following reduced-form linear relationship between 
adult outcomes ijmtY of an adult i born in province j in month m of year t: 
0 1 2 3
* **ijmt jmtjmt jmt jt t ijmtjTRENDUFI SFIY FFIβ β β β μλ δ ε= + + + + + ++        
(3.1) 
 
      The coefficients of interest are 
1β , the impact of famine intensity experienced in 
utero 
jmtUFI  on adult outcomes; 2β , the impact of famine intensity experienced in 
the first year jmtFFI  on adult outcomes; and 3β , the impact of famine intensity 
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experienced in the second year 
jmtSFI  on adult outcomes. jtTRENDλ  is a linear 
time trend specific to the province, which absorbs the long-run linear trends in the 
outcomes that may vary depending on the province (TREND is a linear time trend, and 
the coefficient 
jtλ  allows the time trend to vary across provinces). jμ  is birth 
province fixed effect, 
tδ is birth year fixed effect, and ijmtε is an individual-specific 
error term. Serial and spatial correlation is likely to be a problem in this setting, biasing 
the OLS standard error estimates downward55. In particular, the concern is about 
correlation among the error terms of individuals experiencing the same or similar 
measured famine intensity. Standard errors allow for an arbitrary variance-covariance 
structure within birth provinces (standard errors are clustered by birth province).  
      Figure 3.5 shows different cohorts and the timings of when they were affected by 
the famine. Group (1) includes cohorts born between January 1954 and January 1957, 
who were not affected by the famine in utero or in the first two years. Group (2) includes 
cohorts born between February 1957 and January 1958, who were affected by the famine 
only in the second year. Group (3) includes cohorts born between February 1958 and 
January 1959, who were affected by the famine in the first and second years. All 
individuals in above three groups were conceived before the famine. Group (4) includes 
cohorts born between February 1959 and June 1959, and group (5) consists of cohorts 
born between July 1959 and October 1959. Both of these two groups were conceived 
before the famine, and were affected by the famine in utero, and in the first and second 
years. The difference between them is that cohorts in group (4) were affected by the 
famine at least five months after they were conceived, but cohorts in group (5) were 
affected by the famine in the first five months in utero. Group (6) includes cohorts born 
between November 1959 and October 1962; these were conceived in the famine and 
affected by the famine in utero and in the first and second years. Group (7) includes 
cohorts born between November 1962 and December 1966, who were conceived after the 
famine when compensatory birth occurred. 
      First, I estimate equation (3.1) using groups (1), (2), (3) and (4). All the cohorts in 
groups (1), (2) and (3) were conceived before the famine. Cohorts in these three groups 
                                                 
55 Moulton, 1986; Bertrand et al.,2004 
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were not affected by the famine in utero, but cohorts in group (2) and (3) were affected 
by the famine in the first and second years. Cohorts in group (4) were also conceived 
before the famine, but affected by the famine at least 5 months after they were conceived, 
when they could not be aborted by their parents. Therefore, their parents' fertility 
decisions were not affected by the famine and women's health were also not affected by 
the famine when those children were conceived. As a result, estimates using these groups 
are free from bias due to selective fertility. Here, groups (2), (3) and (4) are treatment 
groups and group (1) is a control group. We should expect to see negative effects 
estimated using this sample group. However, the existence of positive selection from 
excess death could not be controlled, which makes the estimates here a lower bound of 
the famine effects. Figure 3.6 shows the hypothetical results; outcomes of cohorts in 
groups (2), (3) and (4) are expected to be lower than those of group (1). 
      In order to examine how positive fertility selection affects the estimates, I 
estimate equation (3.1) using groups (1), (5), and (6). Although cohorts in group (5) were 
conceived before the famine, they were affected by the famine in the first five months in 
utero, when their parents could still choose to abort them. Cohorts in group (6) were 
conceived during the famine. Therefore, cohorts in these two groups should be affected 
by their parents' selective fertility decisions; cohorts in group (6) were also affected by 
selection from their mothers' fertility abilities in the famine. At this time, groups (5) and 
(6) are treatment groups, and the control group is still group (1). Since selection effects 
from excess death on both the estimates using the first sample and the estimates using 
this sample cannot be controlled, differences in these two sets of estimates should mainly 
be driven by positive fertility selection. If we see weaker estimates of famine effects from 
this sample compared to effects from the first sample, we have evidence for the existence 
of positive fertility selection in the famine. Figure 3.6 shows the case that the outcomes 
of cohorts in groups (5) and (6) exceed the outcomes of cohorts in group (1); this is 
possible if positive fertility selection is strong enough to offset the negative effects of the 
famine. 
      As discussed in Section 3, a larger portion of children born after the famine are 
expected to have lower initial health and worse outcomes in adulthood. In order to test 
this negative selection, I add group (7) to the first sample. That is, I estimate equation 
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(3.1) using groups (1), (2), (3), (4), and (7). This time, cohorts in groups (2), (3) and (4) 
are treatment groups, but those in groups (1) and (7) are control groups. Figure 3.6 shows 
that, if negative selection existed, adding group (7) would make the estimated famine 
effects less strong than those estimated using the first sample. 
      When discussing the magnitude of the estimated famine effects, I focus on the 
impact per 0.1 unit change in the famine intensity, meaning I examine the impact per 
10% by which the death rate in the famine exceeded the predicted normal level. 
 
3.5.2 Effects of famine controlling for fertility selection 
      Table 3.5 presents regression results from estimating equation (3.1) for a variety 
of outcome variables using the first sample described above, i.e. cohorts born between 
January 1954 and June 1959. This table is divided into upper and bottom panels. In the 
upper panel, estimates are from regressions using the sample of women. In the bottom 
panel, the estimates come from regressions using men. For each outcome in each panel, 
the coefficients on famine intensity experienced in utero, the first year, and the second 
year are presented separately. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. For brevity, 
regression coefficients for the constant term, the large numbers of fixed effects and the 
provincial linear time trends are not shown. This format will be followed in subsequent 
results in Tables 3.6, 3.7, 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and 3.12. 
      Table 3.5 shows in the upper panel that experiencing famine in utero and in the 
second year did not have any significant effects on women's adult outcomes, but 
experiencing famine in the first year had significant negative effects on adult outcomes. 
This shows that nutrition intake in the first year of life has the most important effects56. 
Since only estimates of the first year effects are significant, the following discussion 
focuses on the first year effects. 
      Experiencing famine in the first year has negative effects on women's educational 
attainment. I use two variables to measure educational attainment. One is schooling years, 
                                                 
56 This might be because children grow fastest in the first year, according to the Children Growth Chart 
published by the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention in 2000. The growth rate of girls' weight is 
186% in the first year, but drops to 26.2% in the second year. The girls' height growth rate is 48.7% in the 
first year, and drops to 17.2% in the second year. This growth pattern is the same for boys. Their weight 
increases by 188% in the first year, and drops to 21.7% in the second year. Boys' height growth rate is 
50.6% in the first year, and only 16% in the second year. 
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and the other is an indicator of completing high school. Both coefficients are negative 
and statistically significant. The coefficient of schooling years is significant at the 5% 
level, and the coefficient of the high school indicator is significant at the 1% level. In 
addition, the magnitudes of these two coefficients are large. With 0.1 unit increases in the 
famine intensity experienced in the first year, women exposed to the famine in the first 
year completed 0.024 fewer schooling years and were 0.54% less likely to complete high 
school. 
      The second set of variables is labor market performance. I also use two variables 
to measure individuals' labor market performance: an employment indicator about 
whether the individual was employed from Oct. 25 to Oct. 31 in 2000, which has a 
positive, but not significant coefficient, and work days of those employed in the same 
period in 2000, which has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant at the 10% 
level. A 0.1 unit increase in famine intensity in the first year led to 0.014 fewer work days 
for employed women. The famine might affect women’s employment through two 
channels. The negative effects of the famine on women directly reduced their probability 
of employment because of poor health and a subsequent lower education level. However, 
lower wealth due to negative famine effects, which will be shown soon, might give 
women incentives to work outside the home in order to increase the family income, 
which increases the ratio of employed women in the population. The insignificant, but 
positive coefficient of employment indicator might reflect that the second effect slightly 
exceeded the first. 
      In addition to educational attainment and labor market performance, I also 
investigate the effects of the famine on wealth. I use average rooms per capita and 
average housing area per capita to measure wealth. The coefficients of both of these 
variables are negative and statistically significant. The coefficient of average rooms per 
capita is significant at the 1% level, and the coefficient of average housing area per capita 
is significant at the 10% level. With a 0.1 unit increase in famine intensity, average rooms 
per capita decreases by 0.005, and average housing area per capita decreases by 0.199. 
These two variables represent household level wealth; there are two possible ways for the 
famine effects on women to affect household level variables; one is in direct way, women 
affected by the famine had lower education and less work days as shown above, which 
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reduced the income they could earn and contribute to the family; the other might go 
through an indirect way, women exposed to the famine in early life might marry to men 
with lower income, which also reduced the household wealth.  
      The bottom panel in Table 3.5 shows the regression results for men. We can see 
that most of the first year effects (effects on schooling year, high school indicator, 
employment indicator, and average housing area per capita) are still negative, but no 
coefficients are statistically significant. With a 0.1 unit increase in famine intensity, men 
experiencing the famine in their first year of life completed 0.014 fewer years of 
schooling, were 0.07% less likely to complete high school and 0.03% less likely to be 
employed, and lived in a household with 0.1 square meters less housing area per capita. 
The famine effects on men are much weaker than on women. This is consistent with a 
gender bias model in which available resources are given to boys in bad times57.  
      One might be concerned that, since the selection from excess death could not be 
controlled for here, the insignificant effects of the famine on men might be driven by 
stronger selection effects on men if boys were more likely to die than girls during the 
famine. In order to test this, I regress a female indicator on famine intensity experienced 
in utero, in the first year, and in the second year after controlling for birth province fixed 
effects, birth year fixed effects, and provincial time trends. Regression results are shown 
in Table 3.A in Appendix. Results showed that effects of famine experienced in utero, in 
the first year and in the second year on the proportion of women in the sample are not 
significant. This means that there is no systematic difference between survival of boys 
and girls in different provinces in the famine. Therefore, the insignificant effects of the 
famine on men should not be driven by the stronger selection effects of the famine on 
men. 
 
3.5.3 Effects of famine allowing for positive fertility selection 
      In Table 3.6, I investigate the effects of the famine on women and men, not 
controlling for positive fertility selection in the famine. We need to compare the results 
                                                 
57 Dreze and Sen, 1989; Behrman, 1988; Rose, 1999; Alderman and Gertler, 1997; Duflo, 2003, Cameron 
and Worswick, 2001; Jayachandran, 2005; Maccini and Yang, 2006.  
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shown in this table with the corresponding results in Table 3.5. The discussion will 
remain focused on the first year effects. 
      For women, the coefficients of schooling years and the high school indicator are 
both negative, but become statistically insignificant. A 0.1 unit increase in famine 
intensity leads to 0.009 fewer schooling years and a 0.03% decrease in the probability to 
complete high school. These two coefficients in Table 3.5 are significant. With the same 
increase in famine intensity, the decreases in schooling years and probability to complete 
high school are smaller in Table 3.6. Therefore, we can see that allowing for positive 
fertility selection leads to insignificant famine effects on educational attainment, and the 
magnitude decreases. 
      For the labor market performance of women, the coefficient of work days is still 
negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, but the magnitude decreases 
compared with the corresponding coefficient in Table 3.5. A 0.1 unit increase in famine 
intensity leads to 0.01 fewer work days per week, which is smaller than the 
corresponding number in Table 3.5. The coefficient of employment indicator becomes 
negative, while it is positive in Table 3.5, and this coefficient in both Tables 3.5 and 3.6 
is not statistically significant. The weaker effect of the famine on work days shows some 
evidence for positive fertility selection. As shown below, positive fertility selection leads 
to higher household wealth for women affected by the famine, which gives women less 
incentive to work outside the home, which provides a possible reason for the negative 
coefficient of the employment indicator in Table 3.6. 
      For women, the coefficients of average rooms per capita and average housing area 
per capita are positive and statistically insignificant. A 0.1 unit increase in famine 
intensity led to an increase of 0.002 average rooms per capita and 0.038 square meters 
average housing area per capita. Compared with those significantly negative effects 
shown in Table 3.5, the positive effects in Table 3.6 show that positive fertility selection 
effects are strong enough to offset the negative effects of the famine on cohorts exposed 
to it in the first year of life. 
      All the coefficients estimated using men sample are still insignificant. Although 
the effects of the famine on schooling year, high school indicator, and average housing 
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area per capita become weaker, showing some evidence for positive fertility selection in 
the famine, the evidence is not as strong as that for women. 
      By comparing the results in Tables 3.6 and 3.5, especially those with women, we 
can see that positive fertility selection in the famine does exist and leads to a downward 
bias of the estimates of famine effects if we do not control for it. 
 
3.5.4 Effects of famine allowing for negative fertility selection 
      When investigating the effects of the famine, previous researchers focused only 
on the effects of the famine on those cohorts who were directly affected. However, the 
cohorts born after the famine are expected to have lower quality due to negative selection 
after the famine since more parents with lower endowments decided to have children, and 
more women with weaker health conceived. This indirect effect of the famine has never 
been studied. 
      Table 3.7 shows the estimated results allowing for negative selection. We should 
also compare the results in Tables 3.7 and 3.5. We can see the results for women first: the 
coefficients of schooling year and high school indicator are still negative, and the 
coefficient of high school indicator is statistically significant at the 1% level. A 0.1 unit 
increase in famine intensity led to 0.017 fewer years of schooling, and 0.48% decrease in 
the probability of completing high school. However, in Table 3.5, both coefficients are 
statistically significant, and a 0.1 unit increase in famine intensity led to 0.024 fewer 
years of schooling and 0.54% decrease in the probability of completing high school. This 
shows that including cohorts affected by negative selection in the control group makes 
famine effects on educational attainments weaker, providing evidence for the existence of 
negative selection after the famine. 
      Regarding labor market performance of women, the coefficients of both the 
employment indicator and work days are not significant (Table 3.7). In addition, a 0.1 
unit increase in famine intensity led to a 0.02% increase in the probability of being 
employed and 0.015 fewer working days for those employed. However, in Table 3.5, a 
0.1 unit increase in famine intensity led to a 0.07% increase in the probability of being 
employed and 0.014 fewer work days. Although the coefficient of the employment 
indicator in both Tables 3.5 and 3.7 is not significant, the change of coefficient 
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magnitude is consistent with our expectation. Since women affected by negative fertility 
selection might be more likely to work because of lower family wealth, including them in 
the sample would narrow the gap between the probability of being employed for women 
affected by the famine and women not affected by the famine in the first year. When I 
include cohorts affected by negative fertility selection, the coefficient of work days 
changes from significant in Table 3.5 to insignificant in Table 3.7, although the 
magnitude increases slightly. The results of labor market performance also show 
evidence for the existence of negative fertility selection after the famine. 
      The last two variables are average rooms per capita and average housing area per 
capita. In Table 3.7, the coefficients of these two variables for women are not significant. 
With a 0.1 unit increase in famine intensity, the average rooms per capita decreases by 
0.003, and average housing area per capita decreases by 0.1. In Table 3.5, both of these 
coefficients are significant, and with the same increase in famine intensity, the average 
rooms per capita and average housing area per capita decrease by 0.005 and 0.199, 
respectively. The magnitude of both coefficients in Table 3.5 are larger than those in 
Table 3.7, which is consistent with our expectation that negative selection after the 
famine would make the estimates of famine effects weaker if we include cohorts 
conceived after the famine as a control group. 
      In Table 3.7, all the coefficients estimated using men remain insignificant. 
Although the effects of the famine on probability of being employed and average rooms 
per capita become weaker, showing some evidence for negative fertility selection in the 
famine, the evidence is not as strong as that shown for women. 
      Although I do not estimate exactly how large the negative selections are, the 
above comparisons, especially for women, provide suggestive evidence that negative 




      Because of lack of individual income in China’s 2000 population census data, I 
use household wealth (measured by average number of rooms per capita and average 
housing area per capita) as a proxy. One concern might be that other members in the 
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same family but not affected by the famine could also contribute to the household wealth, 
leading to downward bias of the estimated famine effects. In China, household heads and 
their spouses are usually thought of as main contributors of household income and 
therefore household wealth. In this section, I use a sub-sample, only including household 
heads and their spouses, to check whether the results found in the above are robust. Table 
3.8 shows the results controlling for fertility selection, Table 3.9 the results allowing for 
positive fertility selection, and Table 3.10 the results allowing for negative fertility 
selection after the famine. 
      In Table 3.8, we can see that the effects of the famine on men are not significant. 
For women, only the effects of the famine experienced in the first year are significant, but 
the effects of the famine experienced in utero or in the second year are not significant. 
This pattern is the same as that shown in Table 3.5. Although the first year effects on 
schooling years appears insignificant, the P-value is actually 10.1%, very close to 10%. 
The significance of all other coefficients of first year effects is the same as in Table 3.5. 
With a 0.1 unit increase in famine intensity experienced in the first year, schooling years 
decreased by 0.017, the probability of completing high school decreased by 0.52%, work 
days decreased by 0.014, average rooms per capita decreased by 0.005 and average 
housing area per capita decreased by 0.175. Compared with Table 3.5, the magnitudes of 
the famine effects on different outcome variables are very similar. This shows that the 
famine effects controlling for fertility selection are robust to the change in the sample. 
      Moving from Table 3.8 to Table 3.9, which allows for positive fertility selection, 
we can see that all significant first year effects shown in Table 3.8 become insignificant 
in Table 3.9. For women, with a 0.1 unit increase in famine intensity experienced in the 
first year, schooling years decreased by 0.011, the probability of completing high school 
decreased by 0.02%, work days decreased by 0.01, average rooms per capita increased by 
0.002, and average housing area per capita increased by 0.04. Compared with the results 
in Table 3.8, the famine effects become weaker if positive fertility selection is not 
controlled. For men, all coefficients are not significant, which is the same as in Table 3.8. 
The famine effects on schooling years, high school indicator, working days, and average 
housing area per capita become weaker. This still provides some evidence for positive 
fertility selection, but not as strong as for women. 
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      Table 3.10 shows the results allowing for negative fertility selection. For women, 
except for the coefficient of high school indicator, all coefficients are not significant. A 
0.1 unit increase in famine intensity led to 0.005 fewer schooling years, a 0.44% lower 
probability of completing high school, 0.015 fewer work days, 0.002 fewer average 
rooms per capita, and 0.069 square meters less average housing area per capita, and also 
led to a 0.02% increase in the probability of being employed. Compared with the results 
in Table 3.8, the famine effects become weaker, except for the effect on work days, 
which is almost the same as in Table 3.8. For men, the effects of negative selection are 
not as strong as for women. This is consistent with the results using the whole sample. 
      From the discussion above, we can see that the results found in this paper are 
robust with regard to the change in sample characteristics.  
 
3.6.2 Effects of possible endogeneity of the 1959-1961 famine 
      A possible bias in the estimation might come from the possibility that the 
variation of famine intensity across provinces might be correlated with other 
time-specific variables, which can affect cohorts affected by the famine in early life 
through channels other than the famine. 
      In order to determine whether the variations of famine intensity were correlated 
with other variables, I perform a regression on the average provincial excess death rates 
in 1959-1961 and pre-famine provincial economic variables, political variables, and 
natural disaster intensities. Provincial economic variables include grain output per capita 
and GDP per capita. Provincial political variables include the ratio of Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) members in the population and the ratio of members 
participating in the dining hall. I use the ratio of lands affected by natural disasters to 
measure provincial disaster intensity. Table 3.11 shows the regression results. We can see 
that: (1) the economic variables are not significant, and the joint F tests of economic 
variables are also not significant. This means that economic factors were not correlated 
with the variation of famine intensity across provinces. (2) Provincial disaster intensity is 
also not significant, indicating that natural disaster was not a reason for the occurrence 
and variation of the famine. (3) The ratio of CCP members in the population is significant 
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at the 10% level in different specifications and the coefficients are negative58. However, 
the joint F tests of these two political variables are not significant, which shows that 
although variation of the famine intensity might be correlated with the ratio of CCP 
members in the population, it does not provide strong evidence that the famine was 
related to provincial political factors. 
      The correlation between the ratio of CCP members in the population and the 
variation of famine intensity leads to a bias in estimates in two situations: (1) if the ratio 
of CCP member in the population before the famine was also correlated with other big 
shocks, like the Great Proletarian Culture Revolution (1966-1976), which might also 
affect cohorts exposed to the famine in early life; (2) if the ratio of CCP members in the 
population before the famine affected adult outcomes of the cohorts affected by the 
famine in very early life through some other time-specific channels in 1959-1961 other 
than the famine. However, the famine was occurring nationally, and affected almost all 
factors in 1959-1961; it is very hard to find other time-specific channels not related to the 
famine but affecting cohorts exposed to the famine in the early years of life. As far as the 
Culture Revolution is concerned, if the negative effects of the famine shown in this paper 
are driven by the Cultural Revolution, then the estimates using urban samples should 
have the same pattern as those estimated using rural samples, since the Cultural 
Revolution definitely affected urban regions59. I therefore estimate equation (3.1) using 
an urban sample60. Table 3.12 shows the estimated results, which should be compared to 
those in Table 3.5. We can see women's results first. All the signs of the coefficients of 
the first year famine intensity are the opposites of those in Table 3.5, and the coefficients 
of schooling year and high school indicator are statistically significant. For men, except 
for the two coefficients of labor market performance, the signs of the coefficients of other 
variables are also the opposites of those in Table 3.5, although none of them are 
statistically significant. Results shown in Table 3.12 imply that the estimated famine 
effects shown in Table 3.5 were not driven by the Cultural Revolution; otherwise the 
                                                 
58 Yang (1996) argued that having fewer CCP member represented lower political stands; in order to catch 
up to other provinces, these provinces would exaggerate grain outputs more than other provinces, so would 
be allocated more quota of procurements, which might cause higher mortality when the famine hit. 
59 Gregory and Meng, 2002a, 2002b; Giles et al., 2007 
60 Urban sample includes cohorts born between January 1954 and June 1959; individuals in this sample 
had non-agricultural hukou in 2000. 
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estimates using the urban sample should have the same pattern as those in Table 3.5.61 
Therefore, although the variation of famine intensity was correlated with the ratio of CCP 
members in the population in 1957, the probability that it affected the estimates is low. 
      Even though the variations of the famine intensity across provinces were totally 
random, the estimates could be biased if there were other post-famine programs targeting 
the specific population affected by the famine. For example, the government might invest 
more in provinces affected by the more severe famine. However, to the best of my 
knowledge, there were no such programs in China from the end of the famine to 2000. 
 
3.6.3 Measurement issues 
      In this paper, I investigate the effects of the famine on individuals exposed to it in 
early life, especially in utero, in the first year and in the second year. Therefore, it might 
be better to use the provincial death rates of 0-2 year old children during the famine to 
construct famine intensity for each province. Because of insufficient data, I generate 
provincial famine intensities from crude death rates. The following analyzes the 
difference between the famine intensities created using crude death rates and those 
created using death rates of 0-2 year old children. 
      Let's assume that α  is the ratio of 0-2 year old children in the population in the 
famine, and α  is the ratio of 0-2 year old children in the population in a normal year. 
02dr  is the death rate of children 0-2 years old, and otherdr  is the death rate of persons 
in all other age cohorts in the famine. I also assume that 
02dr  and otherdr  are death 
rates for 0-2 year old children and other age cohorts in normal years, respectively. In this 
paper, the famine intensity is calculated as: 
                                                 
61 A possible reason for the estimated results in Table 12 could be as follows: since the Cultural Revolution 
was mainly a political movement, the ratio of CCP members in the population was positively correlated 
with the intensity of the Cultural Revolution in different provinces. So, the higher the ratio of CCP 
members in the population, the higher the intensity of the Cultural Revolution, which led to lower 
outcomes of the cohorts affected by it. As we see in Table 11, the ratios of CCP members in the 
populations of different provinces were negatively correlated with provincial famine intensity. Therefore, 





























      If we measure the famine intensity using that of 0-2 year old children, the famine 
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      We can see that whether 
1, minfa eedr  over- or under-estimates 2, minfa eedr  
depends on whether 
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is larger or smaller than 1, which is 
indeterminate depending on the population structure and the magnitude of the death rate 
of children aged 0-2 years old relative to the death rates of other age cohorts, but not 
systematically correlated with 
2, minfa eedr . 
      We can write 
1, minfa eedr = 2, minfa eedr + ε , where ε  is measurement error. 
Since there is no systematic difference between 
1, minfa eedr  and 2, minfa eedr , this 
errors-in-variable problem leads to attenuation bias in OLS, i.e. the negative effects of 
famine are under-estimated.62 
      In this paper, I link famine intensity to different individuals using their birth 
provinces. This leads to another problem of measurement, since during the famine, 
children might migrate with their parents to other provinces where the famine was not as 
severe as in their birth provinces. Then, the famine intensity experienced by these 
children should be lighter than that linked to them by birth province. This is another 
source of downward bias in the estimated famine effects. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
                                                 
62 Wooldridge, 2002 
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      Famine in 1959-1961 caused about 30 million excess deaths, but little research 
exists about the long term effects of the famine. This chapter uses the China 2000 
population census data to study this issue. 
      In this chapter, I propose a conceptual framework to demonstrate how fertility 
selection causes downward bias in the estimation of famine effects. Using a rural sample 
from the China 2000 population census data, after controlling for fertility selection, I find 
that experiencing the famine in the first year of life has negative effects on women's adult 
outcomes. Women exposed to the famine with 10% higher death rate than normal in the 
first year of life completed 0.024 fewer years of schooling, had a 0.54% lower probability 
of completing high school, worked 0.014 fewer days per week, and lived in houses with 
0.005 fewer rooms and 0.199 square meters less housing area per capita. I do not find 
significant effects of being exposed to the famine in the first year for men. I also do not 
find significant effects of being exposed to the famine in utero or in the second year for 
either women or men. In this paper, I find that if fertility selection is not controlled for, 
the estimated effects of the famine become weaker. I also provide some suggestive 
evidence for negative fertility selection arising from compensatory birth immediately 
after the famine. 
      In addition to revealing the long-term effects of China's 1959-1961 famine, these 
results have important implications for policy. Our findings point to a group (newborn 
infants), which is particularly vulnerable to fluctuations in exogenous environments. The 
long-term effects of early-life conditions on schooling and other socioeconomic outcomes 
decades later should be included in the cost-benefit analyses of programs targeting this 
subpopulation. As such, our findings provide additional justification for interventions that 
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Figure 3.4 Distribution and shift of parents’ endowments, or women’s health, or 
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Figure 3.6 Hypothetical results 
 
 



















Table 3.1 Provincial death rate distribution in different years. (Unit: 0.1%)  
Province 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966
              
Beijing 8.6 9.5 7.7 8.2 8.1 9.7 9.1 10.8 8.8 8.1 8.3 6.8 7.2
Tianjin 9.3 9.9 8.8 9.4 8.7 9.9 10.3 9.9 7.4 7.3 7.8 6.2 6.9
Hebei 12.1 11.6 11.3 11.3 10.9 12.3 15.8 13.6 9.1 11.2 10.9 8.7 8.7
Shanxi 14.7 12.9 11.6 12.7 11.7 12.8 14.2 12.2 11.3 11.4 14 10.4 10.3
Neimenggu 20.9 11.4 7.9 10.5 7.9 11 9.4 8.8 9 8.5 11.8 9.3 8.1
Liaoning 8.6 9.4 6.6 9.4 8.8 11.8 11.5 17.5 8.5 7.9 9.3 7.1 6.2
Jilin 10.4 9.9 7.5 9.1 9.1 13.4 10.1 12.1 10 9.4 12.6 9.7 8.6
Heilongjiang 11.1 11.3 10.1 10.5 9.2 12.8 10.5 11.1 8.6 8.6 11.5 8 7.4
Shanghai 7.1 8.2 6.6 6.1 6.2 7.8 6.9 7.7 7.2 7 6.1 5.7 5.3
Jiangsu 12.2 11.8 13 10.3 9.4 14.6 18.4 13.4 10.4 9 10.1 9.5 8.1
Zhejiang 13.4 12.6 9.5 9.3 9.2 10.8 11.9 9.8 8.6 7.9 7.9 8.1 7.1
Anhui 16.6 11.8 14.3 9.1 12.4 16.7 68.6 8.1 8.2 7.9 8.6 7.2 7.1
Fujian 10.9 10.4 10.2 9.8 9.4 12.5 20.7 16 11.7 9.3 8.7 7.9 7.7
Jiangxi 14.2 16.2 12.5 11.5 11.3 13 16.1 11.5 11 9.8 10.9 9.4 8.5
Shandong 11.7 13.7 12.1 12.1 12.8 18.2 23.6 18.4 12.4 11.8 12 10.2 9.9
Henan 13.3 11.8 14 11.8 12.7 14.1 39.6 10.2 8 9.4 10.6 8.5 8.2
Hubei 15.9 11.6 10.8 9.6 9.6 14.5 21.2 9.1 8.8 9.8 10.9 10 9.7
Hunan 17.5 16.4 11.5 10.4 11.7 13 29.4 17.5 10.2 10.3 12.9 11.2 10.2
Guangdong 11.2 10.6 11.1 8.4 9.2 11.1 15.2 10.8 9.4 7.6 8.3 6.8 6.4
Guangxi 15.2 14.6 12.5 12.4 11.7 17.5 29.5 19.5 10.3 10.1 10.6 9 7.5
Sichuan 8.4 9.2 10.4 12.1 25.2 47 54 29.4 14.6 12.8 13.9 11.5 10.8
Guizhou 12.2 16.2 13 12.4 15.3 20.3 52.3 23.3 11.6 17.1 20.7 15.2 13.5
Yunnan 16.7 13.7 15.2 16.3 21.6 18 26.3 11.8 10.9 14.1 15.2 13 10.8
Shannxi 11 10.5 9.9 10.3 11 12.7 12.3 8.8 9.4 10.6 15.6 13 12.9
Gansu 11.6 11.9 10.8 11.3 21.1 17.4 41.3 11.5 8.3 10.4 15.6 12.3 11.5
Qinghai 13.3 14.6 9.4 10.4 13 16.6 40.7 11.7 5.4 8.4 15.5 9.1 9.7
Ningxia 13.1 10.2 10.6 11.1 15 15.8 13.9 10.7 8.5 10.2 13.4 9.3 9.4
Xinjiang 16.8 14.4 14.2 14 13 18.8 15.7 11.7 9.7 9.4 16.4 11.1 9.4
              










Table 3.2 Distribution of sample used for analysis
Province # of persons born in this province 
      
 Men Women Total 
Beijing 415 432 847 
Tianjin 430 422 852 
Hebei 5692 5513 11205 
Shanxi 2246 2304 4550 
Neimenggu 1554 1504 3058 
Liaoning 2649 2699 5348 
Jilin 1651 1595 3246 
Heilongjiang 1821 1862 3683 
Shanghai 441 430 871 
Jiangsu 5458 5353 10811 
Zhejiang 4068 3957 8025 
Anhui 4183 4115 8298 
Fujian 2265 2296 4561 
Jiangxi 2666 2795 5461 
Shandong 7671 7849 15520 
Henan 7150 7079 14229 
Hubei 4060 4079 8139 
Hunan 4957 4787 9744 
Guangdong 4225 4164 8389 
Guangxi 3321 3136 6457 
Sichuan 8253 8224 16477 
Guizhou 2314 2343 4657 
Yunnan 2970 3044 6014 
Shannxi 2781 2742 5523 
Gansu 1830 1859 3689 
Qinghai 280 286 566 
Ningxi 297 302 599 
Xinjiang 756 736 1492 
    
Total 86,404 85,907 172,311 
Note: (1) In this table, numbers for Sichuan include Sichuan Province and Chongqing 









Table 3.3 Provincial excess death rate in 1959-1961 (Unit:1%)
Province 1959 1960 1961 
    
Beijing 4.89 3.99 5.39 
Tianjin 4.90 5.15 4.60 
Hebei 4.92 8.24 5.86 
Shanxi 3.94 5.12 2.91 
Neimenggu 3.48 1.89 1.31 
Liaoning 6.93 6.34 12.05 
Jilin 7.26 3.49 5.03 
Heilongjiang 6.37 3.89 4.31 
Shanghai 4.56 3.37 3.88 
Jiangsu 7.37 11.04 5.92 
Zhejiang 4.46 5.56 3.46 
Anhui 9.17 61.30 1.04 
Fujian 6.13 14.12 9.21 
Jiangxi 4.45 7.59 3.04 
Shandong 9.59 14.75 9.32 
Henan 6.27 31.79 2.42 
Hubei 7.00 13.55 1.30 
Hunan 3.82 20.19 8.26 
Guangdong 5.29 9.32 4.86 
Guangxi 9.03 21.13 11.24 
Sichuan 37.65 44.13 19.01 
Guizhou 9.23 40.60 10.98 
Yunnan 6.30 14.57 0.04 
Shannxi 4.95 3.90 -0.25 
Gansu 8.30 31.84 1.68 
Qinghai 8.89 32.84 3.69 
Ningxia 7.97 5.84 2.41 
Xinjiang 8.98 5.88 1.88 
    





















Table 3.4 Summary statistics 
                          Woman  
                           
Man  
 Mean S.D. Max Min OBS Mean S.D. Max Min OBS
           
Age 39.48 3.94 46 34 85907 39.48 3.93 46 34 86404
Marriage 0.99 0.08 1 0 85907 0.94 0.24 1 0 86404
High school(indicator) 0.05 0.23 1 0 85907 0.12 0.33 1 0 86404
Schooling years 6.72 2.97 19 0 85907 8.07 2.53 19 0 86404
Employment(indicator) 0.85 0.35 1 0 85907 0.94 0.23 1 0 86404
Work days 5.86 1.56 7 1 73387 6.05 1.38 7 1 81604
Average rooms per capita 0.85 0.56 27 0 85339 0.82 0.53 27 0 84604
Average housing areas per 
capita 25.62 18.88 490 0 85337 24.47 17.38 350 0 84601
Famine intensity in utero 0.27 0.33 1.89 -0.30 18755 0.27 0.33 1.89 -0.30 18595
Famine intensity in the 
first year 0.29 0.33 1.89 -0.30 17677 0.29 0.34 1.89 -0.30 17756
Famine intensity in the 
second year 0.31 0.35 1.89 -0.30 19784  0.31 0.34 1.89 -0.30 20440
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Table 3.5  Effects of famine controlling for fertility selection  
 Dependent Variables:     
Women              Education Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
Schooling year High School Employment Work day




Famine intensity in utero 1.295 0.074 0.176 0.229 0.179 -1.059 
 (0.831) (0.079) (0.206) (0.196) (0.190) (6.089) 
Famine intensity in the first year -0.240 -0.054 0.007 -0.140 -0.053 -1.989 
 (0.090)** (0.008)*** (0.021) (0.078)* (0.015)*** (0.996)* 
Famine intensity in the second year 0.161 0.012 0.011 0.077 -0.027 -0.169 
 (0.159) (0.017) (0.014) (0.092) (0.022) (0.561) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 32755 32755 32733 27839 32640 32639 
R-squared 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.15 
       
 Dependent Variables:     
Men              Education Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
 Schooling year High School Employment Work day




Famine intensity in utero 1.536 0.214 -0.080 0.067 -0.195 -1.112 
(0.984) (0.133) (0.060) (0.205) (0.129) (3.537)
Famine intensity in the first year -0.136 -0.007 -0.003 0.052 0.019 -1.002 
 (0.230) (0.018) (0.008) (0.082) (0.033) (0.699) 
Famine intensity in the second year 0.317 0.022 -0.004 0.031 -0.014 0.826 
 (0.200) (0.025) (0.006) (0.053) (0.015) (0.979) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Observations 33229 33229 33208 31356 32746 32745 
R-squared 0.07 0.02 0.09 0.04 0.08 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses(cluster in birth province)     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     















Table 3.6  Effects of famine allowing for positive selection  
 Dependent Variables:     
Women              Education  Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
Schooling year High School Employment Work day




Famine intensity in utero -0.132 -0.014 0.008 -0.016 -0.013 -0.481 
 (0.091) (0.009) (0.010) (0.037) (0.015) (0.613) 
Famine intensity in the first year -0.089 -0.003 -0.005 -0.109 0.022 0.379 
 (0.154) (0.010) (0.009) (0.056)* (0.025) (0.837) 
Famine intensity in the second 
year 0.152 0.009 0.002 0.042 -0.020 -1.141 
 (0.212) (0.017) (0.011) (0.073) (0.034) (1.026) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES
Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
Observations 36731 36731 36804 31285 36666 36665 
R-squared 0.15 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.16 
       
 Dependent Variables:     
Men              Education  Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
 Schooling year High School Employment Work day 




Famine intensity in utero -0.090 -0.013 0.002 -0.046 0.002 -0.443 
 (0.094) (0.013) (0.004) (0.047) (0.015) (0.574) 
Famine intensity in the first year -0.058 0.009 -0.005 0.040 0.018 0.589 
(0.106) (0.015) (0.006) (0.050) (0.017) (0.574)
Famine intensity in the second 
year -0.043 -0.005 0.002 -0.018 -0.051 -0.972 
 (0.129) (0.018) (0.011) (0.083) (0.034) (0.911) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
114
       
Observations 36351 36351 36422 34329 35844 35842 
R-squared 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.09 0.15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses(cluster in birth province) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: both women and men samples include cohorts born between January 1954 and January 1957, and cohorts born between July 1959 
























Table 3.7  Effects of famine allowing for negative selection  
 Dependent Variables:     
Women              Education  Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
Schooling year High School Employment Work day




Famine intensity in utero 1.076 0.056 0.162 0.230 0.187 -3.325 
 (0.826) (0.074) (0.201) (0.199) (0.209) (6.891) 
Famine intensity in the first 
year -0.169 -0.048 0.002 -0.148 -0.027 -0.997 
 (0.122) (0.011)*** (0.022) (0.099) (0.018) (1.061) 
Famine intensity in the second 
year -0.025 0.007 -0.001 0.086 -0.016 -0.263 
 (0.135) (0.014) (0.012) (0.064) (0.021) (0.808) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 68719 68719 68697 58781 68221 68219 
R-squared 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.16 
       
 Dependent Variables:     
Men              Education  Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
 Schooling year High School Employment Work day 




Famine intensity in utero 1.287 0.230 -0.060 0.000 -0.161 0.640 
 (0.971) (0.147) (0.057) (0.195) (0.160) (3.652) 
Famine intensity in the first 
year -0.196 -0.030 0.001 0.047 0.021 -1.210 
 (0.260) (0.019) (0.008) (0.069) (0.031) (0.837) 
Famine intensity in the second 
year 0.020 0.012 0.005 -0.036 0.008 0.583 
 (0.112) (0.019) (0.007) (0.036) (0.015) (0.874) 














Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 69438 69438 69417 65677 67958 67956 
R-squared 0.07 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.13 
Robust standard errors in parentheses(cluster in birth province) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: both women and men samples include cohorts born between January 1954 and June 1959, and cohorts born between November 
1962 and December 1966. 
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Table 3.8  Effects of famine controlling for fertility selection (Robustness)  
 Dependent Variables:     
Women              Education  Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
Schooling year High School Employment Work day




Famine intensity in utero 1.268 0.094 0.176 0.244 0.185 0.052 
 (1.209) (0.112) (0.183) (0.199) (0.200) (6.682) 
Famine intensity in the first 
year -0.170 -0.052 0.008 -0.137 -0.046 -1.753 
 (0.100) (0.008)*** (0.020) (0.076)* (0.017)** (0.955)* 
Famine intensity in the second 
year 0.144 0.013 0.010 0.090 -0.027 -0.050 
 (0.164) (0.016) (0.015) (0.087) (0.021) (0.534) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 31605 31605 31605 26894 31587 31586 
R-squared 0.11 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.15 
       
 Dependent Variables:     
Men              Education  Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
 Schooling year High School Employment Work day 




Famine intensity in utero 2.254 0.274 0.008 0.102 -0.199 -1.690 
 (1.497) (0.177) (0.052) (0.164) (0.123) (3.447) 
Famine intensity in the first 
year -0.055 0.001 0.001 0.025 0.038 -0.681 
 (0.247) (0.019) (0.008) (0.087) (0.033) (0.743) 
Famine intensity in the second 
year 0.242 0.022 -0.005 0.052 -0.021 0.738 
 (0.203) (0.025) (0.005) (0.057) (0.014) (0.966) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 31360 31360 31360 29695 31213 31212 
R-squared 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses(cluster in birth province) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: both women and men samples include cohorts born between January 1954 and June 1959. They are either household head, or 




















Table 3.9  Effects of famine allowing for positive selection (Robustness)  
 Dependent Variables:     
Women              Education  Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
Schooling year High School Employment Work day




Famine intensity in utero -0.114 -0.015 0.006 -0.027 -0.014 -0.512 
 (0.094) (0.009) (0.009) (0.038) (0.013) (0.610) 
Famine intensity in the first 
year -0.110 -0.002 -0.008 -0.099 0.023 0.401 
 (0.154) (0.010) (0.009) (0.059) (0.024) (0.857) 
Famine intensity in the second 
year 0.108 0.002 0.007 0.076 -0.028 -1.372 
 (0.223) (0.016) (0.011) (0.075) (0.033) (1.066) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 35282 35282 35368 30083 35341 35340 
R-squared 0.14 0.03 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.16 
       
 Dependent Variables:     
Men              Education  Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
 Schooling year High School Employment Work day 




Famine intensity in utero -0.075 -0.015 0.002 -0.070 -0.000 -0.626 
 (0.097) (0.013) (0.004) (0.054) (0.018) (0.558) 
Famine intensity in the first 
year 0.027 0.014 -0.007 0.046 0.009 0.390 
 (0.114) (0.016) (0.007) (0.053) (0.019) (0.592) 
Famine intensity in the second 
year -0.124 -0.006 0.002 -0.031 -0.041 -0.753 
 (0.135) (0.018) (0.010) (0.089) (0.038) (0.955) 














Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 34075 34075 34168 32289 33975 33973 
R-squared 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.15 
Robust standard errors in parentheses(cluster in birth province) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: both women and men samples include cohorts born between January 1954 and January 1957, and cohorts born between July 
1959 and October 1962. They are either household head, or household head's spouse. Households with only household head or 
household head's spouse are not excluded 
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Table 3.10  Effects of famine allowing for negative selection (Robustness)  
 Dependent Variables:     
Women              Education Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
Schooling year High School Employment Work day 




Famine intensity in utero -0.464 -0.033 0.180 0.237 0.173 -3.004 
 (0.461) (0.038) (0.182) (0.201) (0.216) (7.452) 
Famine intensity in the first 
year -0.051 -0.044 0.002 -0.145 -0.019 -0.687 
 (0.120) (0.011)*** (0.021) (0.094) (0.018) (1.018) 
Famine intensity in the 
second year -0.043 0.007 0.000 0.091 -0.016 -0.161 
 (0.146) (0.014) (0.013) (0.060) (0.021) (0.849) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 64958 64958 64895 55538 64807 64805 
R-squared 0.15 0.02 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.16 
       
 Dependent Variables:     
Men              Education Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
 Schooling year High School Employment Work day 




Famine intensity in utero 0.252 -0.071 0.014 0.026 -0.170 -0.095 
 (0.487) (0.115) (0.053) (0.154) (0.159) (3.845) 
Famine intensity in the first 
year -0.053 -0.014 0.003 0.022 0.034 -0.983 
 (0.258) (0.019) (0.008) (0.069) (0.033) (0.883) 
Famine intensity in the 
second year -0.028 0.011 0.002 -0.023 0.000 0.528 
 (0.125) (0.020) (0.006) (0.036) (0.015) (0.890) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 63376 63376 63325 60113 62883 62881 
R-squared 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.14 
Robust standard errors in parentheses(cluster in birth province) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note: both women and men samples include cohorts born between January 1954 and June 1959, and cohorts born between 
November 1962 and December 1966. They are either household head, or household head's spouse. Households with only household 













Table 3.11 Factors influencing famine intensity in different provinces  
 Avg. EDR(59-61) Avg. EDR(59-61) Avg. EDR(59-61) 
        
Grain output per capita in 1958 -10.707   
 (9.865)   
Grain output per capita in 1956-1958  -12.312  
  (11.561)  
Grain output per capita in 1954-1958   -10.506 
   (11.106) 
GDP per capita in 1958 0.012   
 (1.176)   
GDP per capita in 1956-1958  -0.428  
  (1.399)  
GDP per capita in 1954-1958   -0.555 
   (1.544) 
CCP member/population in 1957 -2.265 -2.386 -2.348 
 (1.153)* (1.151)* (1.165)* 
Member in Dining Hall/population in 1957 0.004 -0.003 -0.004 
 (0.028) (0.030) (0.030) 
Ratio of cultivated land affected by disaster 2.990 2.859 3.055 
 (3.587) (3.573) (3.553) 
P-value of F test :    
(1) Grain output per capita=GDP per capita=0 0.53 0.49 0.53 
(2) CCP member/population= 
Member in dining hall/population=0 0.16 0.14 0.16 
Observations 25 25 25 
R-squared 0.34 0.34 0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses    





Table 3.12 Urban sample  
 Dependent Variables:    
Women              Education  Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
Schooling year High School Employment Work day




Famine intensity in utero -2.143 -0.437 -0.002 -0.131 -0.072 0.282 
 (2.026) (0.352) (0.135) (0.531) (0.094) (3.624) 
Famine intensity in the first year 1.348 0.189 -0.031 0.156 0.052 0.358 
 (0.381)*** (0.061)*** (0.038) (0.119) (0.034) (1.234) 
Famine intensity in the second year -0.031 0.001 0.059 -0.032 0.013 -0.077 
 (0.253) (0.024) (0.052) (0.073) (0.029) (0.990) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
       
Observations 11687 11687 11700 7359 11667 11667 
R-squared 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05 
       
 Dependent Variables:     
Men              Education  Labor Market Outcomes Housing 
 Schooling year High School Employment Work day 




Famine intensity in utero -0.278 0.052 -0.029 -0.071 0.003 -2.730 
 (1.729) (0.220) (0.102) (0.234) (0.096) (3.747) 
Famine intensity in the first year 0.185 0.002 -0.032 0.073 -0.043 2.769 
 (0.388) (0.071) (0.022) (0.084) (0.078) (2.179) 
Famine intensity in the second year 0.156 0.084 0.037 -0.085 -0.019 -1.065 
 (0.279) (0.032)** (0.031) (0.058) (0.046) (1.152) 
Provincial time trend YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth province fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Birth year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Observations 12600 12600 12618 10671 12433 12431 
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.05 
Robust standard errors in parentheses(cluster in birth province)     
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%     












Table 3.A Effects of famine on proportion of women in sample
 Female indicator 
Famine intensity in utero 0.150 
 (0.113) 
Famine intensity in the first year -0.024 
 (0.025) 
Famine intensity in the second year -0.012 
 (0.020) 
Provincial time trend YES 
Birth province fixed effect YES 




Robust standard errors in parentheses  




















[1] Average number of rooms per capita: Total number of rooms divided by total number 
of family members. 
[2] Average housing areas per capita: Total household construction areas divided by total 
number of family members.  
[3] Schooling years: The number of years of schooling is created from respondent's self 
report of the highest level of education. In China, primary school is typically six years, 
followed by three years of junior high school, followed by three years of senior high 
school (or three years of professional school), followed by four years of university 
(BenKe) (or three years of college (DaZhuan)), followed by three years of graduate 
school study for MA degree, then followed by three years of graduate school study for 
Ph.D. degree. The respondents getting degrees from adult education programs are 
dropped. 
[4] High school indicator: Whether the highest level of education of the respondent is 
high school or above. The respondents getting degrees from adult education programs are 
dropped. 
[5] Employment indicator: Whether the respondent worked at least one hour during Oct. 
25 and Oct. 31 in 2000. 
[6] Work day: How many days did the employed respondent work during Oct. 25 and Oct. 
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Does school quality matter?: 




      One of the most fundamental questions in the economics of education is the 
extent to which school quality affects educational outcomes.  This is an especially 
critical question in developing countries, where budgetary resources are scarce and 
governments must trade off improvements in educational quality with expanding access 
to education.  Most empirical studies of the effects of various measures of school quality 
(e.g., educational spending and teacher quality) are difficult to interpret because students, 
teachers, and resources are almost never randomly allocated between schools. 64  
Therefore, there are almost always unobserved factors correlated with both school quality 
and student attributes.   
      A few studies have attempted to address the endogeneity problem using different 
approaches, such as comparison with matched control groups (Angrist and Lavy, 2001; 
Rivkin, Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004), conducting randomized trials to 
examine the impact of specific schooling inputs (Glewwe, Kremer and Moulin, 2007; 
Banerjee, Cole, Duflo, and Linden, 2006; Dee, 2001), and exploiting natural experiments 
that create plausibly exogenous variation in class size (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hoxby, 
2000) or in the quality of schools attended, e.g., lotteries (Gould, Lavy and Paserman, 
                                                 
63 This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Albert Park, Chang-tai Hsieh and Xuehui An.  
64 Although some research has found no significant link between educational attainment, usually measured by 
test scores, and school quality, measured by teachers’ education level, school resources, equipment, class size, 
etc. (Altonji, Elder and Taber, 2005; Hoxby, 2000), other research has found a significantly positive relationship 
(Angrist and Lavy, 1999, 2001; Case and Deaton, 1999; Dee, 2001; Eide and Showalter, 1998; Goldhaber and 
Brewer, 1997; Gould, Lavy and Paserman, 2004; Greenwald, Hedges and Laine, 1996; Krueger, 1999; Krueger 
and Whitmore, 1999; Lai, Sadoulet and Janvry, 2006;  Lavy, 2002; Newhouse and Beegle, 2005; Rivkin, 
Hanushek and Kain, 2005; Rockoff, 2004; Urquiola, 2006). School quality also has been found to be correlated 




2004; Hoxby 2007).  However, these studies have weaknesses. For example, studies 
using matched control groups do not convincingly control for unobservable student 
differences, and many of the studies focus narrowly on one dimension of schooling 
quality even though many other dimensions may be more important.   
      In this paper, we present new evidence from a natural experiment in China.  We 
quantify the impact of school quality on students’ educational attainment using a 
regression discontinuity research design that exploits the fact that in China’s rural 
counties admission to the best high schools are strictly determined by entrance 
examination scores.  In addition to informing general debates over the importance of 
school quality, because many countries in Asia (e.g., Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
and Korea) employ a similar mechanism for allocating students to schools, our results 
may help such countries evaluate the benefits of maintaining such a merit-based 
allocation system at the high school level rather than shifting to other allocation systems, 
such as neighborhood-based schools.  
      China has a magnet school system for high schools in rural counties.  Typically, 
a rural county has one magnet school located in the county seat and a number of regular 
high schools spread across the county, and students resident in a given county attend one 
of the county’s public high schools. Graduating middle school students must take 
county-wide high school entrance examinations, which determine whether they attend a 
magnet high school, a regular high school, or no high school at all.  In any given county, 
the magnet school has the best quality as well as the highest entrance examination score 
cutoff line. This paper uses a regression discontinuity design to compare students with 
nearly identical entrance exams who attend different quality schools because they are just 
above or just below the cutoff score for admission to the magnet school.  In this paper, 
we first investigate whether entering a good school has any effects on the probability for 
students to take college entrance examinations. Then for those students taking college 
entrance examinations, we examine the effects of entering a good school on their 
educational attainment, measured by standardized college entrance examination scores 
and the probability of entering college. Using data from 7 counties in Gansu province in 
China, we find that entering the magnet high school can decrease the probability to take 
college entrance exam by 14.9 percent, increase students’ standardized college entrance 
 
133
score by 0.256 standard deviation, and increase students’ probability of entering college 
by 22.5 percentage points. 
      The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data and 
variable definitions. Section 4.3 presents the methodology for implementing the 
regression discontinuity design and describes the empirical specification. Section 4.4 
describes students’ assignment to different schools in the sample used for analysis. 
Section 4.5 presents the empirical results, and section 4.6 describes the differences 
between magnet schools and regular schools that might explain differences in educational 
attainment. Section 4.7 concludes.  
 
4.2 Data and variables 
4.2.1 Data collection 
      The data used in this paper was collected from high schools in rural counties in 
Gansu Province in western China during the summer of 2004. Gansu is one of China’s 
poorest provinces, with a GDP per capita of $744 in 2004 which ranked 30th among 
China’s 31 provinces. It had a population of 26 million in 2004, ranking 22nd among 
Chinese provinces.  
      The sample used for analysis includes 12035 students in entering classes from 
1997 to 2001 of 34 high schools located in 7 rural counties.  China’s high schools have 
three grade levels, so all students in the sample had completed high school and taken 
college entrance examinations by the time of the survey.  Initially, the data includes high 
schools in 19 counties, distributed in 74 county-years65 (Table 4.1 shows statistics of 
these 74 county-years). However, a few counties had data only for one school. In addition, 
county education bureaus have discretion in determining how students are allocated to 
schools. For example, some schools allow students with poorer scores to pay additional 
fees in order to attend the best schools, a practice which has become more prevalent over 
time. It is possible that some counties also allow personal connections to principals or 
school officials to influence admissions decisions. For these reasons, we exclude 21 
                                                 
65 100 county-years, including 20 counties in 5 years, were intended to be surveyed, but 26 of them were 
lack of either school information or student information. Therefore, we collected information for both 




county-years for which data on only one high school is available (the first panel in Table 
4.1 shows these county-years).  We also drop counties that did not strictly adhere to 
examination score cutoff lines in determining who was admitted to the best high schools. 
We restrict the sample by excluding 11 county-years for which the percentage of students 
entering the magnet high school, where the magnet high school is defined as having the 
highest average students’ entrance score and the highest high school entrance score cutoff 
line among all schools in the same county in the same year, having lower entrance score 
than this school’s cutoff line is higher than 30 percent. We also exclude 4 county-years 
where the percentage of regular students having high school entrance score higher than 
the highest cutoff line is extremely high, actually higher than 70%. Panel 2 in Table 4.1 
shows these county-years. According to the above definition of magnet school, we drop 4 
county-years for which the school with the highest mean high school entrance score is 
different from the school with the highest entrance score cutoff line, and 12 county-years 
where the cutoff lines of high school having the highest mean high school entrance score 
are missing. Panel 3 and panel 4 in Table 4.1 show these two groups of county-years.  
      Nearly 100 percent of students report a high school entrance exam score, but only 
59.01 percent of those with high school entrance exam scores also report a college 
entrance examination score.  Attrition could be due to the following reasons: the student 
dropped out, transferred to another school, or decided not to sit for the college entrance 
examination; or the school kept incomplete records. In this paper, besides students’ 
educational attainment, we also investigate the effects of entering magnet school on the 
students decisions to take college entrance exam, so we drop those county-years for 
which the schools might not keep the college entrance score of those students not 
admitted by colleges. Table 4.1 shows the percentage of students having missing college 
entrance and the percentages of students admitted or not admitted by colleges. Those 6 
county-years in panel 5 in Table 4.1 are most likely to keep college entrance scores only 
for students admitted by colleges either because the percentage of students having 
missing college entrance score is the same as (or very close to) the percentage of students 
not entering the colleges or because the percentage of students having college entrance 
score is very close to the percentage of students entering colleges. We also exclude these 
6 county-years.  Panel 6 in Table 4.1 shows 2 county-years having more than 45% 
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students with missing information of their gender; after these students are dropped; only 
information for one school is remained, so we drop these 2 county-years. We are left with 
a sample of 12035 students for 14 county-years which are shown in panel 7 in Table 4.1. 
      This survey collected information on students’ gender, birth year, year of high 
school entrance, high school entrance exam score, and college entrance examination 
score. The survey also collected data from schools on the high school entrance exam 
score cutoff line and school characteristics such as teachers’ education levels and school 
facilities. 
 
4.2.2 Variable definitions 
      Two treatment variables are defined. The variable treatment is assigned to equal 
one if the student attends the best school as defined above. The other variable eligible is 
assigned to equal one if the student’s high school entrance score is higher than the high 
school entrance exam cutoff line of the best school in the county-year.  While treatment 
more accurately reflects whether students attended better schools, it is more subject to 
selection bias. The coefficient on eligible should be viewed as capturing a lower bound 
estimate of the true treatment effect.  Our preferred estimate is one in which eligible is 
used as an instrument for treatment.   
      The high school entrance examination scores and college entrance examination 















=                      (4.2) 
 
      Here, HSijt is the high school entrance examination score for student i in county j 
who entered high school in year t, 
______
jtHS  is the mean high school and college entrance 
exam score for students in county j who entered high school in year t, and
jtHSSD  is 
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the standard deviation of high school entrance exam scores among students in county j 
who began high school in year t.  The variables in (4.2) are similarly defined, but for 
college entrance examination scores. The only difference is that there is an additional 
subscript p which is for the college exam type, which in China can be liberal arts, science, 
physical education, musical education, or arts education.  Thus, CSijpt is the college 
entrance examination score for student i entering high school in year t in county j taking 
test p.  
      Another educational attainment variable is an indicator variable for whether the 
student is qualified to attend college. In the survey, there is a question about whether the 
student actually enrolled in college but many answers to this question were missed. We 
therefore compares student’s college entrance exam score with the lowest college 
admission cutoff lines in Gansu Province in the year the student took the college entrance 
exam in order to determine whether the student qualified for college.3 This measure is 
similar to the eligibility variable in that it is not subject to selection biases associated with 
the student’s decision to actually attend college conditional on his or her entrance exam 
score being above the cutoff line. Such decisions will be influenced by credit constraints, 
family income and wealth, and parental expectations.   
      In this paper, student age at the time of entering high school is first calculated by 
subtracting students’ birth year from the year they entered high school. Unfortunately, 
there are many missing values for birth year.  We therefore impute student age by 
setting missing values to be equal to the average student age in the same school in the 
same year. In cases where age is missing for all students in the whole school, it is 
imputed to be equal to the mean student age of all students entering school in the same 
county in the same year. And if data is missing for all students in the county-year, then 
age is imputed to equal the average student age for all students in the sample entering 
high school in the same year.  
      Table 4.2 gives summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The 
upper panel is for all the students including those having and not having college entrance 
                                                 
3 The cutoff lines from different provinces come from 
http://www.eol.cn/include/cer.net/gaokao/zhuanti/2006_fenshuxian.shtml#2000. There are different lowest 




scores. Thirty eight percent of students are female, and the average age is 15.78.  Also, 
44 percent of students in the sample attend the best school in the county, while 50 percent 
are eligible to attend the best school in the county. The bottom panel shows the statistics 
for students whose college entrance scores are not missing. The mean value of their 
normalized college entrance scores is very close to zero. Forty nine percent of students 
qualify for college entrance. 35 percent are female, and the average age is 15.80. And 49 
percent of students in this sample attend the best school in the county, while 56 percent 
are eligible to attend the best school in the county. Comparing these two groups of 
students, we can see that the ratio of female students and the average age are similar, but 
the percentages of students entering the best high school or eligible to attend the best high 
school are 6 percent points higher in the smaller sample.  
 
4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Regression discontinuity design 
      We employ regression discontinuity design (RDD) to quantify the impact of 
school quality on educational attainment. First developed by Thistlethwaite and Campbell 
(1960), in recent years there has been renewed interest in identification issues that arise 
using RDD (Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw, 2001; Lee, 2004), estimation issues (Porter, 
2003), and RDD applications (Angrist and Lavy, 1999; van der Klaauw, 2002). 
      The basic regression model we employ is the following:  
*i i iuY Tβ α= + +  
1{ }i i SST = ≥  
      In the first equation, iY  is outcome variable, and iT is the treatment variable, 
which equals one if treated and zero otherwise. The second equation describes the 
selection rule: those who fall below some distinct cutoff point S are placed in the control 
group ( iT =0), whereas those on or above that point are placed in the treatment group 
( iT =1).  
      In regression discontinuity design, under the assumption that the conditional mean 
function E[u|S] is continuous at S , the treatment effect α  can be identified as follows:  
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      Intuitively, the treatment effects are identified by the sample of individuals within 
a very small interval around the cutoff point. Since these individuals have essentially the 
same 
iS  value, we can expect individuals just below the cutoff line on average to be 
very similar to individuals just above the cutoff line and thus to have similar average 
outcomes in the absence of the treatment as well as similar average outcomes when 
receiving treatment. With those to the right of the cutoff line receiving treatment and 
those to the left not, a comparison of the average outcomes of both groups should 
therefore provide a credible estimate of the treatment effect.  
      In the model, 
iS could be related to the outcome iY  which would cause iT  to 
be related to iY  as well.  This could cause OLS estimate of α to be inconsistent. One 
approach proposed by Heckman and Robb (1985) to estimate the treatment effect in this 
case is to specify and include the conditional mean function E[u| T, S] as a “control 
function” in the outcome equation. Therefore, in practice, the following equation is 
estimated:  
* ( )i i i ik SY Tβ α ω= + + +      (4.3) 
      As long as ( )
i
k S is continuous in S, identification can be guaranteed because of 
the discontinuity in the function T(S). In this paper, ( )
i
k S  is approximated by a 5 order 
polynomial function of the standardized high school entrance exam score, that is: 
5
1





≈ ∑  
      Lee (2003) proposes a direct test of the continuity assumption by checking 
whether there are discontinuities in the relationship between the treatment effect and any 
predetermined characteristics.  That is, the following equation can be estimated as a 
pre-assumption test:  
5
1
* * ji i i ij
j
SX Tφ ϕ μ ε
=
= + + +∑   (4.4) 
      If ϕ  is not significant, then the continuity assumption is valid. In this paper, 
student age and gender are two predetermined characteristics that can be tested.  
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4.3.2 Fuzzy regression discontinuity design and IV estimation 
      In the regression discontinuity design discussed above, treatment depends on the 
selection variable S in a deterministic way. However, in reality, it is more likely for 
treatment assignment to depend on S in a stochastic manner, which is called as fuzzy 
regression discontinuity design in the literature. In this case, OLS estimates of equation 
(4.3) are biased.  
      In our context, even after we apply an exclusion criteria to ensure that violations 
of the eligibility rule are less than 30% in the best school and exclude county-years where 
the percentages of regular students having high school entrance score higher than the 
cutoff line are high, there are still students in the best schools whose high school entrance 
exam scores are below the cutoff line and students not in the best schools whose scores 
are above the cutoff line. In this case, the OLS estimate of α  in equation (4.3) using the 
variable treatment is likely to be downward biased. In our used sample, i.e. 12035 
students, 19.06% students not in the best schools have high school entrance examination 
score above the cutoff line, but only 10.31% students in the best schools have high school 
entrance examination score below the cutoff line.  
      This is where the second treatment variable eligible can avoid the problems 
associated with bias caused by fuzzy discontinuity design.  The variable eligible itself 
does not suffer from fuzziness and so can be used to cleanly estimate a treatment effect.  
However, the impact of eligibility is not of primary policy interest, one wants to estimate 
the impact of actually attending better schools. To obtain an unbiased estimate of actually 
attending better schools, we can use eligible as an instrument for treatment.   
 
4.4 Student assignments 
      Students are assigned to magnet schools and regular schools according to their 
high school entrance examination score. Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of students 
with different high school entrance scores in magnet school and regular schools in 7 
counties used for analysis. In each panel, on the y-axis, a “one” indicates a student that is 
treated, i.e. enters a magnet school; while a “zero” indicates untreated students. In order 
to pool data from different years for each county, we create a variable that indicates each 
student’s score relative to its respective regional cutoff in each year, which is shown in 
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x-axis. Each dot in graphs on the left hand side in each panel represents each student. 
Each graph on the right hand side is nonparametric predication from a local polynomial 
smoother with degree equal to zero and bandwidth equal to 0.25. These figures highlight 
two things; one is that there are sharp changes in the probability to be treated close to the 
cutoff. We also conduct regressions of treatment on eligible after controlling for female 
dummy, age, county fixed effects, year fixed effects, and middle school fixed effects. 
Column (1) and column (5) in Table 4.3 show the estimated results for the whole sample 
and the sub-sample of students having college entrance scores respectively. A student 
eligible for magnet school is 58.8% (in the whole sample) or 57.9% (in the sub-sample) 
more likely to be treated, i.e. enroll in the magnet school.  
      However, the second thing we can see from these graphs is that, in practice, the 
strictness of implementation of cutoff line is different in different counties. From the 
figures, we know that the cutoff line should be implemented the most strictly in county 
16, 20, 26, and 29. Columns 9 and 10 in Table 4.1 show the percentage of magnet 
students having entrance score lower than cutoff line and the percentage of regular 
students having entrance score higher than cutoff line in each county-year. We can see 
large variations in these two percentages. In Panel 7 in Table 4.1 where the county-years 
are used for analysis in this paper, we can see that there are 28.87% magnet students 
having high school entrance score lower than cutoff line in county 28 in year 2000; but in 
county 16 in year 1997, county 16 in 1999, and county 29 in 1998, there are no magnet 
students having high school entrance score lower than cutoff line. We can also see that 
39.47% regular students in county 19 in year 2000 have higher high school entrance 
examination score than cutoff line; this percentage is the highest among all 14 
county-year in Panel 7 in Table 4.1; however, in county 16 in 2001, only 2.64% regular 
students have high school entrance score higher than the cutoff line. Because of this 
fuzziness in the implementation of cutoff lines, in the following analysis, our preferred 
results come from the regressions using eligible as an instrument for treatment.  
 
4.5 Results  
4.5.1 Pre-assumption tests 
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      We first report results for the pre-assumption tests that test whether sex or age 
jumps in a discontinuous fashion at the high school entrance exam cutoff line. In Figure 
4.2, the x-axis measures the difference between the standardized high school entrance 
exam scores and the standardized cutoff line in the same county in the same year; the 
y-axis in Panel A measures the proportion of students that are female, while the y-axis in 
Panel B measures the students’ age. The graph on the left hand side in each panel is from 
the whole sample, but the graph on the right hand side in each panel is from the 
sub-sample including students with college entrance scores. The curve in each graph is 
nonparametric prediction from local polynomial smoother with degree 0 and bandwidth 
0.25. We can see that for female proportion and student age, whether we use the whole 
sample or the sub-sample, there is no jump at x=0, where the high school entrance 
examination score is equal to the cutoff line. These figures provide support for the 
validity of the regression discontinuity design.  
      Table 4.4 presents the regression results for the pre-assumption tests. Columns 
(1)-(4) are for the whole sample, and columns (5)-(8) are for the sub-sample of students 
with college entrance scores. In the regression specifications, we control for a 5th-order 
polynomial function of the normalized high school entrance score, county fixed effects, 
year fixed effects and middle school fixed effects. Columns (1), (3), (5) and (7) present 
results for OLS regressions of female and age on eligible; while columns (2), (4), (6) and 
(8) present results for regressions of female and age on treatment using eligible as IV. 
From the table, we can see that, the coefficients before female and age are not statistically 
significant, whether they are estimated using OLS or IV regression. These results again 
show that the students’ pre-characteristics are continuous at the cutoff line. 
 
4.5.2 Treatment effects 
      Figure 4.3 plots three outcome variables, i.e. index for having college entrance 
scores, normalized college entrance scores, and index for college eligibility as a function 
of the normalized high school entrance exam score relative to cutoff lines.  Each graph 
is nonparametric prediction from local polynomial smoother with degree 0 and 
bandwidth 0.5.  
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      Panel A in Figure 4.3 presents the estimates of the index for having college 
entrance scores. When the students are treated and untreated, i.e. the curve on the left and 
the curve on the right,  the proportion of students having college entrance score is 
continuous, but there is a gap between these two curves at x=0 by a magnitude of roughly 
0.05; and the curve representing untreated students is above the curve representing 
treated students. It means entering magnet school might reduce the probability to take 
college entrance examination. Panel B in Figure 4.3 presents a similar graph for 
normalized college entrance score. The curve of treated students is above the curve of 
untreated students at x=0; the gap is roughly equal to 0.3, which implies a 0.3 standard 
deviation increase in college entrance examination score. Panel C also presents a similar 
graph for the index of college eligibility. From the graph, we can also see that the curve 
of treated students is above the curve of untreated students at x=0; the gap is roughly 
equal to 0.2, which implies a 20% increase in qualifying college. These pictures provide 
rough visual estimates of the size of the treatment effect using RDD. 
 
4.5.2.0 First stage results 
      Table 4.3 also presents the first stage regression results. Columns (2), (3) and (4) 
are the results using the whole sample; columns (6), (7) and (8) are the results using the 
sub-sample of students having college entrance examination scores. In all the 
specifications, county fixed effects, year fixed effects and 5 order polynomial function of 
normalized high school entrance score are controlled for. In columns (2) and (6), we do 
not control for other variables; in columns (3) and (7), we control for sex and age; in 
column (4) and (8), we control for sex, age and middle school fixed effects.  The last 
row of Table 4.3 presents F-value of the null hypothesis that the coefficient of eligible is 
equal to zero.  
      For the whole sample, all three coefficients of eligible are statistically significant 
at 1% level, with the magnitude of 0.468, 0.469 and 0.381. The F-value is equal to 
1344.91, 1346.00 and 962.89. It shows that for the whole sample, eligible can be used as 
a valid IV for treatment. For the sub-sample, from Table 4.3, we can also see that all 
three coefficients of eligible are statistically significant at 1% level, with the magnitude 
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of 0.492, 0.493 and 0.409. The corresponding F-values are 887.61, 889.56 and 643.21. 
These results also show that for the sub-sample, eligible is also a valid IV for treatment.  
 
4.5.2.1 Effects on students’ decision to take college entrance examination 
      Upper panel in Table 4.5 presents the estimates of effects of entering magnet 
school on students’ decision to take college entrance examination. Three types of 
specifications are estimated. The first one uses treatment as the independent variable of 
interest. The second one uses eligible as the key independent variable. The third uses 
eligible as an instrument for treatment, which is our preferred specification for the 
reasons described earlier.  In the upper panel, we control for county fixed effects and 
year fixed effects in all specifications. In columns 1 to 3, we control only for the 5-th 
order polynomial function of standardized high school entrance exam scores, and for the 
time-being do not control for gender, student age, or middle school fixed effects. All 
three coefficients for the treatment variables are negative and statistically significantly 
different from zero, with magnitudes of -0.046, -0.067, and -0.143. As expected, the IV 
estimate is larger than both OLS estimates. The estimates using treatment as the variable 
of interest produce the smallest treatment effect magnitudes. Columns 4 to 6 present 
estimates from specifications that control for sex and student age. There are just trivial 
changes in the coefficients, changing to -0.046, -0.066 and -0.141. Columns 7 to 9 
present results adding controls for which middle school the student attended. In this case, 
the impact of treatment changes to -0.056 (column 7), the impact of eligible falls to 
-0.057 (column 8); but the IV estimate of the treatment effect does not change much, 
becoming -0.149 (column 9). One interpretation for the negative treatment effects is 
because the RDD is comparing students just above the cutoff line and students just below 
the cutoff line. For the students with score just above the cutoff line and entering the 
magnet school, they could be the worst students in the best school; but for those students 
with score just below the cutoff line and entering the regular school, they could be the 
best students in the regular school. Therefore, it is very possible for the worst students in 
the best school to give up taking college entrance examination when they think their 
chance to be admitted is low. But those best students in the regular schools would decide 
to take college entrance examination because they are the best in their schools. In the 
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bottom panel, we conduct a regression of index for taking college entrance examination 
on treatment, normalized high school entrance score, the interaction of treatment and 
normalized high school entrance score. As the upper panel, we use three different 
specifications, i.e. not controlling for sex, age, or middle school fixed effects, controlling 
for sex, age, and controlling for sex, age and middle school fixed effects. We can see the 
IV estimates, which are preferred. All the coefficients before treatment are statistically 
negative, all the coefficients before the interaction of treatment and normalized high 
school entrance score are also statistically negative, but the coefficients of normalized 
high school entrance score are statistically positive. It shows that given the save high 
school entrance score, the probability to take college entrance examination is higher for 
students entering regular schools, which explain why the estimates from RDD are 
negative, which identify the probability difference between treated students and untreated 
students at the cutoff line.  
 
4.5.2.2 Effects on students’ college entrance score and college eligibility 
      Table 4.6 presents the estimates of effects of entering magnet school on students’ 
college entrance examination score and students’ probability of qualifying to enter 
college. Three types of specifications are estimated. The first uses treatment as the 
independent variable of interest. The second one uses eligible as the key independent 
variable. The third uses eligible as an instrument for treatment, which is our preferred 
specification for the reasons described earlier.  In all the specifications, we control for 
county fixed effects and year fixed effects. One caveat we need to bear in mind is that, 
since only students taking college exam are used for analysis, therefore, all the results in 
Table 4.6 should be interpreted as effects of school quality conditional on students’ 
decision to take college entrance exam. In columns 1 to 3, we control only for the 5-th 
order polynomial function of standardized high school entrance exam scores, and for the 
time-being do not control for gender, student age, or middle school fixed effects. All 
three coefficients for the treatment variables are positive and statistically significantly 
different from zero, with magnitudes of 0.110, 0.124, and 0.252. As expected, the IV 
estimate is larger than both OLS estimates. The estimates using treatment as the variable 
of interest produce the smallest treatment effect magnitudes. Columns 4 to 6 present 
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estimates from specifications that control for sex and student age. There are just trivial 
changes in the coefficients, changing to 0.108, 0.126 and 0.255. Columns 7 to 9 present 
results adding controls for which middle school the student attended. In this case, the 
impact of treatment decreases to 0.089 (column 7), the impact of eligible falls to 0.105 
(column 8); but the IV estimate of the treatment effect is 0.256(column 9), slightly higher 
than the previous two specifications. The results show that entering magnet school can 
increase the students’ college entrance examination score by 0.256 standard deviation.  
      The bottom panel of Table 4.6 shows similar results on the impact of school 
quality on students’ probability of qualifying to enter college. In these regressions, county 
fixed effects and year fixed effects are controlled for. In the simplest specification 
(columns 1 to 3), the effect of treatment is 0.058, the effect of eligible is 0.104, and the 
IV estimate is 0.212. Again, as expected the largest estimate is the IV estimate. 
Controlling for gender dummy or student ages slightly changes estimation results 
(columns 4 to 6); the effect of treatment decreases to 0.057, the effect of eligible 
increases to 0.105, and the IV estimate increases to 0.214.  After adding middle school 
fixed effects, just as for college entrance exam scores, the effect of treatment decreases 
(to 0.045), the effect of eligible decreases (to 0.092), and the IV treatment effect estimate 
increases (to 0.225). Thus, attending a better high school increases the probability of 
qualifying for college entrance by 22.5 percent. 
      In practice, the unconditional effects of school quality on the students’ probability 
to be admitted by colleges might be more of interest since students not taking college 
entrance exam would usually thought of as not being admitted by colleges and therefore 
the unconditional school’s effects are more relevant with policy analysis. In Table 4.7, we 
define all students not taking college entrance exam as not being admitted by colleges, 
and then re-estimate the impacts of school quality on students’ probability of qualifying 
to enter college using the same specifications as in Table 4.6. Columns 1 to 3 show the 
results from the simplest specification in which we only control for county fixed effects, 
year fixed effects and 5th order polynomial terms. The effect of treatment is 0.015 
(column 1), the effect of eligible is 0.057 (column 2), and the IV estimate is 0.114. 
Controlling for gender dummy or student ages almost does not change estimation results 
(columns 4 to 6); the effect of treatment decreases to 0.014, the effect of eligible 
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increases to 0.058, and the IV estimate increases to 0.116. After adding middle school 
fixed effects, we get the more reliable estimates. The effect of treatment decreases -0.001, 
the effect of eligible decreases to 0.048, and the IV estimate increases to 0.120. As 
discussed in the above, entering a better high school can (unconditionally) increase the 
probability of qualifying for college entrance by 12 percent.  
   
4.5.2.3 Effects of school quality within narrow bands of the selection threshold 
      Table 4.8 shows the results using students with high school entrance examination 
scores within different neighborhoods around the cutoff lines in their counties in the year 
they entered high school. There are three panels in Table 4.8; the upper panel shows 
results for the index of having college entrance examination scores, the middle panel 
shows results for the normalized college entrance examination scores, and the bottom 
panel shows the results for the probability of qualifying to enter colleges. Since we only 
use the sample within the neighborhood around the cutoff lines, we do not include 5-th 
order polynomial function of standardized high school entrance examination scores. As in 
Table 4.6, we control for county fixed effects and year fixed effects for all the 
specifications. For each specification, we use three different bands of the selection 
thresholds: 1.5, 1 and 0.5 standard deviations of high school entrance examination scores. 
Specifically, we estimate the effects of school quality using students with high school 
entrance examination scores within neighborhoods with different bands around the cutoff 
lines in each county-year. Here, we just present the preferred IV estimates. The first thing 
we know from Table 4.8 is that all the estimates are statistically significant from zero, 
and most of them are at 1% level.  
      In column (1)-(3), we do not control for other variables. In the upper panel, we 
can see that with the band of neighborhood becoming from 1.5 standard deviations to 0.5 
standard deviation, the coefficient is changing from 0.099 to 0.047, and then to -0.071. In 
column (4)-(6), we control for sex and age. Compared with the first three columns, the 
magnitude of the coefficient is almost the same, and the coefficient changes from 0.096 
to 0.045, then to -0.072.  If sex, age and middle school fixed effects are controlled 
(column (7)-(9)), we can see that the coefficient becomes smaller; with the band 
becoming narrower, the coefficient changes from 0.085 to 0.038, then to -0.090. One 
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possible reason for the decrease in the treatment effects might be: with the neighborhood 
becoming narrower and narrower, the qualities of students in the magnet schools become 
worse and worse but the qualities of students in the regular schools become better and 
better relative to other students in the same school, therefore, the probability of students 
in magnet school to take college entrance examination becomes from higher than the 
probability of students in regular schools to lower. 
      The middle panel presents results for normalized college entrance scores. In 
column (1)-(3) where we only control for county fixed effects and year fixed effects, the 
treatment effect decreases from 1.028 to 0.835, then to 0.629 with the band of 
neighborhood changing from 1.5 standard deviations to 1 standard deviation, then to 0.5 
deviation. After sex and age are added, there are only slight changes to the results; when 
the band is 1.5 standard deviations (column (4)), the treatment effect is 1.026; when the 
band is 1 standard deviation (column(5)), the treatment effect is 0.833; and when the 
band is 0.5 standard deviation (column(6)), the treatment effect is 0.628. If we add sex, 
age and middle school fixed effects, the treatment effects increase a little bit; they are 
1.101 with band of 1.5 standard deviations (column(7)), 0.916 with band of 1 standard 
deviation (column(8)) and 0.752 with band of 0.5 standard deviation (column(9)). From 
graph in Panel B in Figure 4.3, we can see that the college entrance examination score is 
a positive function of high school entrance score; therefore, with the band of 
neighborhood around the cutoff line becoming narrower, the difference between the mean 
value of treated students’ college entrance score becomes smaller.  
      The bottom panel presents results for the probability of qualifying to enter college. 
In column (1)-(3) where we only control for county fixed effects and year fixed effects, 
the treatment effect decreases from 0.517 to 0.438, then to 0.335 with the band of 
neighborhood changing from 1.5 standard deviations to 1 standard deviation, then to 0.5 
deviation. After sex and age are added, there are only slight changes to the results; when 
the band is 1.5 standard deviations (column (4)), the treatment effect is 0.516; when the 
band is 1 standard deviation (column(5)), the treatment effect is 0.437; and when the 
band is 0.5 standard deviation (column(6)), the treatment effect is 0.335. If we add sex, 
age and middle school fixed effects, the treatment effects increase a little bit; they are 
0.555 with band of 1.5 standard deviations (column(7)), 0.483 with band of 1 standard 
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deviation (column(8)) and 0.404 with band of 0.5 standard deviation (column(9)). The 
reason for the decrease of treatment effects with the decrease in the band of neighborhood 
around the cutoff line is the same as that discussed in the last paragraph.   
 
4.6 Magnet schools versus regular schools 
      A remaining question in interpreting our results of a positive effect of better 
quality schools on learning is, in what dimensions do magnet schools actually differ from 
regular schools? The school questionnaire provides annual information on a variety of 
school characteristics that can inform the answer to this question.  We measure school 
quality for an entering class by the 4-year average values of school indicators that span 
the years that they attended the school.  For example, for students starting high school in 
September 1997 and graduating in June 2000, we take mean values for the years 1997 to 
2000.   
      Table4.9 presents summary statistics on 3 groups of school variables for both 
magnet and regular schools, and for each of the 7 counties investigated. The upper panel 
shows the share of teachers with different teacher rankings. These rankings reflect 
systematic, multidimensional annual evaluations of teacher performance by school 
principals, fellow teachers, and students.  The ratios of teachers having advanced and 
first class titles in magnet schools are much higher than those in regular schools, while 
the ratios of those with second and third class titles is much lower. The middle panel 
shows the ratios of teachers with different education levels in each county. In magnet 
schools, the ratios of teachers with four-year college education are much higher than 
regular schools while the ratio of teachers with three-year college education level in 
regular schools is much higher than in magnet schools, with the exception of one county. 
In both types of schools, the ratio of teachers with secondary specialized schooling and 
high school education are very similar. Finally, the bottom panel describes the basic 
endowments of schools. Magnet schools have larger total area, larger building areas, 
better equipment, and more library books.  
      Table 4.10 presents simple regression-based comparisons between magnet and 
regular schools. From the upper panel, we can see that the share of teachers with 
advanced titles in magnet schools is 0.151 higher than in regular schools, the share of 
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teachers with first class titles in good schools is 0.092 higher than that in bad schools. 
However, the shares of teachers with second and third class titles are 0.093 and 0.049 
greater in regular schools.  All of these differences are statistically significant. In the 
middle panel, we see that the share of teachers with four-year college education is 0.402 
higher in magnet schools than in regular schools, while the share of teachers with 
three-year college is higher in regular schools by 0.399 (both statistically significant at 
the 1% level). However, there are not significant differences in the share of teachers with 
secondary specialized schooling or who are high school graduates. The bottom panel 
examines school endowments. Magnet schools are larger than regular schools by 57.63 
thousand square meters, their building area is larger by 13.65 thousand square meters, the 
number of library books is 72,770 greater, and the probability for equipments to achieve 
national criteria is 0.451 greater. All differences in the bottom panel are significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level except for equipment quality, which is significant at 
the 5% significance level.  
      Because we only are able to estimate treatment effects for 7 counties, we are 
unable to credibly identify the relative contribution of different school characteristics in a 
multivariate framework.  It does appear that magnet schools are clearly advantaged with 
respect to teacher quality, physical infrastructure, and equipment.  Unfortunately, further 
analysis of what school inputs really matter for learning is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
      Whether higher school quality can improve students’ education achievements is a 
very important and highly debated question in the economics of education. This paper 
uses China’s magnet school system and a regression discontinuity design approach to 
credibly estimate the effects of higher school quality on students’ education 
achievements.   
      Using data from seven counties in Gansu province in China, according to our 
preferred estimates which control for sex, age and middle school attended, we find that 
attending a magnet high school can decrease students’ probability to take college 
entrance examination by 14.9 percent, but increase students’ college entrance score by 
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0.256 standard deviation and increase students’ probability of qualifying for college by 
































Figure 4.1 Student assignment 
 









































































































































































































































































Figure 4.2 Pre-assumption test 
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Panel B Student age 
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Figure 4.3 Effects of school quality 
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1               
11 1999 1 486 NA NA 619.08 100.00% NA NA 46.50% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
11 2001 1 313 NA NA 597.27 100.00% NA NA 22.04% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
12 1997 1 29 NA NA 370.66 100.00% NA NA 10.34% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
12 1998 1 29 NA NA 381.52 100.00% NA NA 17.24% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
12 2001 1 426 587 587 568.49 100.00% 54.69% NA 19.01% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
13 1999 1 623 520 520 597.80 100.00% 0.16% NA 54.41% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
13 2000 1 943 580 580 591.28 100.00% 38.60% NA 48.78% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
13 2001 1 1107 560 560 597.85 100.00% 13.73% NA 43.72% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
20 1999 1 196 444 444 486.08 100.00% 11.73% NA 30.10% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
23 1997 1 350 575 575 568.72 100.00% 54.86% NA 63.14% 0.00% 36.86% 63.14% 0.00% 
23 1998 1 349 574 574 583.74 100.00% 35.53% NA 51.29% 0.00% 48.71% 51.29% 0.00% 
23 1999 1 352 580 580 592.85 100.00% 27.84% NA 53.69% 0.00% 46.31% 53.69% 0.00% 
23 2001 1 363 589 589 590.90 100.00% 42.15% NA 62.81% 0.00% 37.19% 62.81% 0.00% 
24 1999 1 384 498.5 498.5 531.96 100.00% 20.57% NA 40.89% 14.32% 44.79% 40.89% 0.00% 
24 2000 1 456 509 509 547.66 100.00% 21.49% NA 22.15% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
27 1997 1 22 578 578 551.32 100.00% 77.27% NA 77.27% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
27 1998 1 24 490 490 538.58 100.00% 0.00% NA 62.50% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
28 1999 1 584 566.5 566.5 557.35 100.00% 41.27% NA 6.34% 25.51% 68.15% 6.34% 0.00% 
30 1997 1 443 NA NA 510.30 100.00% NA NA 34.76% 42.89% 22.35% 34.76% 0.00% 
30 1999 1 621 NA NA 539.86 100.00% NA NA 8.86% 28.50% 62.64% 8.86% 0.00% 
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30 2000 1 502 NA NA 591.94 100.00% NA NA 85.26% 0.00% 14.74% 85.26% 0.00% 
Panel 
2               
17 1997 4 488 545 545 432.87 41.19% 92.04% 3.48% 59.63% 25.82% 5.33% 68.85% 0.00% 
17 1998 4 352 540 540 462.84 28.13% 79.80% 8.70% 69.60% 0.28% 1.42% 98.30% 0.00% 
17 1999 4 512 558 558 500.20 37.30% 80.10% 3.12% 56.25% 21.68% 22.07% 56.25% 0.00% 
17 2000 4 544 564 564 490.39 38.42% 87.56% 2.69% 48.71% 22.79% 28.49% 48.71% 0.00% 
17 2001 5 627 560 560 519.96 31.74% 71.86% 3.74% 35.25% 47.21% 17.54% 35.25% 0.00% 
18 1998 10 485 576.5 576.5 574.15 41.44% 44.78% 1.76% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
18 2000 10 784 565 565 565.70 44.52% 40.69% 9.43% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
19 2001 5 2279 545 545 548.38 41.55% 39.28% 36.64% 17.11% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.04% 
20 2001 5 1630 562 562 574.11 31.04% 32.41% 14.59% 41.23% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 75.09% 
22 2001 2 315 400 400 442.58 85.40% 30.48% 6.52% 82.86% 82.86% 17.14% 0.00% 0.00% 
28 2001 2 1479 561.5 561.5 533.74 50.71% 71.33% 2.06% 41.31% 0.95% 14.54% 84.52% 0.00% 
24 2001 2 513 504 504 559.68 63.35% 0.31% 100.00% 22.42% 10.72% 37.04% 52.24% 0.00% 
25 2001 2 581 406 406 475.23 22.55% 6.11% 100.00% 58.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
26 1998 2 408 488 488 553.43 76.96% 3.50% 79.79% 53.68% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
27 2000 2 104 430 430 488.41 25.96% 0.00% 76.62% 41.35% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
Panel 
3               
19 1997 5 1252 510 431 499.91 13.74% 0.00% 65.93% 26.36% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
19 1998 5 1291 510 480 557.76 13.56% 3.43% 68.10% 21.84% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
19 1999 5 1460 530 500 551.04 15.48% 0.00% 59.00% 19.73% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 47.88% 
20 1997 5 1092 490 485 506.93 36.36% 28.46% 14.68% 50.09% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
Panel 
4               
15 1998 4 1352 432 NA 571.64 34.76% NA NA 40.83% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
15 1999 4 1274 408 NA 583.30 33.36% NA NA 26.14% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
15 2000 4 1628 417 NA 605.39 29.79% NA NA 30.22% 24.57% 45.21% 30.22% 0.00% 
15 2001 4 1741 517 NA 594.90 40.61% NA NA 40.84% 0.00% 59.16% 40.84% 0.00% 
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27 2001 2 474 431 NA 520.08 88.82% NA NA 46.84% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
28 1997 4 644 551 NA 544.43 20.81% NA NA 31.52% 24.53% 12.27% 63.20% 0.00% 
28 1998 2 737 588.5 NA 587.24 26.87% NA NA 8.82% 44.78% 21.57% 33.65% 0.00% 
29 1999 2 425 380 NA 537.35 80.24% NA NA 23.29% 43.53% 32.00% 24.47% 0.00% 
29 2000 3 775 480 NA 531.89 65.03% NA NA 6.84% 6.71% 0.65% 92.65% 0.00% 
29 2001 3 1159 490 NA 514.36 63.93% NA NA 13.11% 32.01% 28.82% 39.17% 0.00% 
30 1998 2 720 NA NA 590.60 49.86% NA NA 68.61% 8.47% 22.92% 68.61% 0.00% 
30 2001 2 1359 NA NA 572.82 50.18% NA NA 24.87% 0.00% 25.75% 74.25% 0.00% 
Panel 
5               
21 1999 2 507 456 456 495.54 75.35% 25.92% 24.80% 55.42% 55.23% 44.58% 0.20% 0.00% 
21 2000 3 855 478.5 478.5 519.37 63.63% 8.46% 12.54% 45.96% 45.85% 54.04% 0.12% 0.00% 
21 2001 2 875 412 412 492.86 77.14% 3.56% 61.00% 41.83% 41.14% 58.17% 0.69% 0.00% 
22 1999 2 159 375 375 445.50 86.79% 17.39% 47.62% 47.17% 47.17% 52.83% 0.00% 0.00% 
22 2000 2 179 390 390 435.07 86.59% 27.10% 41.67% 53.63% 53.63% 46.37% 0.00% 0.00% 
23 2000 2 508 583 583 601.29 66.14% 19.94% 36.63% 62.01% 6.50% 31.50% 62.01% 0.00% 
Panel 
6               
20 2000 5 1270 516 516 568.97 41.18% 5.93% 49.40% 19.37% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 74.25% 
25 2000 2 577 490 490 572.59 54.94% 0.00% 25.00% 49.05% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 45.06% 
Panel 
7               
16 1997 3 531 560 560 597.35 51.32% 0.00% 3.86% 68.42% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
16 1998 5 1195 564 564 613.75 27.28% 1.53% 8.52% 64.69% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
16 1999 4 762 554.5 554.5 609.19 42.52% 0.00% 12.56% 56.96% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
16 2000 3 784 560 560 599.59 34.69% 1.10% 8.98% 44.64% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
16 2001 3 1032 568 568 597.85 37.75% 0.00% 2.64% 34.85% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
18 1997 9 463 530 530 547.49 46.44% 26.51% 13.71% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
18 1999 9 593 540 540 557.81 43.34% 22.96% 30.65% 100.00% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
19 2000 5 1805 540 540 566.20 39.26% 18.90% 39.47% 18.72% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
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20 1998 5 1137 518.5 518.5 558.14 34.92% 14.61% 16.62% 51.36% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
26 1999 3 391 543 543 579.95 55.87% 0.91% 34.68% 46.68% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
26 2001 3 812 532 532 575.38 47.60% 1.03% 22.77% 46.62% 0.00% 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 
28 2000 4 1572 553 553 563.09 48.47% 28.87% 23.70% 25.45% 11.64% 17.94% 70.42% 0.00% 
29 1997 2 386 438 438 501.42 81.09% 2.56% 35.62% 25.91% 40.67% 33.16% 25.91% 0.00% 
29 1998 2 572 430 430 495.91 86.21% 0.00% 10.13% 13.09% 69.28% 17.45% 13.09% 0.00% 
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college Female Age Treatment Eligible
All students       
Mean NA NA 0.38  15.78  0.44  0.50  
S.D. NA NA 0.48  0.36  0.50  0.50  
Observation NA NA 12035 12035 12035 12035 
Students having college entrance 
score      
Mean 0.00  0.49  0.35  15.80  0.49  0.56  
S.D. 1.00  0.50  0.48  0.39  0.50  0.50  
Observation 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 
(1) Treatment =1 if the student enters good high school, which is defined as the school whose students' 
average entering grade is the highest in this county and year 
































Table 4.3 School assignments and the first stage regressions 
Dependent variable: 
treatment         
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Eligible 0.588 0.468 0.469 0.381 0.579 0.492 0.493 0.409 
 (0.007)*** (0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.012)*** (0.009)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.016)***
Female YES NO YES YES YES NO YES YES 
Age YES NO YES YES YES NO YES YES 
County fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Middle school fixed 
effects YES NO NO YES YES NO NO YES 
5 order of polynomial 
terms 
of normalized high school 
entrance score NO YES YES YES NO YES YES YES 
Observations 12035 12035 12035 12035 7102 7102 7102 7102 
R-squared 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.60 0.57 0.53 0.53 0.59 
F value (Eligible=0) 7189.60 1344.91 1346.00 962.89 3920.22 887.61 889.56 643.21
Standard errors in parentheses 










Table 4.4 Pre-assumption tests  










Eligible 0.012  0.018  0.026  -0.002  
 (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.023)  (0.018)  
Treatment(Eligible 
as IV)  0.031  0.048  0.063  -0.006
  (0.049)  (0.034)  (0.057)  (0.044)
5 order of 
polynomial terms 
of normalized high 
school entrance 
score YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Middle school fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 12035 12035 12035 12035 7102 7102 7102 7102 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.17 0.17  0.05 0.05 0.13 0.13 
Standard errors in parentheses 

















Table 4.5 Effects of school quality on students' decision to take college entrance examination 
 Dependent Variable : Taking college entrance examination=1            
Treatment  -0.046    -0.046   -0.056   
 (0.011)***   (0.011)***   (0.012)***   
Eligible  -0.067   -0.066   -0.057  
  (0.017)***   (0.017)***   (0.017)***  
Treatment (Eligible as IV)   -0.143   -0.141   -0.149 
   (0.036)***   (0.036)***   (0.045)***
Female NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Age NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Middle school fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
5 order of polynomial terms of normalized 
high school entrance score YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.20 
          
 Dependent Variable : Taking college entrance examination=1        
Treatment  -0.044    -0.045   -0.054   
 (0.011)***   (0.011)***   (0.012)***   
Treatment*Normalized high school 
entrance score 0.011   0.010   0.034   
 (0.011)   (0.011)   (0.011)***   
Eligible   -0.025   -0.025   -0.024  
  (0.015)   (0.015)   (0.015)  
Eligible*Normalized high school  
entrance score  -0.049   -0.051   -0.016  
  (0.014)***   (0.014)***   (0.015)  
Treatment (Eligible as IV)   -0.059   -0.060   -0.058 
   (0.027)**   (0.027)**   (0.031)* 
Treatment*Normalized high school 
entrance score (Eligible*Normalized high 
school entrance score as IV)   -0.051   -0.054   -0.008 
   (0.021)**   (0.021)***   (0.022) 
Normalized high school entrance score 0.081 0.103 0.112 0.081 0.103 0.112 0.055 0.072 0.074 
 (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)***
Female NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Imputed age NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
 
164
Middle school fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
County fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES  YES YES 
Observations 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.15  0.16 0.16 0.15  0.20 0.20 0.20 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note:          
(1) Treatment =1 if the student enters good high school, which is defined as the school whose students' average entering grade is the highest in this county and year 


























Table 4.6 Effects of school quality on students' college entrance score and college eligibility 
 Dependent Variable : Normalized Gaokao Grade          
Treatment  0.110    0.108   0.089   
 (0.029)***   (0.029)***   (0.031)***   
Eligible  0.124   0.126   0.105  
  (0.042)***   (0.042)***   (0.043)**  
Treatment 
(Eligible as IV)   0.252   0.255   0.256 
   (0.086)***   (0.086)***   (0.106)** 
Female NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Imputed age NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Middle school 
fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 




entrance score YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County fixed 
effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 
R-squared 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.26 0.26 0.26 
          
 Dependent Variable : College entrance score is higher than lowest cutoff line=1      
Treatment  0.058      0.057      0.045     
 (0.014)***   (0.014)***   (0.016)***   
Eligible   0.104   0.105   0.092  
  (0.021)***   (0.021)***   (0.022)***  
Treatment 
(Eligible as IV)   0.212   0.214   0.225 
   (0.043)***   (0.043)***   (0.054)***
Female NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Imputed age NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 








entrance score YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
County fixed 
effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 7102 
R-squared 0.22 0.23 0.21  0.23 0.23 0.21  0.25 0.25 0.23 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Note:          
(1) Treatment =1 if the student enters good high school, which is defined as the school whose students' average entering grade is the highest in this county 
and year 



















Table 4.7 Unconditional effects of entering good school on the probability to enter college 
Dependent Variable : College entrance score is higher than lowest cutoff line=1  
Treatment  0.015   0.014 -0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Eligible 0.057 0.058 0.048 
(0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)***
Treatment 
(Eligible as IV) 0.114 0.116 0.120 
(0.033)*** (0.033)*** (0.042)***
Female NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Imputed age NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Middle school fixed effect NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
County fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
5 order polynomial 
function of normalized 
high school entrance score YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 12035 
R-squared 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.20 0.20 0.19 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(1) Treatment =1 if the student enters good high school, which is defined as the school whose students' average entering grade is the highest in this 
county and year 
      Eligible=1 if the student's entering grade is higher than the cutoff line of the good high school defined above 











Table 4.8 Effects of school quality on students' performance in different neighborhood 
 Dependent Variable : Having college entrance score=1          
 1.5 S.D. 1 S.D. 0.5 S.D. 1.5 S.D. 1 S.D. 0.5 S.D. 1.5 S.D. 1 S.D. 0.5 S.D. 
Treatment 
(Eligible as IV) 0.099 0.047 -0.071 0.096 0.045 -0.072 0.085 0.038 -0.090 
 (0.014)*** (0.017)*** (0.031)** (0.014)*** (0.017)*** (0.031)** (0.018)*** (0.021)* (0.039)** 
Female NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Imputed age NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Middle school fixed 
effect NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Observations 10107 7885 4277 10107 7885 4277 10107 7885 4277 
R-squared 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.20 
          
 Dependent Variable : Normalized college entrance score     
 1.5 S.D. 1 S.D. 0.5 S.D. 1.5 S.D. 1 S.D. 0.5 S.D. 1.5 S.D. 1 S.D. 0.5 S.D. 
Treatment 
(Eligible as IV) 1.028 0.835 0.629 1.026 0.833 0.628 1.101 0.916 0.752 
 (0.039)*** (0.045)*** (0.075)*** (0.039)*** (0.045)*** (0.075)*** (0.049)*** (0.056)*** (0.101)*** 
Female NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Imputed age NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Middle school fixed 
effect NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Observations 6188 4881 2642 6188 4881 2642 6188 4881 2642 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.09 
          
 Dependent Variable : College entrance score is higher than lowest cutoff line=1      
 1.5 S.D. 1 S.D. 0.5 S.D. 1.5 S.D. 1 S.D. 0.5 S.D. 1.5 S.D. 1 S.D. 0.5 S.D. 
Treatment 
(Eligible as IV) 0.517 0.438 0.335 0.516 0.437 0.335 0.555 0.483 0.404 
 (0.020)*** (0.024)*** (0.041)*** (0.020)*** (0.024)*** (0.041)*** (0.025)*** (0.030)*** (0.056)*** 
Female NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Imputed age NO NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Middle school fixed 
effect NO NO NO NO NO NO YES YES YES 
Observations 6188 4881 2642 6188 4881 2642 6188 4881 2642 
R-squared 0.07 0.06 0.09  0.07 0.06 0.09  0.09 0.09 0.13 
Standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
(1) Treatment =1 if the student enters good high school, which is defined as the school whose students' average entering grade is the highest in this county and year 
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      Eligible=1 if the student's entering grade is higher than the cutoff line of the good high school defined above 
(2) Each regression above includes county fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
(3) S.D. is the standard deviation of high school entrance examination score 
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Table 4.9 Comparison between good schools and bad schools  
 Ratio of teachers with different titles 
 Advanced title First class title Second class title Third class title 
County Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad 
16 0.26  0.03  0.40  0.27  0.30  0.48  0.01  0.02  
18 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
19 0.17  0.03  0.38  0.38  0.36  0.50  0.00  0.07  
20 0.17  0.07  0.42  0.43  0.34  0.37  0.09  0.13  
26 0.12  0.04  0.40  0.36  0.45  0.39  0.03  0.18  
28 0.20  0.11  0.46  0.33  0.26  0.35  0.00  0.00  
29 0.04  NA 0.49  NA 0.43  NA 0.02  NA 
         
 Ratio of teachers with different education level  
 Four year college Three year college 
Secondary 
specialized school High school 
County Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad 
16 0.86  0.25  0.08  0.70  0.00  0.04  0.00  0.02  
18 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
19 0.63  0.32  0.37  0.68  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
20 0.75  0.28  0.25  0.68  NA 0.03  NA 0.02  
26 0.48  0.32  0.51  0.64  0.01  0.02  NA 0.03  
28 0.74  0.20  0.25  0.72  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.08  
29 0.31  0.38  0.58  0.63  0.08  NA 0.09  NA 
         
 School characteristics 
 
School area (Square 
meters) 
Building area (Square 
meters) Books 
Does equipment satisfy 
criteria 
County Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad 
16 122866  24822.48  25425.70 4698.19 127000 3566.34  1.00  0.50  
18 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
19 55360 18749.75  15486  7062.50 66250 28314.83  1.00  1.00  
20 53020 11534.25  6520  3719.31 9500 10336.13  0.00  0.25  
26 57276 26329  13500  6668.44 137000 5800  1.00  0.00  
28 47923 52000  28500  6009  22200 13494.63  NA 0.00  

















Table 4.10 Different characteristics between magnet schools and regular schools 
 Share of teachers with different titles 
 Advanced title First class title Second class title Third class title 
Magnet school 0.151 0.092 -0.093 -0.049 
 (0.019)*** (0.050)* (0.040)** (0.019)** 
County fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 37 39 39 38 
R-squared 0.72 0.23 0.28 0.51 
     







school High school 
Magnet school 0.402 -0.399 -0.020 -0.007 
 (0.071)*** (0.067)*** (0.015) (0.010) 
County fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 39 39 35 33 
R-squared 0.54 0.56 0.31 0.46 
     










Does equipment satisfy 
criteria 
Magnet school 5.763 1.365 7.277 0.451 
 (0.754)*** (0.154)*** (1.128)*** (0.177)** 
County fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
Year fixed 
effects YES YES YES YES 
Observations 39 39 38 34 
R-squared 0.71 0.76 0.63 0.42
Standard errors in parentheses 
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      My dissertation investigates human capital issues, including education and health, 
in China. In the first chapter, I test for evidence of an intra-household flypaper effect by 
evaluating the impact of an educational fee reduction reform in rural China on different 
categories of household expenditures. Using data from Gansu Province in China, I find 
that educational fee reductions were matched by increased voluntary educational 
spending on the same children receiving fee reductions, providing strong evidence of an 
intra-household flypaper effect. The second chapter investigates the long-term effects of 
China’s 1959-1961 famine. Using China’s 2000 population census data, I find that 
women affected by the famine in the first year of life were living in smaller houses, 
achieved lower level of education, and provided less labor in their adulthood. But there 
are no long term effects on men affected by the famine in their early years of life. In the 
third chapter, I investigate the impact of school quality on students’ educational 
attainment using a regression discontinuity research design that compares students just 
above and below entrance examination score thresholds that strictly determine admission 
to the best high schools in China’s rural counties. Using data from Gansu Province in 
China, I find that attending the best high school in one’s county of residence decreases 
the probability to take college entrance examination; increases college entrance scores 
and the probability of entering college.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
